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This thesis investigated healthcare regulation practice in Wales with the aim to evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of hospital inspection regimes implemented by the 
Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (HIW). Applying Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) realist 
theory-driven programme evaluation, the study interviewed 46 representatives from eight 
NHS organisations, five independent sector organisations and HIW.  
HIW draws on various mechanisms to direct, detect and enforce compliance with 
standards. The research found that, while some elements of HIW’s inspection regimes 
such as self-assessments seemingly eroded over time, others have contributed to 
regulatory effectiveness. Engaging healthcare managers in the standard development 
process has created common understanding and ownership. Professional independence 
and clinically-competent reviewers, who scrutinise healthcare provision, validate findings 
and give informed feedback, have added credibility to hospital inspections. Hospital 
managers generally appreciated external reviews as a ‘reality check’ or lever for change. 
Commitment to quality and the fear of exposure have motivated compliant behaviour 
amongst hospital managers.  
Differences exist in the regulation between NHS and independent hospitals in Wales. 
Managers seem to find it easier to comply with or exceed healthcare standards in small, 
specialised hospitals than in large NHS bodies with many hierarchical levels. Further, 
HIW inspections have effected positive change in both NHS and independent hospitals. 
However, there were examples of repeated negative inspection results in some NHS 
hospitals. This suggests that HIW’s impact on improvements in the NHS has been 
limited. 
The findings suggest that HIW’s inspection regimes can be improved by regularly 
reviewing inspection methods and tools, systematically monitoring improvement actions 
and carefully selecting reviewers with matching clinical skills. The study did not find a 
standard prescription for an ideal inspection regime. Conversely, regulatory 
effectiveness requires the inspectorate to strike the right balance between different 
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Acute hospital A hospital that provides medical treatment for illness, other than a 
mental disorder or palliative care.  
Compliance The act of meeting the requirements of accepted practices, 
prescribed rules, regulation, legislation or standards. Compliance is 
typically assessed and confirmed by a third party, which can be an 
independent or governmental body. 
Detection Actions that are ‘directed towards individual organizations, e.g. 
inspecting an organization’s performance in a particular area in 
relation to standard regulatory requirements’ (Hovlid, Høifødt, 
Smedbråten, & Braut, 2015, p. 2). 
Direction Actions that are ‘taken at a system level aiming to affect all the 
regulated organizations, e.g. developing health-care legislation and 
national guidelines for delivery of care’ (Hovlid et al., 2015, p. 2). 
Effectiveness The extent to which an organisation, programme or intervention 
achieves the intended goals, objectives and targets or a beneficial 
result. 
Efficiency The relation between the outputs and the inputs used. 
Enforcement Actions that are ‘taken at the individual organizational level to 
change their performance to comply with the legal requirements, 
e.g. when the inspecting organization follows up to make sure that 
necessary changes are implemented when nonconformities are 
encountered during an inspection’ (Hovlid et al., 2015, p. 2).  
Governance The process by which the members of a hospital board (or a similar 
governing body) establish policies and continuously monitor their 
implementation. 
Health Board An NHS organisation in Wales, also called Local Health Board, 
University Health Board or Teaching Health Board, that comprises 
functions of commissioning and providing healthcare to patients 
within certain geographical boundaries. 
Healthcare 
Commission 




Employees with managerial responsibilities working within an NHS, 
independent and other non-NHS healthcare organisation. This 
includes nursing directors of a LHB or NHS trust, hospital managers 
and ward managers. 
HIW reviewer Any regular member of an HIW inspection team. This includes HIW 
review managers, peer reviewers and lay reviewers. 
ix 
HIW manager HIW employees with managerial responsibilities. This includes the 
senior management team and review managers. 
Hospital In this study, a synonym for ‘acute hospital’. 
Impact Relates to all consequences of an intervention, determined after a 
considerable period of time. Impact is the result of a complex set of 




An acute hospital that is not operated by the National Health 
Service, but by organisations that provide health services purchased 




Employees with managerial responsibilities, who work at 
independent sector hospitals. In this study also referred to as 
‘independent managers’. 
Indicator A quantitative or qualitative variable used to describe, understand, 
compare, assess and evaluate or improve a system, process, 
project, organisation. Indicators typically relate to certain aspects of 
healthcare and management performance such as cost, quality and 
safety. 
Input Resources comprising personnel, materials, equipment, information 
and money, which are put in a process and which typically can be 
quantified. 
Inspection ‘A mechanism of external oversight whereby experts make periodic 
visits to a regulated organisation in order to assess its performance’ 
(Sutherland & Leatherman, 2006, p. 46). 
Inspector Any regular member of an HIW inspection team. This includes 
inspection managers, peer reviewers and lay reviewers. A synonym 
is reviewer. 
Leadership The ability to direct a group of people or an organisation. 
Lay reviewers Members of an inspection team who are selected as representatives 
of the public. They are not permanently employed by the 
inspectorate and usually do not have a clinical/professional 
background in healthcare. They may have personal experience as 
healthcare users in a particular area, i.e. experts by experience. 
Local Health 
Board 
An NHS organisation in Wales that comprises functions of 
commissioning and providing healthcare to patients within certain 
geographical boundaries. 
LHB managers Employees with managerial responsibilities who work at any level 
within a local health board. This includes LHB nursing directors, 
hospital managers and ward managers. 
x 
NHS body  An NHS trust or Local health board. 
NHS 
managers 
Employees with managerial responsibilities within a local health 
board or NHS trust. 
NHS 
organisations 
NHS trusts and local health boards. 
Nosocomial 
Infection 
An infection acquired during hospitalisation. Primary examples of 
bacteria which can cause nosocomial infections are Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostridium difficile.  
Organisational 
culture 
The expectations, experiences, philosophy and values which prevail 
in an organisation and guide the behaviour of individual employees. 
This applies particularly to patient-centred care and service-oriented 
behaviour, concern for quality and safety as well as attendance and 
punctuality.  
Outcomes Results of operations, processes or systems, typically related to 
outputs. An outcome might not always be intended.  
Output A product or service generated as a direct result of an organisational 
process. Outputs are quantifiable and can be used as performance 
indicators.  
Peer reviewers Members of an inspection team selected for their 
clinical/professional background in healthcare. 
Performance At an individual level, staff performance refers to the 
accomplishment of a given task or job measured against a set of 
defined criteria or standards. At the organisational level, 
performance refers to the extent to which the intended outputs, 
goals or objectives have been achieved. 
Program(me) ‘A structured intervention to improve the well-being of people, 
groups, organizations, or communities. Programs vary in size, 
duration, and clarity and specificity of goals’ (Weiss, 1998, p. 335). 
Program(me) 
theories 
‘The underlying rationales for regulatory policies and strategies and 
the design of regulatory regimes’ (Walshe & Boyd, 2007, p. 1). 
‘The mechanisms that mediate between the delivery (and receipt) of 
the program and the emergence of the outcomes of interest.’ 
(Weiss, 1998, p. 57). 
Regulation 'A sustained and focused control exercise by a public agency over 
activities that are valued by a community' (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). 
Review body Any organisations that audit, review or inspect healthcare 
organisations. Examples are HIW, Wales Audit Office and 




Typically, an HIW employee who leads an inspection team, which 
may include peer reviewers and lay reviewers. A synonym is 
inspection manager.  
Reviewer Any regular member of an HIW inspection team. This includes 
review managers, peer reviewers and lay reviewers. A synonym is 
inspector. 
Risk The likelihood that damage, injury or any other adverse deviation 
from a desired outcome occurs. This includes uncertain events or 
factors that - if occurring - are likely to undermine the hospital’s 
outcomes in general or the health and safety of patients and staff in 
particular. 
Stakeholders Individuals or groups of people with a direct or indirect interest, who 
are affected by or involved in the decisions of an organisation, 
programme or intervention. 
Standard The level of quality against which the performance of the healthcare 
providers is measured. National standards in healthcare set the 
mandatory minimum level of clinical practice, inputs, outputs or 
outcomes. Developmental standards, in contrast, define a higher 
level of quality or performance and aim to promote change and 
quality improvement.  
System A set of processes in the organisation that are aligned to generate 
a particular set of outputs and outcomes according to a specific 
purpose. Typically, a system contains a structure with interrelated 
and interdependent elements, uses inputs or resources and 
operates according to methods, procedures or routines.  
Theory-driven 
evaluation 
‘Any evaluation strategy or approach that explicitly integrates and 
uses stakeholder, social science, some combination of, or other 
types of theories in conceptualizing, designing, conducting, 
interpreting, and applying an evaluation’ (Coryn, Noakes, Westine, 
& Schroeter, 2010, p. 201) 
University 
Health Board 
An NHS organisation in Wales, also called Health Board or Local 
Health Board, that comprises functions of commissioning and 




‘If regulation was going to improve care, it would have done it by now. 
So it’s time to improve regulation.’ (Professional Standards Authority, 
2015a, p. 11)  
Regulation and inspection have a long history in the United Kingdom (UK), particularly 
in education and social care (Johns & Lock 2008; Martin 2008). Prompted by serious 
shortcomings in the NHS in the 1990s (Smith 1998; Beaussier et al. 2016), mandatory 
inspections were introduced to ensure a minimum level of quality and improve healthcare 
in the UK. This thesis explores how inspections work in practice, focusing on hospital 
care in Wales.  
This chapter introduces the reader to the research idea and the key terms employed in 
the thesis. The overview at the end presents the structure and summaries of the thesis 
chapters. 
The alleged conflict between the two objectives of regulation, quality assurance and 
quality improvement (viz. Shaw & Kalo 2002), prompted the author to review the existing 
evidence and conduct this research. The research idea further developed when the 
author recognised the inconsistencies and frequent changes of regulatory approaches 
in the UK (Ham, 2014). In many cases, the scientific evidence for reforms or redesigns 
of inspection regimes remains unclear. A better understanding of how regulatory 
inspections influence healthcare seems essential for designing and implementing more 
effective regulation.  
The focus on hospitals in this research stemmed from the researcher’s professional 
background and the priority that regulatory bodies typically attribute to hospitals as 
resources-intensive, high-risk settings. The Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (HIW) seems 
an appropriate choice, as HIW’s inspection regimes have not been the subject of 
previous research. The thesis follows a qualitative approach and explores the nature of 
the inspections from the two main perspectives: the inspectorate and the inspected 
healthcare organisations. The realist theory-driven evaluation employed by the study is 
instrumental in analysing the specific components, mechanisms and settings, in which 
hospital inspections take place.  
The research sets out to answer the following question: 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the inspection regimes that HIW has 
implemented in acute care hospitals in Wales? 
The specific research questions are: 
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I. How far have the inspection regimes been implemented and what specific 
problems have been encountered during implementation? 
II. Which elements and mechanisms have shown to be effective in which specific 
setting? 
III. What modifications to the regimes are likely to improve their effectiveness in a 
particular setting? 
1.1 The inspection regime 
HIW (2015a) describes itself as ‘independent inspectorate and regulator of all health care 
in Wales’. The concepts of regulation and inspection are central to this research. 
Numerous definitions of regulation can be found in academic literature. Amongst the 
most cited definitions are the following: according to Selznick (1985, p. 363) regulation 
is 'a sustained and focused control exercise by a public agency over activities that are 
valued by a community'. Contrastingly, James (2000, p. 327) defines regulation as 
‘achieving public goals using rules or standards of behaviour backed up by sanctions or 
rewards of the state’. Black (2002, p. 20) more comprehensively perceives regulation as 
an ‘attempt to alter the behaviour of others with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes’. 
From the various definitions and interpretations, the following features of regulation have 
been extracted and employed in this thesis: 
1. Formal remit, which entails a range of sanction and reward mechanisms to 
influence behaviour, 
2. Central oversight, 
3. Monitoring performance according to rules or standards, 
4. Third-party accountability, separation between regulating and regulated 
organisations, 
5. Orientation to explicit public goals and/or an implicit public interest. 
These are put into practice through the inspection regime. Inspection refers to a method 
or process typically employed in regulation. The thesis uses the terms inspection regime 
and regulatory regime, which Walshe and Boyd (2007, p. 22) define as a ‘set of 
processes or interventions which the regulator puts in place in order to regulate.’ Walshe 
(2003, p.33) identifies three functions: 
‘Direction The methods used to communicate regulatory requirements or 
directions to regulated organisations 
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Detection The methods used to measure and monitor the performance of 
regulated organisations to determine whether they comply with 
regulatory requirements or direction 
Enforcement The methods used to persuade, influence or force regulated 
organisations to make changes to comply with regulatory 
requirements or directions’. 
The regulatory regime is typically presented as a set of three functions. At the same time, 
the inspection regime can be perceived as a process or set of interconnected processes. 
This thesis distinguishes three major stages of the entire inspection regime: the pre-
inspection, the on-site inspection and the post-inspection processes. The thematic 
framework employed by this thesis reflects this process approach and guides the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis has been divided into three main parts: 
Part I. Research context 
The first part describes the context in which this evaluation is embedded.  
Chapter 2 Hospital inspections  
The literature review discusses the results of previous hospital evaluation studies and 
the methodological difficulties in evaluating organisational performance and hospital 
inspection regimes. Moreover, the researcher examines existing programme theories 
and theoretical frameworks regarding their potential to inform and support this evaluation 
research. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
This chapter outlines the evaluation approach, strategy and methods chosen to answer 
the research questions. The chapter outlines the activities undertaken to ensure a 
thorough and systematic research process. The chapter also presents the theoretical 
framework used in the data analysis. 
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Part II. Hospital inspections – HIW’s perspective and the hospital managers’ views 
The chapters in Part II present the main findings, structured according to the 
aforementioned theoretical framework. 
Chapter 4  Inspecting 
Here the researcher presents the findings from the document review and the interviews 
with HIW managers and reviewers. This encompasses HIW’s views on how its 
inspections are supposed to be conducted and become effective. 
Chapter 5 Being inspected 
This chapter contains the main findings from the interviews with NHS and independent 
healthcare managers from Wales, who describe how inspections were conducted at their 
hospitals. This includes difficulties and impacts that managers encountered. 
Part III. Reflection 
Part III critically reviews the findings from the interviews and document reviews that are 
presented in Part II.  
Chapter 6 Effective elements and mechanisms of HIW’s inspection regimes 
Chapter Six discusses the findings of this thesis. Particularly, it reviews the mechanisms 
of how the various elements of HIW’s inspection regimes become effective and 
compares the findings with other studies.  
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
The final chapter contains the main conclusions and recommendations as well as 
implications for future research.  
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Part I. Research context 
The first part of the thesis contains two chapters, which describe the context in which 
this research is embedded. Chapter Two contains the literature review, which 
summarises the results and the methodological difficulties of evaluation studies in the 
healthcare sector. The methodology chapter presents the approach, strategy and 
methods which were employed in this evaluation study. 
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2 Hospital inspections 
This chapter summarises the theoretical and empirical literature which informed this 
study. It includes an overview of key concepts, published findings on regulatory 
effectiveness and the difficulties in evaluating hospital performance and inspection 
regimes. Moreover, the literature review examines theoretical frameworks and 
assumptions of how inspection regimes work.  
2.1 Searching for literature 
A staged process was employed in the literature search and review comprising the 
following steps: 
1. Familiarising with the major theories 
2. Structuring the overview in a draft literature review  
3. Regular updating and refinement  
4. Finalising the literature review with regard to the research findings 
The first literature searches, conducted between October 2011 and May 2012 in the Web 
of Knowledge and Pubmed/Medline, employed the following search terms:  
• Inspectorate OR commission OR HIW OR CQC OR CHAI OR NHS OR 
regulator* 
• Perform* OR compliance OR deterren* OR effectiveness OR quality OR 
accountab* OR achievement OR cleanliness 
• Inspect* OR assess* OR scrutin* OR examin* OR stud* OR review OR visit 
OR evaluat* OR regulation OR audit  
• Standard* OR indicator* OR target* OR objective* 
• Hospital* 
• United Kingdom OR Wales OR England OR Great Britain, 
Only 30 scientific articles of some relevance were detected. After the first strategy, which 
exclusively relied on publications in peer-reviewed journals, had yielded limited results, 
the researcher employed a wider search strategy using various tactics to identify relevant 
literature. This included  
• Searching the reference lists and citations of publications 
• Searching and identifying relevant articles and authors in journals and 
anthologies  
• Approaching experts, practice-based supervisors and peers for relevant literature 
and authors 
• Searching for previous or later work of authors, whose articles were identified 
through the initial search, citation and reference lists and other ways. This 
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included looking at university websites for particular authors (e.g. Kieran Walshe, 
John Braithwaite). 
• Using regular publication alerts such as JAMA, BMJ and Researchgate – to 
identify new articles about healthcare regulation, inspection and quality 
• Searching and accessing relevant literature via the catalogues of Frankfurt and 
Bath university libraries, the browsers of Google, Google scholar and Google 
books, BMJ, ResearchGate, Endnote and Mendeley  
• Visiting potentially relevant websites such as Cochrane library, Kings Fund, 
Health Foundation, HIW, CQC, Monitor, EPSO and Welsh government.  
This wider search for literature yielded many relevant documents, including grey 
literature such as evaluation reports. It appeared that some of the most relevant studies 
(Day & Klein, 2004; Sutherland & Leatherman, 2006; Walshe, Addicott, Boyd, Robertson, 
& Ross, 2014) were not published as peer-reviewed journal articles. The search for 
literature and updating continued throughout the study.  
Initially, the literature search had focused on healthcare inspections. In the course of the 
reading, the researcher widened her perspective and her search towards the themes of 
regulation, regulatory theories, performance and effectiveness, healthcare quality, public 
service and reforms in UK. This helped to gain a broader understanding of the 
researched area and the context in which inspections take place. 
In preparation of the research protocol, the researcher then explored the literature on 
suitable research and evaluation methods. This included textbooks and articles about 
the case study method, evaluation methods, programme theory and reports of applied 
evaluation. Reviewing the literature informed the choice of realist evaluation as 
evaluation method. 
At a later stage, the focus shifted to particular change models and mechanisms. The 
specific literature searches aimed to inform the reconstruction of the change 
mechanisms related to particular inspection elements such as healthcare standards, 
registration, self-assessment, peer-review, feedback, reporting, action plan and follow-
up. The mechanisms, elements and their synonyms were used as search terms. For 
example, search terms related to action plans included: action plan, improvement plan, 
corrective action, implementation, improvement.  
The literature review, data extraction and synthesis proceeded in an iterative manner. 
This included making notes and highlighting essential information in the original text and 
extracting data and tables, citing relevant phrases, critically reviewing and summarising 
thoughts and information in separate word documents. The notes and summaries were 
instrumental in the preparation of specific paragraphs and draft literature chapters. Initial 
literature review chapters covered in large parts theories of regulation and the political 
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context of regulation and devolution in UK. The draft versions were modified and 
shortened several times, before the final literature review appeared in the current shape.  
The following review comprises the essence of the studied literature and how it informed 
the content and design of this study. The literature is reviewed in four main sections. The 
first sets the scene with a general overview of the regulation literature. The second 
summarises the specific literature on healthcare regulation, which explores regulatory 
effectiveness and the difficulties in measuring effectiveness. The third examines 
theoretical frameworks for the evaluation of regulatory regimes in order to develop a 
framework for this research. The fourth seeks to identify the change mechanisms in the 
process of inspection. 
2.2 Regulation theories  
This section sets the scene with a general overview of the regulation literature and 
describes the shift from descriptive to prescriptive theories.  
The boom in regulation, which various authors describe as ‘golden age of regulation’ 
(Walshe, 2003, p. xi), ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 1994) and ‘inspection explosion’ (Martin, 
2010, p. 18), has been accompanied by a growing body of theoretical literature. Many 
regulation theories are descriptive, i.e. portraying the development and rationales of 
regulation. This includes: 
• Public interest theory, which regards regulation as a means to achieve desired 
results in the public interest, where the market otherwise would fail. The approach 
postulates ‘dispassionate expertise’ of the regulator and ‘objective standards’ 
(Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 41).  
• Interest groups theories which argue that regulation is driven by particularistic 
concerns. 
• Institutionalism, which deals with questions of the institutional design and 
relations, such as the principal-agent-theory.  
The latter two are predominantly concerned with examining dysfunctions and unintended 
consequences of regulation (Stigler 1971; Berry 1982; James 2000; Walshe 2003; 
Downe & Martin 2007; Baldwin et al. 2012a), such as: 
1. Ineffectiveness due to regulatory ‘capture’  
2. High cost, which decreases efficiency in the industry  
3. Goal displacement and proliferation: regulation creates more regulation which is 
in the regulator’s self-interest 
4. Ossification: compliance with predefined standards hinders innovation and 
improvement  
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5. Stabilisation of monopolistic or oligopolistic structures by limiting market access 
for potential producers or service providers  
6. Unaccountability: the regulator lacks accountability/legitimacy  
7. Juridification: involvement of lawyers and appeals to courts. 
Due to a shift in paradigms, described as ‘Zeitgeist has changed’ (Walshe, 2011, p. 516), 
regulation has become commonly accepted as ‘necessary for the functioning of a market 
economy and public services’ (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 9). In consequence, the focus 
moved towards prescriptive theories. As Table 1 shows, normative regulatory theories 
initially focused on either compliance or deterrence approaches.  
TABLE 1 THE DETERRENCE – COMPLIANCE CONTINUUM 
Deterrence  Compliance 
Detection, apprehension and 
punishment for breaching rules 
General 
strategy 
Bargaining, conciliation and negotiation to 
attain results, prevent or repair harm 
Legalistic, accusatory style; 
Poor and antagonistic 
Style and 
relationship 
Informal, conciliatory style; 
Friendly and cooperative 
‘Amoral calculators’ dominated 





‘Good-hearted compliers’, sharing the 
regulator’s objectives, worthy of trust and 
support 





‘Politician’ or ‘consultant’: persuading, 
advising, educating 
Large number of organisations  
-> distance  
Prevalence in 
sectors with 
Small number of organisations -> building 
long term relationships 
Speedy change; more effective 
with small & medium size 
organisations 
Advantage Securing cooperation and support, more 
sustainable, long-term commitment to 
improvement, less costly 
Costly; may provoke a ‘culture of 
regulatory resistance’ 
Disadvantage Some organisations may circumvent & not 
comply; the lack of severe consequence, 
undermines the morale of other 
organisations and disadvantages 
consumers  
Source: Adapted from Kagan & Scholz 1984; Braithwaite et al. 1987; Black 2001; Walshe 2003; Gunningham 
2015  
This dichotomy, which can be perceived as a two ends of a continuum of regulatory 
behaviour (Braithwaite et al., 1987; Walshe, 2003), has been succeeded by ‘better 
regulation initiatives‘ (Baldwin et al. 2012a, p.9), labelled as  
• ‘responsive’ (Braithwaite, 2011),  
• ‘smart‘ (Gunningham, Grabovsky, & Sinclair, 1998),  
• ‘right-touch’ (Professional Standards Authority, 2015b),  
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• ‘risk based’ (Beaussier et al. 2016),  
• ‘proportionate’ (Prosser, 2010) or 
• ‘hybrid’ (Mcdermott, Hamel, Steel, Flood, & Mkee, 2015).  
Better regulation refers to different prescriptive approaches that aim to design regulatory 
systems which (i) more effectively achieve the intended objectives in the public interest 
and (ii) prevent regulatory failure. Prescriptive regulation theories are of practical 
importance in that they may support the legislators/regulators in their efforts to design 
new or reform existing regulatory systems. 
2.3 Healthcare regulation 
This section summarises the specific healthcare regulation literature, the (re)search for 
regulatory effectiveness and why effectiveness is so difficult to assess in healthcare.  
With the pursuit of more effective regulation, publications increasingly differentiate 
amongst different industries and regulatory goals. Unlike many other sectors, where 
regulators pursue economic, market-regulating objectives, the nature and rationale of 
most regulation in healthcare is predominantly social (Walshe, 2003). Walshe (2003) and 
Sutherland and Leatherman (2006, p. 7) list three main objectives for healthcare 
regulation:  
1. Improvement, i.e. better performance and quality of care for patients through 
changes in practice 
2. Assurance that minimally acceptable standards of quality, safety and 
effectiveness are achieved 
3. Accountability for performance and financial resources, ‘empowering patients, 
users and the public in their interaction with healthcare organisations and 
professionals’ (Walshe, 2003, p. 170). 
Further objectives may include: (i) patient safety (Healy, 2016) and (ii) informing 
government policies and decisions (Day & Klein, 2004; Welsh Assembly Government, 
2009).  
Compared to clinical research, studies on regulatory interventions form a relatively small 
body of research literature (Bardsley, 2016; Healy, 2016). The two meta-analyses on 
regulatory interventions and/or inspections in healthcare, which the literature review 
identified, searched for evidence of regulatory effectiveness (Flodgren, Pomey, Taber, & 
Eccles, 2011; Sutherland & Leatherman, 2006). 
In a systematic review, Flodgren and colleagues (2011) sought evidence of 
improvements in organisational and professional behaviour as well as patient outcomes 
resulting from external compliance inspections. The assumption was that mandatory 
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inspections have a positive effect on hospital performance due to the deterrance of 
expected negative consequences of noncompliance. Amongst the 9901 titles retrieved 
in the initial stage, only two studies fullfiled the review critera, one from South Africa, 
which showed some effectiveness, and one from the UK conducted by the Office for 
Public Management (OPM)1. The latter, an interupted time-series study, did not show a 
significant difference between the number of hospital-acquired MRSA2 cases before and 
after the inspection programme started. Conversely, recent field studies in UK hospitals 
showed that self-reported infection rates cannot be regarded as entirely objective 
measures of incidence (Dixon-Woods, Myles, Bion, & Tarrant, 2012; Limb, 2012).  
In their review of ‘regulation and quality improvement’, Sutherland and Leatherman 
(2006) identified three studies on the effectiveness of inspections: one about US hospital 
inspections (Gibbs Brown, 1999), two concerning the former Commission for Health 
Improvement (CHI) in UK (Benson, Boyd, & Walshe, 2004; Day & Klein, 2004). Both 
evaluation studies, which employed, however to varying extents, interviews, surveys and 
document analysis, provide a comprehensive view on CHI inspection activities and their 
impact. 
In a three-year study, Day and Klein (2004, p. 10) highlight the challenges and dilemmas 
of CHI’s inspection regime, which they portray as a ‘process of experiment, adjustment 
and change’. While the authors acknowledge CHI’s productivity, they raise concerns 
about the appropriateness of the clinical governance framework for the ratings, the 
variability in data analysis, reporting as well as the composition and expertise of 
inspection teams. In the absence of formal enforcement powers, CHI’s role was judged 
as more ‘diagnostic’ and ‘catalytic’, rather than ‘therapeutic’. The issues which CHI 
inspections detected were often known to the healthcare managers. The prospect of 
poor rating and reporting urged the inspected organisation to tackle those issues more 
rapidly. Overall, Day and Klein (2004, p.35) evaluated CHI’s impact as ‘diffuse and 
indirect’.  
Benson and colleagues’ (2004) findings widely concur with the above study: 
inconsistencies in CHI reports, review methods and review teams. While the authors 
found evidence of positive impact from CHI inspections, they saw room for improvement 
in various areas. This included more explicit standards; training and selection of review 
teams; clear, specific and reasoned recommendations; thorough follow-up and frequent 
feedback on performance. In their literature review, the authors – compare Walshe 
                                                 
1 The OPM study remained inaccessible and could therefore not been included in the current 
literature review. 
2 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a bacterium, which can cause hospital-
acquired infections. 
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(2003, p.163f.) and (2008, p. 81) - summarise reported positive effects of healthcare 
regulation on organisational performance: 
• Improvements in patient care resulting from regulatory attention 
• Organisational reflection sparked by comparison of performance 
• Changes in organisational priorities 
• Providing leverage for change to internal stakeholders 
• Driving continuing improvement due to regularly updated standards. 
The effects relate to changes made by the regulated organisation (i) in the knowledge of 
the existence of the regulator and regulatory instructions, (ii) in the expectation of an 
inspection, (iii) in direct connection with an inspection or other regulatory intervention or 
(iv) as an indirect consequence. 
In an attempt to synthesise the findings, Sutherland and Leatherman list five factors, 
which they claim to be generally agreed as contributing to effectiveness. These overlap 
with some of the ‘principles of inspection’ developed by the Office of Public Services 
Reform (OPSR) (2003, p. 34), as Table 2 shows.  
TABLE 2 SYNOPSIS: PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Factors contributing 
to effectiveness 
Comparison The 10 OPSR principles 
Expertise of inspectors Similar, but 
not identical 
• Inspectors should continually learn from 
experience 




• The purpose of improvement 
Balance local flexibility 
with national standards 
No equivalent  
Clear goals for inspected 
organisations 
No equivalent  
Proportionality in terms of 
costs and risks 
Similar • Proportionate to risk  
• Inspectors should have regard for value for 
money, their own included 
 No equivalent • A focus on outcomes 
• A user perspective 
• Inspectors should encourage rigorous self-
assessment by managers 
• Inspectors should use impartial evidence  
• Inspectors should disclose the criteria they 
use to form judgments  
• Inspectors should be open about their 
processes, willing to take any complaints 
seriously, and able to demonstrate a robust 
quality assurance process 
Source: Adapted from Sutherland and Leatherman 2006 and Office of Public Services Reform 2003  
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More evidence of regulatory effectiveness could have been expected with regard to the 
growing importance of healthcare regulation. Although Flodgren and colleagues do not 
exclude a publication bias, it seems reasonable to assume that the paucity of selected 
studies in their and Sutherland and Leatherman’s review results from the rigid selection 
criteria and a positivist-reductionist stance.  
Many authors have explicated the fundamental difficulties of evaluating quality 
improvement interventions (Øvretveit & Gustafson 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2003; Walshe 
2003; Leatherman & Sutherland 2008; Flodgren et al. 2011; Braithwaite 2014). These 
mainly relate to the  
(i) Complexity of organisational effectiveness  
(ii) Difficulties of measurement 
(iii) Complexity of real-world interventions and 
(iv) Research designs. 
(i) The complexity of organisational effectiveness  
Organisational effectiveness and performance relate to complex concepts, which are 
objectively not definable and ‘compounded by the lack of theoretical consensus’ (Talbot, 
2010, p. 148). This equally applies to healthcare quality, which embraces multiple 
perspectives, expectations and dimensions (Berwick, 2002; Cowing, Davino-Ramaya, 
Ramaya, & Szmerekovsky, 2009; B. C. James, 1989; Øvretveit, 1997). 
This ambiguity poses the central question: what to assess the regulator against? 
Although ‘it might be very proper to judge regulators according to their success in fulfilling 
their mandates’ as Baldwin and colleagues (2012, p. 27) explain, they admit that: ‘Most 
regulators statutes give regulators broad discretions’. Moreover, enforcement functions 
are often distributed amongst different regulating bodies (Baldwin & Black, 2008), as in 
the case of HIW. Healthcare regulation goals are unstable, difficult to define and often 
competing (Beaussier, Demeritt, Griffiths, & Rothstein, 2015), such as accountability 
versus organisational learning and improvement (Dodds & Kodate, 2011). Furthermore, 
regulatory effectiveness needs to consider the resources spent, i.e. regulatory efficiency. 
(ii) The difficulties of measurement 
For the purpose of evaluation, objectives, targets or service standards need to be 
specified in measurable terms, though not all aspects are ‘readily quantifiable’ (Raleigh 
& Foot, 2010, p. 4). As the selection of indicators is ‘politically contentious’ (Beaussier et 
al., 2016, p. 4), ideally, they should reflect the values of the key stakeholders (Shaw, 
2003a). Results may vary across the sometimes-conflicting performance dimensions. 
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Aggregated performance data at hospital or NHS trust level are likely to mask variation 
in healthcare quality across different departments and units (Nuffield Trust, 2013). 
A disputed question in performance assessment is the choice between input/structure, 
process, output and outcome indicators. Their usefulness depends on the particular 
measurement aim and purpose (Baldwin & Black, 2008). Although Donabedian (2005, 
p. 694) described outcomes as ‘the ultimate validators of the effectiveness and quality of 
medical care’, their predominant use in evaluation is problematic from a hospital’s 
viewpoint due to confounding effects of time-lags and co-morbidities (Raleigh & Foot, 
2010). Comparison and generalisation are impaired by differences and variability in data 
sets, which evaluators use to measure inputs, process and outcomes, and data collection 
methods. Thus it becomes a matter for speculation ‘whether the observed changes result 
from real change in performance or changes in data collection’ (Walshe, 2003, p. 160). 
Bevan and Cornwell (2006, p. 365) comment on the ‘formidable difficulties’ of relying 
exclusively on statistical data that are ‘routinely available’. Several authors (Clarke & 
Dawson, 1999; Walshe & Phipps, 2013) point at the potential for inspection to generate 
data that can be used to serve the purposes of evaluation. In this respect, published 
inspection reports represent a potential opportunity for secondary data analysis. 
However, the changes in HIW’s inspection regimes, reporting and staff impede the 
comparison. Moreover, inspections of one hospital ward over one or two days do not 
necessarily represent the performance of all wards at all times. 
(iii) The complexity of real-world interventions 
Regulatory interventions take place in natural settings (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, & 
Walshe, 2005; Walshe, 2007), typically concurrent with other, interrelated interventions 
(Ham, 2014; Øvretveit & Gustafson, 2002). The context, content and variables in 
implementation make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to objectively relate changes 
in healthcare outcomes or other effects to one single intervention (Bate, Robert, Fulop, 
Øvretveit, & Dixon-Woods, 2014; Ham, 2014). Variables in real-world settings, unlike in 
laboratory experiments, are not under full control. This particularly relates to the 
inspections themselves, which entail many, interrelated processes, actors and elements. 
Benson and colleagues (2004) refer to methodological difficulties caused by the changes 
in CHI’s review process and reporting structure as well as to the changes in staff 
responsibilities at the hospitals. 
Last but not least, the evaluation may fail to realise that an intervention was not 
implemented as planned or documented (Øvretveit & Gustafson, 2002). 
(iv) Research designs 
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Various authors have commented on the suitability of certain research designs (Boaden, 
2011; Øvretveit & Gustafson, 2002). The fact that all healthcare organisations in the UK 
are subjected to regulation excludes an experimental design comparing regulated and 
unregulated hospitals. Walshe (2003) suggests instead examining the changes in 
performance of regulated organisations over time, if possible before and after the 
regulatory intervention. Observational studies are according to Sutherland and 
Leatherman (2006) the preferred methodology to identify research evidence about 
regulatory impact. Boaden (2011, p. 503), referring to the potential sources of bias and 
confounding, notes that most research papers on quality improvement are ‘descriptive 
studies rather based on a single site than analytic reviews’. Some evaluation studies 
attempt to mitigate the inherent difficulties by employing mixed methods (Benson et al., 
2004; Day & Klein, 2004).  
Not surprisingly, regulators’ own reports are very likely to state a positive impact of 
reguation and inspection (J. Dixon, 2011). Some scholars therefore argue for 
independent evaluations and distance (Walshe, 2003). This thesis with the researcher 
not being employed, commissioned or funded by any regulatory body fulfils the criterion 
of ‘distance’. The downside of this distance is, however, the lack of inside knowledge 
and experience. A practical solution to combine distance and regulatory expertise could 
be external evaluations conducted by peer evaluators from similar inspection bodies. 
The example of the peer evaluation of the Norwegian Board of Healthcare Supervision 
conducted by the European Partnership of Supervisory Organisations in Health Services 
and Social Care (2012) indicates, however, two potential weaknesses. Firstly, the 
funding of the study by the evaluated body may compromise the independence of the 
evaluators. Secondly, the absence of a researcher and lacking information about 
evaluation methods and tools raise concerns about methodological rigor. 
2.4 Theoretical frameworks  
This section examines the more theoretical literature in order to help develop the 
framework for this thesis. Several frameworks, which were identified as potential tools 
and structural guidance, are presented below. 
In their study on external reviews of healthcare organisations, Walshe and colleagues 
(2001) examine five aspects: the purpose, organisation, overall approach, methods and 
results. Walshe (2003) further elaborated this framework: 
1. Regulatory organisation  
2. Regulatory goals/objectives  
3. Scope of regulation  
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4. Regulatory model  
5. Direction  
6. Detection  
7. Enforcement. 
In a later publication, Walshe and Boyd (2007) suggest a similar framework. The core of 
this framework, the three elements of the regulatory regime, resemble Shaw’s (2003b) 
’Cycle of quality improvement’, which is depicted in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 THE CYCLE OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT APPLIED TO REGULATORY 
INSPECTIONS 
 
Source: Shaw 2003b 
In their theoretical framework, see Figure 2, Boyne and colleagues (2002) relate the 
elements of the regulatory regime with ‘five potential problems’. According to this 
framework, the expertise of inspectors as a mediating variable is central for regulatory 
effectiveness. While inspectors are undoubtedly crucial, the framework seems to 
disregard other relevant factors. Boyne and colleagues’ framework transcends the role 



















FIGURE 2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VARIABLES IN THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: Boyne and colleagues 2002 
Conversely, Walshe’s (2007) proposed framework for a theory-driven evaluation of 
quality improvement interventions considers the context, content, application and 
outcomes. In the publication ‘Developing a strategic framework to guide the Care Quality 
Commission’s (CQC) programme of evaluation’, Walshe and Phipps (2013) reconstruct 
CQC’s regulatory model and the underlying assumptions which shaped the regulatory 
design. More specifically, they examine the components of standard setting, risk-based 
regulation and the regulatory workforce. The report on the evaluated inspections in 2014 
(Walshe et al., 2014), however, employs a slightly different structure: 
• The logic of the model 
• Preparation for inspection 
• Inspection teams and how they work 
• The process of inspection 
• Ratings and reports 
• After inspections: actions and impacts. 
The structure predominantly follows a sequential order: (i) the activities before the actual 
inspection, (ii) the on-site visit and (iii) the activities, outputs and outcomes after the 
inspection. Due to their important role throughout the process, inspection teams are 
analysed separately. A similar process-oriented framework was developed for this thesis 
(viz. 3.3 Analysis). 
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2.5 Change mechanisms 
This section seeks to identify possible change mechanisms in the process of inspection. 
Knowledge of these mechanisms helps to evaluate HIW’s inspection regime (viz. 
methodology chapter). In the absence of explicit programme theories, the researcher 
made initial assumptions by reviewing relevant publications and interviewing 
stakeholders (Posavac, 2010). She reviewed several papers which develop and test 
theories of how the regulatory regime and its components work. 
Basically, healthcare regulators aim to influence the behaviour of the regulated 
organisations (Walshe, 2003). If the underlying assumptions hold true, inspection 
regimes are expected to influence changes in behaviour at individual, group and 
organisational level and thus improve organisational performance and healthcare quality 
(Walshe & Boyd, 2007).  
Regulation relies on various mechanisms which, in combination with specific contextual 
factors, produce desired outputs and outcomes (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Since not all 
circumstances generate these effects (Grol & Wensing, 2004), it is important to analyse 
in more detail the content, mechanisms and contextual factors. These aspects are often 
neglected in study reports (Kringos et al., 2015) and are insufficiently understood (Bate 
et al., 2014; Kaplan, Provost, Froehle, & Margolis, 2012). Empirical research, such as 
this thesis, may serve the practical purpose of investigating these aspects in order to 
‘establish when, how and why an intervention works’ (Walshe, 2007, p. 58), the evidence 
of which can then be used to improve the system.  
The following elements and presumed working mechanisms have been extracted from 
the reviewed literature and grouped according to their prevalence in the regulatory 
process. It needs to be noted that the multiple functions of certain components such as 
inspection teams complicate an unambiguous attribution to particular parts of the 
inspection regime or process. 
2.5.1 Pre-inspection 
Components which may influence the behaviour of the regulated organisations prior to 
the actual on-site inspection are the (i) standards and rules, which regulated 
organisations are supposed to comply with, (ii) registration of healthcare organisations 
through the regulator, (iii) self-assessments, which the regulated organisation conducts 
and shares with the regulator as well as (iv) selection of inspection sites and pre-





To assess the organisations against, healthcare regulators use rules, standards and 
criteria. According to Walshe and Phipps (2013) standards in regulation (i) determine 
stakeholders’ values and performance expectations, (ii) promote self-enforced 
compliance which leads to improvement, (iii) are instrumental in measuring and enforcing 
compliance and (iv) help to compare performance and differentiate between providers. 
The literature distinguishes between minimal, average and ideal (i.e. maximal or optimal) 
standards (Shaw & Kalo, 2002) as well as generic and specific standards (Walshe, 
2003). Minimal standards intend to ensure a defined minimum of quality by sifting out 
the ‘bad apples’ (Shaw, 2003b, p. 116). However, they fail to drive innovation and further 
improvement amongst organisations that meet the minimum requirements (Walshe 
2003; Shaw 2003a). The ambiguity of generic statements leaves room for interpretation 
and, potentially, disagreement. Counterintuitively, previous research found fewer, 
broadly formulated standards to be preferable for inter-reviewer reliability than a larger 
number of very specific standards (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1995). Guiding literature 
stresses the importance of evidence-based standards and criteria for effective 
improvement of healthcare and acceptability amongst the (clinical) stakeholders (Gray, 
2001; McGlynn, 2003; Veillard, Guisset, & Garcia-Barbero, 2004). Regulated 
organisations presumably find it easier to comply with standards that they consider 
appropriate or reasonable (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). It is therefore advisable to design a 
regular, fair and transparent standard setting process, which involves the stakeholders 
(Walshe 2003; Hilarion et al. 2009). Similarly, Berwick and colleagues (2013, p. 30) plead 
for the involvement of patients, carers and the public in the development of what they 
called ‘principle-based standards’. Conversely, hospitals with insufficient capabilities 
may require additional resources and support to adhere to standards.  
The difficulties of defining standards as quality measures have been highlighted above 
(viz. 2.3 Healthcare regulation). 
(ii) Registration 
Registration potentially contributes to regulatory effectiveness through various 
mechanisms:  
• Firstly, registration requirements can act as a threshold for new providers by 
deterring inept providers or denying them access to the market. Other 
applicants will increase their efforts to meet the requirements (Walshe & 
Phipps, 2013).  
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• Secondly, by building trust or ‘low distrust’ (Rousseau et al., 1998, cited by Six 
2013, p.166) and common understanding of performance requirements the 
registration process can initiate a constructive regulatory relationship, which will 
promote current and future compliance (Walshe & Phipps, 2013).  
• Thirdly, the data provided by the registering organisation can serve as baseline 
for future inspections, help to assess risk levels and thus inform future 
interventions (Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, 2009).  
• Fourthly, the threat of a potential deregistration is a powerful enforcement tool 
(Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, 2009). 
(iii) Self-assessments 
Self-assessment constitutes a modern technique (Office of Public Services Reform, 
2003) or, as Jewell & Wilkinson (2008) enthusiastically declared, a ‘radical new 
approach’ in regulatory regimes. Supposedly, self-regulation reduces the need for and 
frequency of (costly) external inspections and makes regulation more effective through 
the following mechanisms: 
Shifting the primary responsibility for quality assurance to the regulated organisation 
allegedly increases ownership (Thomas 2013) and reflexivity (Hood, James, & Scott, 
2000). The regulated organisation identifies the relevant gaps, takes corrective action 
and thus improves compliance/performance (International Finance Corporation, 2010). 
Self-assessment, which actively involves the entire workforce, has the potential to 
enhance internal communication and common understanding about performance issues 
and improvement techniques (Carnino, 2000). 
Moreover, self-assessments and self-reported data inform regulatory decisions and 
targeted inspections (Jewell & Wilkinson, 2008; Walshe & Phipps, 2013). While self-
assessments may reduce the burden of external inspections, they create an additional 
organisational burden within the regulated organisation (Scrivens, 2007). The regulated 
organisation needs to have the capacity and resources to install systems to control and 
improve performance. Supposedly, regulatory site-visits can serve as a ‘reality check’ of 
how such internal systems work in practice (Day & Klein, 2004, p. 10). Implementation 
deficiencies became, however, apparent at Mid Staffordshire, when inaccurate self-
assessments were relied upon and not thoroughly tested (Francis, 2013). With regard to 
similar failings of CHI concerning Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells trust, Bevan (2008, p. 
97) rated self-assessment as an ‘inadequate tool for regulation’. 
(iv) Selection of inspection sites and pre-inspection information 
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In theory, regulators may choose to inspect a particular organisation either (i) regularly, 
as part of an all-inclusive inspection cycle, (ii) randomly, (iii) purposefully, by targeting 
high-risk services and poor performers or (vi) representatively, selecting a broad 
spectrum of presumably strong, medium and poor performers. 
In the past, regulators such as CHI used to inspect all NHS trusts during one inspection 
cycle. Increasingly, targeted, risk-based inspection approaches have become very 
popular, aiming to concentrate the limited resources on detecting poor performers (Adil, 
2008; Black & Baldwin, 2012; Hampton, 2005; Tombs & Whyte, 2013). Regulatory 
regimes, which purposefully target poorly-performing organisations, intend to incentivise 
good performers by reducing the regulatory burden and, by making the regulated 
organisations aware of the selection principles, stimulate quality improvement (Walshe 
& Phipps, 2013). The difficulty, however, lies in the mechanisms and data to identify poor 
performing hospitals ante inspectionem (Bardsley, 2016; Beaussier et al., 2016; Griffiths, 
Beaussier, Demeritt, & Rothstein, 2016). Moreover, the prospect of preferential 
treatment may tempt providers to embellish or manipulate self-assessed/reported data 
(Shaw, 2003a). 
2.5.2 On-site visit 
The literature describes several mechanisms on how regulatory visits can drive change 
and improvement.  
Improvement prior to announced or anticipated inspection: As explained above, the 
prospect of an inspection and the fear of exposure can impel healthcare managers to 
examine and resolve compliance/performance issues (Day & Klein, 2004; Walshe & 
Phipps, 2013). This is the case for announced inspections, which leave ample 
opportunity for preparation, and those that follow a routine schedule (Walshe & Boyd, 
2007). The impression of an imminent visit can also be created through intensive media 
reporting. 
Improvement through diagnosis, dialogue and enforcement: inspections are the only 
option for the regulator to check how far the healthcare organisation conforms with 
standards and best practice. On-site visits constitute the core element of the regulatory 
regime with regard to the diagnosis of compliance/performance and the dialogue with 
healthcare providers (Kilsdonk, Siesling, Otter, & van Harten, 2016). Though healthcare 
organisations can be expected to have more inside knowledge, they may lack the 
capacity or systems to analyse the voluminous data and take informed actions. The 
independent perspective and expertise of external reviewers can provide fresh ideas and 
valuable advice, equal to a ‘free consultancy’ (Walshe et al., 2014, p. 67). Detected 
noncompliance will be the subject of subsequent improvement / enforcement activities. 
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External lever for internal improvement: certain (internal) stakeholders may use (i) the 
inspections as the ‘big bad wolf’ (Walshe et al., 2001, p. 373) and (ii) inspection results 
as an extra lever to convince other (internal) stakeholders to accept organisational 
change (Day & Klein, 2004).  
Regulators can use a variety of options to modify the characteristics and thus the 
effectiveness of on-site visits. This primarily concerns the inspection design or 
methodology and the composition of the inspection team.  
Scope and themes: inspections can either look at a large range of healthcare aspects or 
focus on certain standards, complaints or themes. The latter often relates to high-risk 
areas and vulnerable patient contingents, such as elderly people (Healy, 2016). 
Moreover, the regulator decides whether to investigate clinical practice or governance 
systems or a combination of both (Day & Klein, 2004).  
Frequency, timing, and duration: regulators determine how often, when and for how long 
they inspect an organisation. In theory, a high frequency (Ivers et al., 2012), irregular 
times, such as week-ends and nights (NHS Wales & Welsh Government, 2014a), and 
extensive site-visits (Walshe et al., 2014) increase the opportunity to detect performance 
issues. In reality, the regulator’s means and decisions are shaped by austerity and 
demands to ease the regulatory burden. 
Inspection mode: regulators can either pre-announce inspections or unexpectedly 
appear at the front door. The pre-announcement leaves time for the inspected 
organisation to plan and prepare.  
Methods and tools: the complexity of healthcare, the difficulty to define healthcare quality 
and the need to evidence findings suggest employing a mix of methods and sources. 
This includes (statistical) data analysis, interviews with clinicians, managers, patients 
and relatives, surveys, observation and document review. Ideally, inspection tools should 
be consistent with current best practice and pre-tested (Dixon & Pearce, 2011; Sale, 
2005; Tuijn, Robben, & Janssens, 2011). Since best practice tends to change over time, 
existing tools need to be regularly reviewed and new tools developed. 
Regulatory credibility, which is largely dependent on the quality of the reviewers, lends 
authority to the regulatory regime and increases its effectiveness (Walshe & Phipps, 
2013). Given the importance of relevant technical, regulatory and interpersonal 
competencies, many regulators assign external peer and lay reviewers to complement 
their in-house teams. Conversely, CQC’s initial approach to employ generalist inspectors 
has been severely criticised as ineffective (Beaussier et al., 2015). Apart from the type 
and mix of skills, the regulator needs to allocate an adequate number of team members. 
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2.5.3 Post-inspection 
The reviewed literature identified several components and mechanisms that regulators 
use after the inspection visit. The post-inspection activities are listed here in the typical 
sequence of their occurrence. They comprise (i) the provision of feedback to the 
regulated organisation, (ii) the reporting and publication of inspection findings, (iii) the 
preparing of improvement plans by the inspected organisation, (iv) the follow-up of the 
implementation of corrective actions by the regulator or another authorised body as well 
as (v) formal and informal enforcement of corrective actions. 
(i) Feedback 
Oral feedback at the debriefing summarises the inspection findings and typically 
highlights certain aspects. The feedback supposedly draws the attention of the audience 
to both, (i) good practice, which the regulator acknowledges and thus intends to 
reinforce, and (ii) compliance gaps, which the regulated organisation is expected to 
address by taking corrective actions and changing behaviour. The effectiveness of 
feedback is influenced by many factors, such as the source, format and duration (Veloski, 
Boex, Grasberger, Evans, & Wolfson, 2006), content and nature of the feedback 
(Hysong, 2009) and possibly accompanying interventions (Ivers et al., 2012; Vos et al., 
2009).  
(ii) Reporting and publication 
The inspection report is potentially read by different groups, such as the regulated 
organisations, ministers, civil servants, local authorities, the media and the public (Day 
& Klein, 2004). As diverse as the audience are the pathways by which reports are 
believed to contribute to an effective inspection regime (Berwick et al. 2003; Hibbard et 
al. 2005; Hysong 2009; Raleigh & Foot 2010): 
• The inspected organisation is expected to use the information about compliance 
gaps and specific recommendations for performance improvement to take 
corrective actions. The motivation either stems from the intrinsic desire to provide 
high quality services (change pathway) or the fear of damage to reputation 
(reputation pathway) and/or market share (selection pathway).  
• The published report might also animate competitors to pre-emptively improve 
compliance/performance.  
• Publicised inspection results hypothetically influence the decisions of potential 
customers, who have timely access to relevant information, interpret it correctly 
and have a choice of different providers.  
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• Other stakeholders such as local and national authorities, activists and media 
may add pressure on incompliant providers or offer support to improve 
performance. 
While these pathways work in theory, many contextual factors and variables may 
increase or decrease the contribution of reporting to regulatory effectiveness. Amongst 
those are the presentation and readability of the reports (different target groups have 
different requirements), motivation and capability of the regulated organisation, 
triangulation of findings and explicitness of recommended actions (Benson et al., 2004; 
Day & Klein, 2004). Ideally, the information should be timely, accurately portray the 
situation, be meaningful to the reader and preferably be comparative (Marshall & 
McLoughlin, 2010; Nash & Goldfarb, 2006; Shekelle, Lim, Mattke, & Damberg, 2008).  
(iii) Action plans 
Improvement plans are developed in response to the identified compliance gaps, 
operationalising the required actions and recommendations in terms of detailed 
activities, time-scheduling and allocation of responsibilities and resources. This will 
facilitate subsequent monitoring and evaluation.  
Previous research has identified weaknesses in action plans, which were attributed to 
insufficient planning capacity amongst the regulated organisations (Benson et al., 2004; 
Day & Klein, 2004). 
(iv) Follow-up 
Postulating rational behaviour, healthcare providers will adhere to the agreed action plan 
more readily, if they know that implementation is externally monitored and non-
implementation will lead to negative consequences.  
The effectiveness of regulatory regimes can be undermined by different practices in how 
to monitor and evaluate the implementation of action plans (Hovlid et al., 2015) as well 
as a discontinuity in the oversight, i.e. when the regulator’s responsibility ends with the 
action plan (Day & Klein, 2004). 
(v) Formal and informal enforcement 
Formal enforcement embraces a range of activities such as issuing warning letters, 
imposing a ban on new admissions and suspending or revoking the registration. Single 
regulators can increase their scope of power by networking with other review bodies, 
governmental and local authorities, advocacy groups and the media (Braithwaite, 2008; 
Healy, 2016). Moreover, they can use informal means, such as persuasion, negotiation 
and threats. According to the responsive regulation approach, regulators should start at 
the bottom of the regulatory pyramid and depending on the response navigate up and 
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down (Braithwaite & Hong, 2015; Nielsen & Parker, 2009). This entails analysing the 
contextual factors and reasons for non-compliance as well as the effectiveness of the 
various enforcement approaches (Walshe & Boyd, 2007). 
Capable, rationally acting healthcare organisations can be expected to comply with 
regulatory standards or make necessary changes to achieve compliance, if otherwise 
they have to fear negative consequences that surpass the potential benefit of non-
compliance (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). This deterrence mechanism will be reinforced by 
salient examples of other regulated organisations that had to pay a ‘high price’ for non-
compliance. The regulator can harness the fear by threatening to take punitive 
enforcement actions, including repetitive inspections, if the non-compliant healthcare 
provider does not rectify the issue (Walshe & Boyd, 2007). 
Severe punishment and/or the loss of reputation can teach the non-compliant 
organisation itself the lesson to avoid non-compliant behaviour in future (Walshe & Boyd 
2007). This mechanism relies on the (i) capability of the regulated organisation to change 
and (ii) the belief that non-compliance will be detected and punished in future. The 
publication of the non-compliance report and enforcement actions may increase the 
‘naming and shaming’ effect for the organisation and serve as a deterrent for others. This 
mechanism might lose its effect, if non-compliance becomes a wide-spread, seemingly 
accepted phenomenon and regulators find it impossible to enforce completely 
(Beaussier et al., 2015). Moreover, a quasi-monopolistic NHS organisation will hardly be 
deterred by a warning (Beaussier et al., 2015) or the non-credible threat to be closed 
down (Baldwin & Black, 2008; Braithwaite, 2008). Individual managers might however 
fear to lose their jobs, when an NHS trust is put under special measures. Though, the 
replacement of senior managers will not automatically lead to immediate improvement 
(Rose, 2015).  
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter briefly described how the theoretical and empirical literature on regulation 
in general and healthcare inspections in particular moved from description to a more 
refined analysis of change mechanisms and contextual factors. While the academic 
literature body is growing, the number of evaluation studies on inspection regimes is still 
limited. No scientific literature was found that explores HIW’s acute hospital inspection 
regimes.  
The sparse evidence of regulatory effectiveness signals the inherent difficulties in 
evaluating organisational performance and inspection regimes under real-world 
conditions. The fundamental challenges and real-world complexity call for caution: 
‘Conclusive evidence of effectiveness may never be possible’ (Øvretveit & Gustafson, 
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2002, p. 274). A difficulty, which academic literature tends to neglect, is the variability of 
inspection regimes. Due to the heterogeneity of regulatory tasks and responses, 
inspection regimes rarely follow a standardised format. Moreover, they change over time 
due to the necessity to adapt to new challenges. Since an inspection regime consists of 
different components, it is essential to examine the various mechanisms of what works, 
when and how in the regulatory context.  
Most of the reviewed theoretical frameworks comprise the three core elements of the 
quality improvement cycle: direction, detection and enforcement. The frameworks as 
such do not solve the difficulties of inconsistent information that the researcher is 
confronted with. The framework recently applied in Walshe and colleagues’ evaluation 
of CQC’s hospital inspections provides analytical guidance by comparing the 
assumptions about change mechanisms with the implemented actions, results and 
impact.  
The next chapter will show how the information gathered through this literature review 




This chapter describes the approach and the activities that were undertaken to ensure a 
thorough and systematic inquiry to answer the research questions. It explains the 
rationale for the inquiry and the choice of the particular evaluation approach, strategy 
and methods. The further sections lay out the stages of the research process and the 
specific activities to gather, analyse and interpret the empirical data, including ethical 
issues. The last section discusses the challenges related to this research.  
3.1 Realistic Evaluation 
Over many years, the proponents and opponents of different research paradigms 
engaged in a fundamental debate, which resembled more a war (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) 
than a fruitful dialogue (Guba, 1990). To the present author, a debate on what constitutes 
the right belief appears rather missionary, at best academic, but futile. In her opinion, the 
alleged incompatibility between quantitative and qualitative approaches (Flick, 2011; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985) is a deadlock and a missed opportunity. She fully agrees with 
Patton (2011, p. 13), who pragmatically notes that there are ‘no logical reasons’ why 
qualitative and quantitative data could not be used together. 
Nowadays, many writers portray the various research paradigms and approaches not as 
dichotomies, but as a continuum (Sale & Brazil 2002; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; 
Creswell 2009) which spreads between two poles: 
• A (post)positivist epistemology at one end, which is associated with an objectivist 
ontology and axiology and advocates purely quantitative research. This entails 
measuring quantifiable data and calculating statistical correlations - aiming to 
establish causal relationships. 
• A relativist/constructionist ontology at the other end, which is associated with an 
interpretivist epistemology and subjectivist axiology and advocates purely 
qualitative research. This entails collecting and interpreting qualitative 
information - aiming to investigate a social phenomenon in more depth and thus 
develop a better understanding.  
The realist paradigm stands somewhere in the middle of this continuum, sharing the 
positivist ontology about an objective, external reality, yet acknowledging the inherent 
limitations of human beings to objectively comprehend social phenomena. Realists, such 
as the author of this thesis, recognise that research and researchers are affected by 
values, worldviews and cultural experiences. What primarily counts for a realist 
researcher is a ‘scientific attitude’, which entails systematic, sceptical and ethical 
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research, aiming to establish and/or test theories to explain the real world (Robson, 2011, 
p. 18).  
This research adheres to a subtle realist assumption (Hammersley, 1992) that the reality 
of inspections exists independent from the interpretations of the various stakeholders. 
By addressing hospital regulation and inspection from different viewpoints, the study 
aimed to ‘approximate’ (Denzin & Lincoln 2003, p.14, referring to Guba) and ideally 
capture the complex reality with its inherent mechanisms that occur in social, political 
and other contexts. 
This research seeks to apply the realistic philosophy to an evaluation. Evaluation science 
has increasingly become theory-oriented, employing qualitative, quantitative or mixed 
methods on the basis of which best suits the specific purpose (Donaldson, 2007). Realist 
evaluation as ‘a relatively recent current in theory-oriented evaluation’ (Vaessen & Leeuw 
2009a, p.147) offers a ‘particularly promising approach’ (2009b, p. 13).  
Realist evaluation and research is concerned with revealing the mechanisms (M) which 
generate certain regularities (R) in a corresponding context (C). Pawson and Tilley 
(1997, p. 71) express this in the formula regularity = mechanism + context. In the social 
world, such regularities typically relate to patterns of behaviour which constitute social 
phenomena, changes, specific events or programme outcomes (O). Realist evaluation 
aims ‘to find ways of identifying, articulating, testing and refining conjectured CMO 
configurations’ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p. 74). As the underlying causal mechanisms are 
often hidden (Pawson & Tilley 1997; Pawson 2002; Tilley 2009) initial propositions need 
to be developed and the particular context identified which make the mechanism 
‘contingent and conditional’ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p. 71).  
The choice of realist evaluation was prompted by several factors. The approach informed 
and seems appropriate to answer the research questions (viz. below). Hospital 
inspection regimes (the research subject) constitute real and observable events. Their 
nature resembles a governmental policy which is implemented like a programme; hence 
the choice of programme evaluation. Hospital regulation aims at influencing 
organisational behaviour (Walshe, 2003). Organisational behaviour does not occur on 
its own. In the case of UK hospitals, it results from collective and individual behaviour of 
hospital managers and staff, interacting with inspectors in the complex UK healthcare 
setting with dynamic changes.  
Thus, the general underlying propositions for this thesis were: 
a. There is no single regulatory inspection regime that fits all purposes and hospitals 
equally. The regimes have comparative advantages and disadvantages.  
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b. The diversity of regulatory objectives, regulated hospitals and other 
circumstances require a responsive approach, i.e. regimes that are specific to the 
contextual factors. 
c. The more the regulators are aware of the different context-mechanism-outcome 
configurations, the better arrangements they can make for effective regulation 
and inspection, provided they have the necessary resources, capability and 
motivation. 
The distinction between the features of inspection regimes as strengths and weaknesses 
is a judgement which may not be equally shared by all stakeholders. With its general 
purpose to investigate the strengths and weaknesses, and thus effectiveness, the 
analysis of hospital inspection regimes applied by HIW constitutes a piece of evaluative 
research (Bowling, 2009; Patton, 2002). Besides its evaluative nature, this study also 
addressed contextual and diagnostic aspects (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) and contains 
elements of formative and summative evaluation (Clarke & Dawson, 1999). Ideally, the 
findings and recommendations of this study will contribute to the growing body of 
prescriptive research, i.e. ‘how regulation should be organized’ (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 
40).  
The research has not been primarily conceptualised as implementation evaluation, which 
would examine the difference between planned and actually conducted programme 
activities (Patton, 2002). Yet, such discrepancies are vital for the analysis and have 
therefore been studied. While the application of quantitative methods was initially taken 
into consideration, a predominantly qualitative approach appears more appropriate. This 
is due to the complexity of the regulatory environment, the change dynamics, the nature 
of the research questions and the lack or limited access to relevant quantitative data. 
This evaluation study does not endeavour to control any of the (partly interrelated) 
variables. Despite a general preference for quantitative research designs amongst 
(positivistic) scientists, an experimental design such as a randomised controlled trial 
would not be feasible for this evaluation. Moreover, several authors have critically 
commented on the practical challenges and inherent weaknesses of experimental black 
box designs in complex programme evaluations (Chen & Rossi 1987; Trochim 1989; 
Shadish 1992; Pawson & Tilley 1997; Stame 2004; Donaldson 2007; Yin 2009). 
In line with Pawson and Tilley’s realist programme evaluation (1997) the thesis drew on 
existing quantitative and qualitative information and generated primary (qualitative) data 
to answer the research questions. Explicit programme theories have been generated 
(viz. 2.5 Change mechanisms), tested and refined in an iterative process, which 
substantially relied on (qualitative) interviews and documentary evidence. Inspection 
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reports were used as secondary data sources to inform the research process. The use 
of qualitative methods also reflects the fact that HIW’s inspections reports almost 
exclusively consist of qualitative information, since the practice of scoring hospital 
performance was abandoned in the late 2000s.  
The holistic approach of a case study, which was chosen for this study, allowed more 
depth into the issue under consideration than alternative research designs with a single 
data-collection method (Anderson & Arsenault 1998; Bowling 2009). Despite the 
‘traditional prejudices against the case study’ Yin (2009, p. 14) plausibly argues for the 
advantageousness of case study inquiry as a robust evaluation research strategy, when 
applied rigorously. The case study is particularly suitable ‘to explain presumed causal 
links in real-life interventions that are too complex for surveys or experimental strategies 
(Yin, 2009, p. 19). Moreover, the richness and diversity of data at the selected hospital 
sites are instrumental in identifying the contextual factors which trigger the causal 
mechanisms and influence the outcomes of hospital inspections. Theory-oriented 
evaluation research literature comprises numerous examples of credible case 
evaluations (Yin 1992; Pawson 2002; Vaessen & F. Leeuw 2009a; Posavac 2010). 
3.2 The research design 
After carefully reading the relevant literature, motivated by the researcher’s interest and 
informed by her realist stance and the theoretical framework, the initial research ideas 
were translated into a set of research questions and a corresponding study design. The 
thesis investigated the phenomenon of healthcare regulation with the primary aim to 
answer the question: 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the inspection regimes that HIW has 
implemented in acute care hospitals in Wales? 
The specific research questions were: 
I. How far have the inspection regimes been implemented and what specific 
problems have been encountered during implementation? 
II. Which elements and mechanisms have shown to be effective in which specific 
setting? 
III. What modifications to the regimes are likely to improve their effectiveness in a 
particular setting?  
While the main research question is apparently descriptive, it implies a causal inquiry of 
‘what works, how and why’ as the specific questions show. The formulation of the 
research question was kept deliberately open. Strengths and weaknesses do not refer 
to outputs or outcomes only. They concern any aspect, including inputs, implementation 
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issues and goals, and particular elements of the inspection regimes which work well in 
their context.  
The study was based in Wales and focused on the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (HIW). 
HIW was chosen for various reasons:  
• HIW’s inspection regimes have not been the subject of previous research, 
presumably due to HIW’s small size and untainted reputation.  
• Unlike its counterparts in England, HIW did not undergo severe reorganisations, 
which would have obstructed the research. Conversely, HIW’s inspection 
regimes evolved over time and involve external peer reviewers and lay reviewers; 
a practice which CQC subsequently introduced. 
• After devolution, Wales followed its own path towards organising healthcare and 
healthcare regulation, which promises interesting findings.  
• On its website, HIW publishes inspection reports and other information which can 
inform the research as secondary data in English language.  
The researcher contacted HIW at an early stage to ensure HIW’s participation. In spring 
2014, HIW’s contact person arranged a formal agreement between HIW and the 
researcher, which stipulated the conditions for the evaluation research (viz. Appendix 1 
Agreement between HIW and the researcher). HIW supported the researcher by 
arranging interviews with its staff and providing access to certain documents. Due to 
confidentiality, HIW did not facilitate contacts between its peer or lay reviewers and the 
researcher.  
The selection of the healthcare organisations did not follow an experimental sampling 
logic, but was more a ‘matter of discretionary, judgemental choice’ (Yin, 2009, p. 56). 
The original plan to choose hospital sites as units of analysis based on their inspection 
results and the intended categorisation of hospitals was abandoned, after it became clear 
that this strategy would not work for a variety of reasons:  
• Firstly, a categorisation of hospitals into excellent, average and poor performers 
was not supported by HIW ongoing inspection regimes.  
• Secondly, the researcher had no information about the inspection sites before 
the inspection reports were published.  
• Thirdly, most participants referred in the interviews to several inspections at 
various inspection sites and highlighted the diversity of healthcare quality across 
different wards within the same hospital. Had the researcher restricted the 
interviews to one particular inspection and site, this would have resulted in a loss 
of valuable information. 
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Instead, the researcher decided to recruit participants from all NHS and independent 
healthcare organisations in Wales, which operate acute, non-mental healthcare 
hospitals. It was deemed that this strategy would help to  
1. Cover a wide spectrum of healthcare organisations, hospitals and inspection 
sites, ranging from excellent to sub-average performers, 
2. Capture a variety of experiences with effective and less effective hospital 
inspections, 
3. Identify similar or dissimilar context-mechanism-outcome patterns across the 
different healthcare organisations.  
All relevant NHS healthcare organisations, i.e. seven Local Health Boards (LHBs) and 
one trust, participated in the study. Unexpectedly, each NHS organisation had different 
procedures and forms in place for the approval of the evaluation research. In some 
cases, the respective research and development departments provided additional 
guidance concerning the recruitment of research participants.  
All independent healthcare organisations that were approached initially agreed to 
participate in the study, but two withdrew before an interview took place. In addition, the 
researcher conducted interviews with a representative body of the independent 
healthcare organisations in Wales. 
Table 3 presents the composition of healthcare organisations that participated in the 
study. 
TABLE 3 PARTICIPATING HEALTHCARE ORGANISATIONS 
NHS Independent healthcare 
7 Local health boards (LHBs) 4 independent healthcare organisations 
1 Trust 1 organisation representing the independent 
healthcare organisations  
 
As the stakeholders play an important, interactive role in making implicit programme 
theory explicit and testable (Pawson & Tilley 1997; Donaldson 2007), the invitation of the 
most relevant stakeholders to the research process appeared crucial to its success. The 
identification of participant groups was informed by previous studies on healthcare 
regulation, particularly Benson and colleagues (2004) who in their case-study targeted 
the hospital chief executive, medical director, clinical governance lead, clinical lead for 
the reviewed clinical area, the review manager and assistant director. 
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The major criterion for the selection of participants for the study was their knowledge and 
experience in regulatory hospital inspections in Wales gained through active or passive 
involvement in HIW’s hospital inspections or particular elements of them. This comprised  
• Current and previous HIW managers; 
• Current and previous HIW peer reviewers, including three professionals, who 
participated in the Trusted-to-care spot-checks in 2014, which were organised by 
the Welsh government; 
• Current and previous managers of NHS or independent healthcare organisations 
in Wales, including LHB directors, hospital directors, divisional nurses and clinical 
leads. 
Potential research participants were either identified directly by the researcher or 
recommended by the respective healthcare organisation or other research participants 
(snowballing). The researcher accessed publicly available directories and information 
such as websites of healthcare organisations, publications concerning the inquiry into 
the work of Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (Health and Social Care Committee, 2014) 
and the review of healthcare standards (Welsh Government, 2014). The information 
helped to identify individuals who due to their managerial role were likely to have 
experienced HIW inspections. These managers were approached by email and given 
further information about the study and its purpose. Some participants were recruited 
during two consultation workshops related to the independent inquiry into HIW by the 
Welsh government (Marks, 2014). Other participants were recruited thanks to 
recommendations made by research participants or healthcare managers, who did not 
participate in the study. Typically, the interviews were prearranged via email, but in 
several instances date and location were agreed on the telephone. An information sheet 
(viz. Appendix 2 Information leaflet) and the consent form (viz. Appendix 3 Consent form) 
were sent by email to each participant prior to the interview. Written informed consent 
was sought before the interview started.  
The semi-structured interviews were piloted in spring 2014 aiming to learn about the 
practical difficulties of conducting a case study in a sensitive and topical area as hospital 
regulation. Seven pilot face-to-face interviews were conducted: two with research 
participants from the NHS and five with participants from the independent health sector. 
The piloting was instrumental in applying and modifying the evaluation strategy, 
techniques and interview guide. The interview guide contained a set of pre-formulated 
questions which were structured according to the pre-identified components of the 
inspection regime. During the piloting, the structure of the interview guide was slightly 
modified, several questions were reformulated as open-ended questions and a section 
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on ‘self-assessments’ was added. The latter reflected the relevance that interviewees 
attributed to the self-assessments which HIW had employed in previous inspection 
regimes (viz. Appendix 4 Interview guide). 
Altogether, the researcher approached 67 healthcare managers and interviewed 46 
participants, the majority of whom from the NHS.  
TABLE 4 COMPOSITION OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
Table 4 shows the number of participants according to their place of employment at the 
time of the interviews. Several interviewees fell into more than one category and had 
previous experience in other roles, such as  
• HIW managers who previously worked as NHS managers or vice versa; 
• NHS managers, who performed temporary roles as HIW peer reviewers; 
• Independent hospital managers, who had previously worked in the NHS and 
vice versa. 
Eight participants had either current or previous working experience as HIW managers, 
34 participants had current or previous experience as NHS managers and nine had 
current or previous experience in managing independent hospitals. Amongst the 
healthcare managers were four individuals, who were trained by HIW as Cancer-peer-
reviewers, and seven HIW peer reviewers, three of whom had actively been engaged in 
the Trusted-to-care spot-checks. All interviewees were senior managers with more than 
10 years professional experience. Many participants had additional active or passive 
experience in other inspection regimes, including those conducted by CQC.  
The researcher had initially considered the participation of lay reviewers but was unable 
to gain access. Neither patients nor professional associations or unions were directly 
involved in the study. This approach may be a source of bias but seemed the only 
feasible solution given the restricted time and resources.  
The initial attempt to recruit equal numbers of research participants with a (i) medical, (ii) 
nursing and (iii) non-clinical background was impractical. Despite the efforts to equally 
balance the composition of participants, 67 percent were trained nurses and only 15 
percent of the participants were males. The latter can be explained by the large 













7 31 8 46 
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One participant was interviewed online through skype and 45 participants were 
interviewed face-to-face on site. Face-to-face interviews were preferred due to the more 
natural conversation atmosphere and the opportunity this created for the researcher to 
visit the respective healthcare organisation and gather additional visual evidence. Apart 
from one joint interview, which was arranged at the request of the two interviewees, the 
interviews were conducted confidentially on a one-to-one basis. One HIW manager was 
re-approached for two follow-up interviews on skype, because this was logistic-wise 
more convenient. Previous studies faced similar obstacles in arranging face-to-face 
interviews (Benson et al., 2004) or entirely relied on telephone interviews (OPM referred 
to in Flodgren et al. 2011).  
The overwhelming majority of interviews took place in 2014. Three interviews with 
healthcare managers and two follow-up interviews with one HIW manager were 
conducted in the second half of 2015. 
Due to the iterative nature of the realist evaluation process the actual interviews often 
resembled an informed dialogue, which included clarification and probing questions. 
These were instrumental in refining the programme theory and answering the particular 
research questions concerning the strengths, weaknesses, mechanisms and contextual 
factors of hospital inspections. 
The interviews were audio-recorded with the explicit permission of the participants and 
hand-written notes were made to capture strategic statements of participants and ideas 
of the researcher arising during and after the interviews. The field notes also contained 
information about the setting and the interviewee. Each interview was transcribed and 
electronically saved. The content of interviews was analysed immediately to inform the 
analysis and further interviews. The interviews provided access to additional materials, 
which were beneficial for corroborating the interview data.  
3.3 Analysis 
As explained above, data collection and data analysis are interlinked in realist evaluation. 
Interpretation of context-mechanism-outcome configurations and the related strengths 
and weaknesses of hospital regulatory regimes were developed gradually and in close 
cooperation with the research participants (Manzano, 2016). While data analysis 
techniques and software can facilitate the data analysis and visualisation, they are no 
substitute for the intellectual process of interpretation, which relies on familiarising with 
and reflecting on the collected evidence. The study employed several strategies and 
techniques to support the data analysis (Yin, 2009). The latter include pattern matching, 
the development of logical models and cross-case synthesis. Wherever available the 
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study used both, quantitative and qualitative data, ideally from different sources 
(triangulation) to develop, test and refine its preliminary propositions. 
The qualitative information, i.e. interview transcripts and other documents such as 
inspection reports, was analysed according to the framework analysis method (Ritchie & 
Spencer 1994; Huberman 1994; Miles & Spencer et al. 2003; Green & Thorogood 2004; 
Lacey & Luff 2009). This data analysis method is considered a suitable tool in qualitative 
research to assess policies and procedures that have ‘specific questions, a limited 
timeframe, a pre-designed sample and a priori issues’ (Thomson, Taber, Lally, & 
Kazandjian, 2004). The analysis entailed the activities of (i) Familiarisation, (ii) 
Developing a thematic framework, (iii) Segmentation and coding, (iv) Summarising and 
synthesising, (v) Comparing and contrasting as well as (vi) Interpreting and reviewing. 
(i) Familiarisation  
The researcher familiarised herself with the interview materials by transcribing the 
recordings, repeated reading of and reflecting on interview transcripts, field notes and 
other documents as well as producing memos and summaries. The researcher 
transcribed nine of the interviews and carefully reviewed, proof-read and corrected, when 
necessary, the remaining transcriptions that were produced by a contracted external 
transcriber, who applied the same transcription instructions (viz. Appendix 5 
Transcription instructions). The transcriber undertook to ensure absolute confidentiality 
on the content of the digital recordings and transcripts and to comply with the respective 
instructions stipulated in the agreement (viz. Appendix 6 Agreement between the 
researcher and the transcriber). 
(ii) Developing a thematic framework 
A thematic framework was developed during the desk-study based on the insights gained 
through the preceding literature review (Boyne et al., 2002; Walshe & Phipps, 2013) and 
was refined during the piloting and throughout the analysis of interviews (viz. Table 5 
Thematic framework structure, viz. Appendix 7 Coding framework). The framework was 
instrumental in structuring the interview guide and provided the codes and structure for 
the further analysis of materials.  
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TABLE 5 THEMATIC FRAMEWORK STRUCTURE 
Headings 
 





• UK and Wales 
• Failings in healthcare 
• Ownership (NHS - Independent sector) 
• Size and type of hospitals 
• Variation in care quality 
Regulation and 
inspection 
• HIW’s remit, purpose and general approach 
• HIW review and reorganisation 




• Healthcare standards 
• Registration  
• Self-assessments 
• Selection of inspection sites and pre-inspection information 
Inspection process 
and elements 
• Inspection themes and topics 
• Frequency, timing and duration 
• Inspection mode (unannounced and announced) 
• Inspection methods, process and tools 




• Oral feedback  
• Immediate actions  
• Reporting and publication  
• Action plans 
• Follow-up 
• Enforcement  
• Impact 
(iii) Segmentation and coding 
The interview transcripts were analysed according to the thematic framework (viz. 
Appendix 7 Coding framework and Appendix 8 Example of coded interview transcript), 
which included identifying and attributing themes to certain pieces of the interviews and 
written documents (coding). For the coding and analysis, the qualitative analysis 
software MAXQDA was initially employed, but abandoned as it did not seem to provide 
added value. Mendeley software was used to organise the transcripts, the reviewed 
literature and any other documentary evidence, including inspection reports and 
websites.  
(iv) Summarising and synthesising 
The data were summarised, categorised and synthesised in a systematic way. The 
headings, categories and subcategories from the thematic framework were used to 
structure and present the data. Three master documents were produced, which included 
summarised findings and relevant quotes, structured according to the thematic 
framework (viz. Table 5):  
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• The programme theory and implementation of HIW’s hospital inspection regime 
from HIW’s perspective 
• HIW’s hospital inspection regime from the perspective of healthcare managers 
(based on interviews conducted between March and November 2014) 
• Recent changes in HIW’s hospital inspection regime from the perspective of 
healthcare managers (based on interviews conducted in September – December 
2015) 
(v) Comparing and contrasting 
Next, an analytical document was produced for each major element, which summarised 
the presumed programme theory/logic and contrasted this with the findings from the 
interviews and documents concerning the implementation of the hospital regime. 
Context-mechanism-outcome configurations as well as the perceived strengths of 
inspections were compared across the materials/participants. Differences and 
similarities were established by contrasting the interviews and documentary evidence 
concerning 
• Healthcare organisations and hospitals, i.e. ownership (NHS – independent) and 
size (large LHBs, small hospitals and wards) 
• HIW’s different hospital regimes, i.e. Dignity and Essential Care Inspections, 
cleanliness spot-checks, general hospital inspections 
To examine any possible biases and misinterpretations, comparisons were also drawn 
between the various interviewees (regarding their roles and perspectives) and between 
the various forms of data collection and sources. This included common patterns about 
what certain groups of participants and the reviewed literature perceived as mechanisms 
and strengths or weaknesses of regulatory inspections. Due to their different roles and 
exposure to hospital inspection regimes, interviewees contributed different perspectives 
and insights, which were often limited to particular elements of the hospital regimes. For 
example: in contrast to their colleagues in the independent sector, senior NHS managers 
were rarely interviewed during the inspections. Due to their double role in inspection 
regimes, peer reviewers typically provided very complex and detailed information 
concerning the inspection process and its effect on hospitals.  
(vi) Interpretation and reviewing 
Based on the above, the draft analyses and discussion chapters were produced. These 
included comparisons with findings from other hospital inspections regimes, i.e. Trusted-
to-care spot-checks, Cancer-peer-reviews and CQC inspections. Preliminary 
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conclusions and assumptions were made based on the identified patterns and 
considered alternative interpretations. The draft summary report was shared with the 46 
research participants and peers, including research supervisors, to seek their views, i.e. 
confirmation or alternative interpretations (member checking). Most of the eleven 
research participants who responded had no or only minor comments. At the suggestion 
of a participant, the researcher replaced the term ‘informant’ with ‘participant’ or 
‘interviewee’ and slightly modified the definition of ‘independent hospital’ in the glossary. 
Only two participants, both either current or previous senior HIW managers, provided 
more detailed feedback, particularly concerning chapter 4, Inspecting. Their comments 
often (i) contained additional information such as that HIW’s intelligence strategy had 
recently been published on its website, (ii) emphasised particular aspects or view-points, 
for example that HIW’s decision to recruit peer reviewers was not primarily economically-
driven, (iii) or suggested deleting or adding words such as omitting the word ‘trendy’ 
regarding HIW’s claim of a risk-based inspection approach.   
The feedback was carefully studied and, if plausible, considered in the final version of 
the thesis. Some of the comments were, in agreement with the two participants, 
incorporated in the thesis as citations. 
3.4 Ethical issues 
This study was approved by the university’s ethical-research-committee. NHS Wales 
finally classified the study as service evaluation, since it did not entail clinical research 
and no participants were exposed to any increased risks during the research process. 
Before interviewing, the participants were informed orally and in writing about the (i) aims 
and nature of the research, (ii) the voluntary nature of participation and participants’ 
rights and (iii) researcher’s contact details. The participants were asked for prior written 
consent. A flexible time schedule was offered to accommodate their availability. All 
participants were treated with respect and sensitivity.  
Confidentiality and data protection included: 
• collecting essential information, avoiding unnecessary (personal/sensitive) data 
• audio-recording with prior consent of interviewees 
• safe storage of confidential data. Electronic data were kept on an external hard-
drive, inaccessible by internet and stored alongside hardcopies in a safe, 
inaccessible to outsiders. 
• audio-materials will be sent to the participants upon their request and deleted on 
the researcher’s computer after the research has been completed. 
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• Pseudonyms were used for individuals and no names of hospitals were 
mentioned in the research reports, to avoid any possible damage regarding the 
‘reputation’ or ‘public image’.  
The study was exclusively funded by the researcher’s own means, no third-party funds 
were received.  
3.5 Challenges of the research design and implementation 
Throughout the evaluation, the researcher faced numerous challenges, which included 
unforeseen occurrences. Firstly, the evaluation of CQC’s new hospital inspection regime 
that was commissioned to a team lead by Kieran Walshe (2014) and CQC’s decline of 
the researcher’s request to volunteer in this evaluation meant that she had to abandon 
the original design of a multiple case study. The comparative multiple-case study design, 
which is commonly employed in evaluation research (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009), would 
have potentially provided more variation and thus a better basis for pattern matching 
(Trochim, 1989), theoretical replication (Yin, 2009) and differentiation or specification of 
theory. However, the change in plan allowed the researcher to investigate HIW’s 
inspection regimes more thoroughly. 
Secondly, the scarce inspections of acute hospitals in Wales in 2013 and the delayed 
publication of inspection reports meant that the researcher had to change her initial plan 
to select healthcare organisations based on recent inspections. Waiting for the 
publications would have delayed the research process and resulted in less timely 
information. Instead, the researcher contacted all relevant NHS organisations and 
gathered information about former inspection regimes. While this change undermined 
the plan of evaluating a clearly defined case (i.e. one specific inspection regime), it 
allowed the researcher to identify different features and mechanisms across HIW’s 
previous and current inspection regimes. 
Thirdly, the inquiry of HIW effectiveness by the Welsh Assembly and the subsequent 
independent review (Marks, 2014) proved to be opportunities. The published evidence 
and reports helped to inform this research. The consultative workshops, which Ruth 
Marks invited the researcher to, gave her access to potential research participants. 
Fourthly, the repeated re-nominations of HIW’s contact persons due to the reorganisation 
and high turnover of HIW staff in 2013-14 delayed the start of the interviews. However, 
the formal agreement with HIW, which the new contact person insisted on, proved to be 
instrumental and the new contact person supportive.  
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Fifthly, the National Institute for Social Care and Health Research Permissions Co-
ordinating Unit (NISCHR PCU)3 initially classified the evaluation study as clinical 
research, required the researcher to register the study online in the Integrated Research 
Application System (IRAS project code 162651) and requested her to undergo the 
‘Introduction to Good Clinical Practice’ training. After many weeks of waiting, a change 
in contact persons, exchange of emails and phone calls and the intervention of a 
research manager of an NHS Local Health Board, NISCHR PCU reconsidered its initial 
judgement and finally classified the study as a ‘service evaluation’. This episode delayed 
the research interviews and made the researcher realise how obstructive well-intended 
regulation can be, when interpreted without discretion and common sense. 
Sixthly, in 2014, the Welsh Government organised independently from HIW Trusted-to-
care spot-check, which most interviewees referred to. In two cases, the researcher 
noticed during the interview that the research participant had confused a Trusted-to-care 
spot-check with HIW’s Dignity and Essential Care Inspection (DECI). Though this 
mistake was addressed and clarified during the interviews, it cannot be excluded that 
other participants confused between the two unwittingly. Nonetheless, the references 
made to the Trusted-to-care spot-checks allowed the researcher to make comparisons 
between the two regimes. 
Seventhly, to capture the changes in HIW’s inspection regimes during 2014 and 2015, 
the researcher conducted two further interviews with an HIW manager and three 
interviews with healthcare managers. The interviews also helped to test the findings of 
the preliminary analysis. 
Apart from those unexpected circumstances, the researcher had to address some key 
issues related to the research subject and design. These included: 
The challenges in measuring hospital performance and the effectiveness of inspection 
regimes (as discussed in section 2.3 Healthcare regulation). A comparison of 
categorised assessment results, similar to the scheme in CQC’s pilot inspections 
(Walshe et al., 2014), would have facilitated a comparison over time and different 
regimes. However, HIW discontinued the previous practice of categorising assessments. 
Therefore, the study predominantly analysed process patterns, which is an appropriate 
technique to enhance construct validity (Trochim, 1989). 
Due to the mostly retrospective nature of the study, a recall bias amongst the participants 
could not be excluded. The researcher always asked the participants at the beginning of 
                                                 
3 NISCHR PCU coordinates the process of gaining permissions for research in NHS 
organisations across Wales. 
42 
the interview to describe their most recent experience with an HIW inspection. Moreover, 
she tried whenever possible to triangulate the information. 
Although the study found no major difficulties in recruiting healthcare managers with a 
nursing background, not all potential participants responded, and some interviews never 
materialised, being repeated rescheduled and cancelled. Particularly, invitations sent to 
medical directors remained unanswered or were rejected. Thus, a bias concerning the 
selection of participants, healthcare organisations and data (Arthur & Nazroo, 2003) 
cannot be excluded.  
The available timeframe and resources necessitated a restriction in the number of 
interviewees and prioritisation of participant groups. Given the small number of 
investigated healthcare organisations and hospital inspections, the thesis contains as 
Patton (2002, p. 584) eloquently expressed ‘modest speculations on the likely 
applicability of the findings to other situations under similar, but not identical, conditions’. 
Further evaluation studies may be needed to confirm or refine its findings and the 
suggested modifications to the inspection regimes. 
As a piece of qualitative evaluation research, the thesis does not claim to be externally 
replicable in a quantitative, experimental sense. The data collection and data analyses 
procedures in this study have been systematically conducted and documented to allow 
other investigators to repeat the operations and come to the same conclusions (Yin, 
2009). However, the interview transcripts have not been enclosed in the final thesis to 
ensure confidentiality. 
Although the researcher received intellectual and moral support from her academic and 
practice-based supervisors, the primary responsibility for the research is hers. A multi-
disciplinary research team would most likely have offered ‘a more comprehensive 
perspective’ and thus may have come to slightly different interpretations (Rossman & 
Wilson, 1994). 
It cannot be excluded that the researcher influenced the research findings directly or 
indirectly by her personality, gender (female), cultural (German), professional and 
educational background (MBA in hospital management) and language skills (non-native 
English speaker).  
Her role as independent, foreign researcher, neither employed by an inspecting body nor 
the hospitals, placed her in an independent position, which potentially created trust and 
credibility amongst the various stakeholders. Research from inside through for example 
participant observation and with insider knowledge may have yielded slightly different 
data and interpretations. However, the confidentiality assured, and the rapport 
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established between the researcher and the interviewees provided the opportunity for 
expressing their views on the inspections that otherwise (i.e. through a document review 
only) would have remained unexpressed. Moreover, documentary and verbal evidence 
(interviews) from multiple sources have been used to establish a plausible chain of 
evidence. The comments research participants made on the draft study reports have 
been carefully reviewed and considered in the final version of the study report. All these 
tactics aim at enhancing construct validity (Yin, 2009).  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described how the realist evaluation approach guided the study design 
and the actual research process. Theory-driven programme evaluation seems a 
particularly suitable approach for the investigation of the regulatory hospital inspections, 
which occur in a complex and dynamic ‘real world’ environment. Due to the combination 
of regulatory theory and practice it offers ‘some important lessons in how to make 
regulation work better’ (Walshe, 2003, p. 238). Conversely, an experimental strategy 
would neither have been feasible nor recommendable under field conditions. 
The change in circumstances necessitated deviations from the original research plan 
and thus required a balanced decision between flexibility and rigor. The strength of this 
study lies predominantly in the iterative discussions with research participants from 
different stakeholder groups and the use of other sources of evidence to confirm or falsify 
specific features of the programme/change theories and contrast the theory with actual 
implementation. Yet, certain biases and discrepancies in judgement are likely to remain 
due to the nature of this social science research. 
The following chapters will present the findings concerning the strengths and 
weaknesses of HIW’s hospital inspection regimes and its different components based on 
the document review and interviews with the various participant groups – starting with 
the Inspectorate itself. 
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Part II. Hospital inspections – HIW’s perspective and the hospital 
managers’ views 
The second part of the thesis contains two chapters, which comprise the findings from 
the document review and the interviews with research participants. Chapter four presents 
HIW’s hospital inspections from the perspective of the inspectorate, chapter five presents 
the views of the inspected healthcare organisations.  
The structure of the chapters follows the thematic framework (viz. chapter 3 
Methodology): 
• The context, which describes the events and environment in which HIW’s inspections 
take place 
• HIW’s general approach, which outlines the thematic focus, purpose and principles 
of HIW’s inspection regimes 
• Pre-inspection process, which includes the (i) healthcare standards, (ii) registration, 
(iii) self-assessments and (iv) selection of inspection sites 
• On-site inspection, which comprises the (i) frequency, duration and depth, (ii) 
inspection mode, (iii) methods, process and tools as well as (iv) the inspection team 
• Post-inspection process, which describes the (i) immediate feedback, (ii) reporting, 
(iii) action plans, (iv) follow-up and (v) enforcement 
• Perceived impact of HIW inspections. 
For the sake of confidentiality and readability, no distinction is made in the text between 





This chapter describes HIW and its hospital inspection regimes from the perspective of 
the inspectorate, relying on official documents and interviews with HIW participants. As 
explained in the methodology chapter above, this comprises eight interviews in 2014 and 
2015 with people who had current or previous working experience at the inspectorate 
and statements by eleven peer reviewers when made from an ‘inspecting’ perspective. 
The first section set the scene for the analysis of the three process stages. The latter 
sections describe how the inspections are supposed to be conducted, explore the nature 
of the problems which occurred during implementation, consider which elements and 
mechanisms worked or did not, and summarise the changes that HIW participants 
recommended to increase effectiveness. 
4.1 Development and context of HIW’s inspection regimes 
Wales is a small country with 3.17 million inhabitants (“Population of Wales 2016 
[online],” 2016), 38 NHS hospitals with acute care functions and 31 community 
hospitals4, which comprise approximately 600 wards or areas to be inspected, as well as 
seven acute independent hospitals (Marks, 2014; NHS Wales, 2016). Since 2009, NHS 
Wales has been structured into three trusts and seven Local Health Boards (LHBs), 
which in contrast to England are responsible for both, commissioning and providing 
healthcare (Longley, Riley, Davies, & Hernández-Quevedo, 2012). 
According to HIW participants, the small size of Wales and the few stakeholders facilitate 
HIW’s work regarding networking, exchanging soft intelligence as well as identifying 
concerns and trends. Review bodies in Wales have a history of cooperation, which is 
manifested through a joint website (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2013b), concordats 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2005a), joint reviews (Wales Audit Office & Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2013) and health summits. 
HIW was established in 2004 as a governmental organisation, inheriting the functions 
from the Commission for Health Improvement (Hutt, 2004). Over the years, its functions 
expanded, including independent healthcare regulation, statutory supervision of 
midwives and clinical reviews of deaths in prison. As a regulatory body HIW’s role has 
been to provide ‘assurance about the efficiency, quality and safety in the absence of 
competition’ (Care & Social Services Inspectorate Wales, Estyn, HIW, & Wales Audit 
Office, 2011, p. 4). Although HIW emphasises its professional independence, the 
overwhelming share of HIW’s revenues derives from the Welsh government.  
                                                 
4 Excluding specialised mental health hospitals. 
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Initially, HIW (2007a) reviewed healthcare organisations against the whole range of 
healthcare standards (and still does in the independent sector). HIW’s inspection 
regimes evolved in response to external factors, such as failings in UK healthcare, new 
government policies or duties given to HIW, and to internal developments, such as 
inspection findings and suggestions made by peer reviewers.  
Based on the experience that inspection regimes or particular elements become obsolete 
over time, either because they have achieved their goals, or they appeared to be not 
effective enough, HIW has kept modifying the inspection scope, themes and formats. 
HIW’s initial comprehensive compliance reviews in the NHS were replaced by more 
thematically-targeted inspection regimes: the cleanliness spot-checks in the late 2000s 
and the Dignity and Essential Care Inspections (DECIs) in the 2010s. With its four 
domains, i.e. (i) patient focus, (ii) patient experience, (iii) staffing, management and 
leadership and (iv) quality and safety, DECIs responded to the issues of poor care found 
at Mid Staffordshire in England and became HIW’s major inspection regime for acute 
hospitals during the early 2010s. No disagreements concerning HIW’s hospital 
inspection regimes were noted in the interviews with HIW managers. 
DECI ‘is our main acute hospital product’ (IN18). 
External and internal developments substantially weakened HIW’s capacity and 
performance between 2012 and 2014 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2013c; Thomas, 
2013), which HIW managers highlighted during the interviews. These included the 
budget cuts and early severance/retirement schemes, the relocation of HIW’s head 
office, unfilled vacancies and the discontinuity in HIW’s leadership. As a result, hardly 
any NHS hospital inspections were conducted in 2013 and several inspection reports 
remained unfinished. This undermined HIW’s credibility as a regulator. 
‘I think we’ve had a hell of a job of work to do, in terms of rebuilding 
our credibility.’ (IN14) 
These problems and the public discourse on regulatory effectiveness in England 
triggered a public inquiry into the work of HIW (Health and Social Care Committee, 2014) 
and a subsequent review (Marks, 2014). At about the same time, an independent report 
on poor care within one NHS organisation in Wales was published (Andrews & Butler, 
2014), which prompted the so-called Trusted-to-care spot-checks of seventy hospital 
wards in 2014. Due to HIW’s capacity constraints, the Welsh government organised its 
spot-checks independently from HIW.  
HIW resumed and intensified its activities during 2014 and launched a new hospital 
inspection regime in 2015 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015o, 2015q), which 
reviews against the new health and care standards (NHS Wales, 2015b). While its focus 
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on patient experience, delivery of care, management and leadership resembles 
resembles the DECI, the new regime covers more hospital wards per inspection 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2016a). With the publication of the summarised findings 
from its DECIs (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015n) in 2015 and the new regime in 
2016 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2016e), HIW (2007b) revived the previous 
practice of thematic reporting. Until 2016, when the government established a new 
steering group, HIW (2016f) had successfully supported the Cancer and Palliative care 
peer-review programmes through guidance, (lay) reviewers and organisational 
arrangements. HIW participants expressed their appreciation for the peer review scheme 
as a model, separate from HIW’s regular inspection regimes. 
‘‘The peer review is a really, really good model. And I believe that 
professionally and clinically, because it absolutely transfers 
knowledge back, and across.’(IN22)  
Differences have remained between HIW’s inspection regimes for NHS and independent 
hospitals, though one HIW participant stated that the inspectorate might consider a 
unified inspection approach for all acute hospitals. 
‘There are large similarities. But, where there are differences, I think 
we need to actually look at what is best, so that we can perhaps have 
one regime for both the independent and the NHS.’(IN22) 
The same interviewee reflected on future changes to HIW’s inspection regime, such as 
longer inspections covering the entire hospital or inspections along patient pathways. 
HIW has not documented the specific, underlying programme theories. While supporting 
the hospital inspection regimes, HIW managers sometimes articulated different views 
and suppositions as to how particular components of its inspection regimes work. HIW 
(2015f) defined four ‘outcomes’ and respective activities to achieve its purposes, which 
include providing assurance, promoting improvement, strengthening the voice of patients 
and influencing policy and standards. HIW have been using diverse regulatory means 
and informal approaches in striking the optimal balance to achieve its purpose(s) with its 
restricted financial means. 
‘We would probably need to double our funding to do a good job. It’s 
not a secret to say that our budget is about three million pounds. 
CQC’s is about two hundred million.’ (IN18) 
‘We can’t argue, you know, there is a very constrained pot in Wales. 
Therefore, we have to be satisfied that everything that we spend the 
money on adds value’ (IN11). 
Thereby, the inspectorate is aware that, no matter how effectively it sets its priorities, it 
cannot guarantee a 100 percent level of assurance. 
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‘Because there’s a cost attached to each of these things. ‘Do you 
want us to give you a 100 percent guarantee that everything is 
always going to be OK? Forget it.’ (IN6). 
4.2 Pre-inspection 
The findings presented below refer to those aspects or activities within HIW’s inspection 
regimes that take place before the inspection team arrives at the hospital. This includes 
(i) healthcare standards, (ii) registration, (iii) self-assessments and (iv) selection of 
inspection sites. These elements are supposed to direct the healthcare organisations, 
establish a common understanding of the expected performance and inform HIW’s 
decisions on inspection topics and criteria as well as inspection sites. 
4.2.1 Healthcare standards  
HIW reviews the healthcare services against ‘a range of published standards, policies, 
guidance and regulations’ (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2014e). Amongst those were 
the 26 Doing-Well-Doing-Better (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010) for the NHS and 
the regulatory 25 National ‘Minimum Standards for Independent Health Care Services’ 
in Wales (Welsh Assembly Government, 2011) for the independent healthcare sector. In 
2014, the Welsh government launched a review with the aim to unify the standards for 
all healthcare providers. The review aimed at integrating the ‘Fundamentals of Care’, 
which HIW predominantly employed in its Dignity and Essential Care Inspections 
(DECIs), and incorporating the recommendations from the Francis inquiry (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2014). In order to develop ownership and thus ‘guarantee the 
success of the revision of the standards’, the Welsh Government (2014, p. 2) invited all 
relevant stakeholders. Although HIW was actively involved in the development and 
review of healthcare standards, it is not HIW’s, but the government’s role to set and 
endorse them.  
‘We clearly wanted them [the standards] to be owned by the 
government, because I felt, if they are owned by the government, 
actually they are more powerful.’ (IN6) 
The previous healthcare standards and the ‘Fundamentals of care’ explicitly aimed at 
quality improvement (Welsh Assembly Government, 2003, 2005b, 2010). The new, 
combined Health and Care Standards more modestly aspire to ‘form the cornerstone of 
the overall quality assurance system within the NHS in Wales’ (NHS Wales, 2015b, p. 
5). Due to their intention to be applicable ‘to all types and size of services regardless of 
their setting’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010, p. 5), the Doing-Well-Doing-Better 
standards were generic. Though the new Health and Care Standards claim to be 
outcomes (NHS Wales, 2015b), they are not quantifiable, neither are the associated 
criteria (Malley, Holder, Dodgson, & Booth, 2014). Only a few of the standards and 
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criteria directly concern clinical effectiveness. Most standards relate to patient 
experience, human resources management or other managerial aspects. HIW managers 
recognised the difficulty to measure standards that derive from complex concepts such 
as dignity and respect5. While the standards are open to subjective judgement and bias, 
at the same time, they give the reviewers leeway for reasonable judgement. 
‘It works both ways. If you have rigid standards there is no room for 
manoeuvring for any party.’(IN13) 
Referring to the more positive results and thus apparently more effective independent 
hospital inspections, some HIW participants considered the non-regulatory status of 
NHS healthcare standards a weakness in HIW’s inspection regimes which required 
changing. According to another HIW participant, the positive results in independent 
hospital inspections seemed to be more related to the attitude and commitment of 
independent managers rather than the regulatory status of standards.  
‘Even though they’ve [independent hospital managers] met the 
standard, most of them […] are not happy with the gold bar position. 
They want the platinum. They are never satisfied.’ (IN13) 
This and the fact that the commercial success of independent hospitals depends on good 
reputation and thus on positive assessment reports leave severe doubts that regulatory 
standards would automatically enhance compliance and quality in NHS hospitals. 
4.2.2 Registration  
In contrast to England, in Wales only independent healthcare providers are obliged to 
register and thereby demonstrate their compliance with the healthcare standards.  
‘[The purpose of the registration is] to make sure that the service they 
[independent hospitals] provide is safe for patients. That’s the main 
reason. And there is a set of regulations and standards behind those 
regulations.’ (IN12). 
HIW interviewees admitted that there was no plausible explanation for this duality in 
treatment of NHS and independent healthcare providers other than the historic 
development.  
‘It’s the same service at the end of the day. If you go to an NHS 
hospital to have an operation or if you go into a private hospital to 
have an operation.’ (IN12) 
                                                 
5 Standard No.10 in the Doing-Well-Doing-Better Standards and the National Minimum 
Standards. 
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Independent hospitals are registered for certain conditions, such as a named manager 
or number of beds. HIW aims to support new healthcare providers with adequate 
guidance:  
‘We’ve got guidance on how to meet the standards. […] And they 
pretty much take you through what you need to do to comply.’ (IN12) 
No evidence was gathered during the study that suggests a negative attitude or deterrent 
approach towards new acute healthcare providers. The respective HIW manager 
described the pre-registration process of an acute independent hospital as transparent 
and professional, emphasising the importance of appointing contact persons on each 
side. 
‘They had a link person, which was really important’. … ‘they kept us 
updated.’ (IN13)  
To improve the effectiveness of NHS inspections, some HIW participants advocated for 
the registration and licensing of all healthcare providers, similar to England. They argued 
that this would allow HIW to revoke the registration in case of a serious breach of 
standards or regulations by NHS organisations. Another HIW manager pointed to 
professional self-regulation and HIW’s cooperation with professional bodies. 
 ‘Whilst NHS organisations aren’t registered, every medical 
practitioner working in them needs to be registered with their relevant 
professional body. In this respect, HIW does have a route to raise 
concerns with these bodies if it identified risks to patients as a result 
of poor care and treatment and has routinely done so.’(IN14) 
4.2.3 Self-assessments 
In 2007, the Welsh government (2005b) introduced mandatory self-assessments against 
the healthcare standards, to be tested and validated by HIW as a ‘third line of defence’ 
(Dixon et al. 2012, p.15). The rationale of this approach was to shift the responsibility to 
the healthcare organisations and thus help to establish ownership and effective internal 
governance mechanisms. One former HIW manager described how HIW tested and 
challenged the self-assessments during the first few years.    
‘We disagreed with them [NHS organisations] quite often: “Your self-
assessment here, we don’t agree, because we don’t think this 
evidence is convincing.”.‘ (IN6) 
The participant further explained that, as time went on, the NHS organisations omitted 
updating the self-assessment, which she interpreted as ‘bad habits’ and laziness. Within 
the current framework, the LHBs and NHS trusts forward their annual self-assessment 
reports to the government. HIW is in charge of reviewing the governance and 
accountability module. The self-assessments inform the discussion between the 
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government, HIW and other review bodies at the healthcare summits (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015c). The LHBs usually receive some feedback after the summit.  
To increase (self)regulatory effectiveness, one HIW interviewee proposed a legal 
obligation for NHS organisations to publish the self-assessments and thus expose them 
to public scrutiny.  
‘They should have published them [the self-assessments] on their 
own website, but again we couldn’t make them’ (IN6).  
4.2.4 Selection of inspection sites and pre-inspection information 
In the past, HIW usually inspected the wards within a hospital randomly, suggesting that 
this element of surprise (viz. 4.3.2 Inspection mode) may keep healthcare managers 
alert. 
‘One or a group of wards picked at random and you have to keep on 
testing your own thinking: These were actually picked up random, 
they didn’t know we were coming.’ (IN6) 
In recent publications, HIW (2012c, 2014a, 2015t) has claimed to apply a proportionate, 
risk-based and intelligence-led approach in its hospital inspection regimes, which implies 
a purposeful selection of inspection sites based on prior data-analysis. The reviewed 
documents and interviews identified four rationales for HIW’s inspections, which however 
partly deviate from the proportionate or risk-based inspection approach: 
i. Some inspections are conducted for the sake of visibility and alertness: even if 
there is no concrete evidence of concerns, omitting inspections for several years 
may risk incompliant behaviour. 
 ‘purposeful selection may include sites that the data tells us have not 
had an independent visit for a long time. I believe that ‘blind spots’ do 
themselves constitute risk’ (IN11).  
ii. Independent hospitals expect annual inspections (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales, 2012c; Taber, 2013).  
iii. Healthcare services with inherently higher risk-levels due to the vulnerability of 
patients are intended to be regularly inspected (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 
2015t). 
iv. Healthcare organisations with reported problems or poor indicators should 
undergo more inspections than others.  
According to a former HIW manager, HIW became over time ‘an intuitive and intelligent 
inspectorate’, that monthly reviewed the available information, identified emerging trends 
and risk patterns and took informed decisions concerning the sites to be inspected. This 
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statement was qualified, if not contradicted by two newly appointed HIW managers, who 
maintained that until recently HIW did not have the necessary capability. Since 2013, 
HIW’s ability to systematically analyse hospital data has increased after establishing a 
corporate intelligence team (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015c, 2015p) and 
enhancing the mechanisms to share and use intelligence (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales, 2016g, 2017a) The decision on which sites to inspect involves the intelligence 
team, the relationship manager for the respective Local Health Board (LHB) and the lead 
review manager.  
’[The intelligence] team will produce pre-inspection evidence packs. 
And that will involve drawing on published data, non-published data, 
but also a lot of other intelligence sources.’ (IN9)  
HIW introduced the roles of relationship managers and lead review managers for every 
LHB to enhance the identification of trends at an early stage and the feedback of 
concerns to the respective healthcare organisation, the government and the Wales Audit 
Office and thus increase the effectiveness of its inspection regime.  
HIW has access to data and information from different sources, including self-
assessments, fundamentals of care audit reports and performance data, but also soft 
intelligence. Opinions amongst HIW participants differed concerning the extent to which 
data should inform the inspections and selection of inspection sites. For a purposeful 
selection of inspection sites, one HIW interviewee considered only a small set of six or 
seven key indicators as decisive and admitted that those do not always form a clear 
pattern.  
‘If we come up with a rank list of 10 wards, I wouldn’t necessarily 
assume that they are absolutely accurate. What I might say is the 
ones that are close to the top are probably better than the ones that 
are close to the bottom.’ (IN9) 
Another HIW participant called for caution not to solely look at data that are seemingly 
of concern, due to the risk of framing the reviewers’ minds. 
‘To what extent is an inspection truly independent, if you go in with 
preconceived ideas of what the issues might be?’ and concluded ‘we 
shouldn't be going in too far with our inspections, with having formed 
our judgement before we arrive.’ (IN11) 
One peer reviewer supported this argument by instancing the example of a Trusted-to-
care spot-check, which found poor care despite wonderful data.  
‘It was interesting, because some of the worst areas that we found, 
had wonderful data. That’s bit worrying, isn’t it?’ (IN38) 
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To prevent potential bias, the peer reviewer explained that she refused to see the 
available intelligence prior to a later HIW inspection. Typically, HIW shares the collated 
data and information in the pre-inspection meeting with the external reviewers, who, like 
in the above case, may not always wish to be influenced by prior knowledge.  
Access to statistical data and soft intelligence, including complaints and sensitive 
information from hospital staff, patients and their relatives, reportedly allowed HIW to 
conjecture about hospital wards. Although, as HIW managers and reviewers conceded, 
the available information may not necessarily lead to firm conclusions, participants 
emphasised that similar or reoccurring problems within a hospital or LHB might indicate 
a systemic problem, which requires further investigation. 
‘We got three wards, they all got problems with infection. That means 
that we have to make an inquiry about the whole.‘ (IN6) 
Regarding the organisational implications, HIW senior managers carefully examine and 
countercheck information before acting according to the ‘degrees of being worried’. While 
HIW’s access to relevant data and enhanced analytical capacity can potentially increase 
regulatory effectiveness, one HIW participant advised caution. 
‘This is still a very small team that has to contend with a vast amount 
of data and other intelligence.’ (IN14) 
4.3 On-site inspection  
The findings presented below refer to the aspects and components which are relevant 
at the time when the hospital is inspected. This relates to the (i) frequency, duration and 
depth, (ii) inspection mode (iii) methods and tools as well as the (iv) inspection team. 
These factors are instrumental in detecting whether a hospital is compliant or not with 
the respective regulations and standards.  
4.3.1 Frequency, duration and depth 
During the inquiry in 2013, HIW’s new chief executive raised the question of a ‘minimum 
frequency of visits, for particular settings’ (Health and Social Care Committee, 2014, p. 
21) and put annual or six-monthly inspections into acute hospitals up for discussion. 
HIW’s activity levels in 2012/13 and 2013/14 were undisputedly low and admittedly 
insufficient for HIW to provide confident assurance (Health and Social Care Committee, 
2014). 
‘We can only provide as much assurance as we can, based on the 
resources that we got to do it. So, we got to try and do as much as 
we can.’ (IN14) 
54 
The targeted fifty wards for the Dignity and Essential Care Inspections (DECI)6 in 
2014/15 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2014f) were in comparison to the eight DECIs 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2014a) in 2013/14, a significant increase, but, as HIW 
managers admitted, still a small number. 
HIW’s decision to maximize coverage7 for the 2014/5 programme was driven by HIW’s 
intention to demonstrate presence and operational capability. Most, but not all of the 52 
DECIs in 2014/15 were conducted over a period of two days each (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015n), two of them on weekend days (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales 2015h; 2015i). The eight NHS hospital inspections during 2015/16, though a 
comparatively low figure at first sight, covered 15 hospitals and 43 wards in total 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2016a). HIW (2015s, p. 8), expected from this approach 
‘a more robust assessment of themes and issues’, hoping to support learning and 
improvement. Admittedly, the larger number of sites per inspection was accompanied by 
a reduction in the depth of the inspections at each ward.  
‘We are trying to strike a balance between coverage and the kind of 
depth based on the resources that we have.’ (IN14) 
In the independent sector, HIW intends to pay at least one annual visit to each acute 
hospital. While in the 2000s HIW visited an independent hospital up to four times per 
year, in the early 2010s inspections became less frequent. 
‘If possible, we like to visit all seven, because of the risk work that 
they do. In terms of- No matter how good they are, the fact that you 
are dealing with general anaesthetics, you are dealing with minors, 
with surgery, always places you within the ample direct category.’ 
(IN13) 
4.3.2 Inspection mode 
HIW’s current hospitals inspections are predominantly unannounced, in contrast to the 
announced reviews against standards in the mid-2000s and the governance reviews 
(Wales Audit Office & Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2013). Despite the general 
preference for unannounced inspections, HIW interviewees acknowledged that 
announcements can contribute to regulatory effectiveness. One participant referred to 
CQC’s announced ‘massive’ inspections in 2013/14, which due to increased publicity 
and visibility had a positive, preventative effect on other healthcare providers, who feared 
to get caught and exposed, if they did not get their ‘act together’. HIW participants 
considered announced inspections as particularly suitable to drive improvement.  
                                                 
6 52 DECIs including 6 follow-ups were conducted in 2014/15. 
7 Coverage refers to the percentage of inspected hospitals out of the total number of hospitals. 
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‘If we are here to make a difference and to drive improvement, and 
you announce the inspection, and the behaviour that you get from 
that is that someone says “Oh dear, someone’s coming in six weeks’ 
time. We better improve our- we better train people, we better update 
our policies, we better clean the ward, we better do X, Y, Z.” I think 
that can be a good thing, because it achieves the same end result.’ 
(IN18) 
Announced inspections seem the only option, as another HIW participant explained, for 
paediatric services in independent hospitals due to the need to obtain informed consent 
for the interviews with children. HIW participants deemed an unannounced mode most 
suitable and effective for testing healthcare organisations in aspects such as cleanliness 
or pursuing a reported case of poor care. 
To prevent any information leaks, HIW informs the respective peer reviewers about the 
particular location only one day before the inspection.  
‘There is a culture of not wanting to tell anyone when you are going 
into an unannounced inspection, because you don’t trust anyone to 
keep it quiet.’ (IN18) 
For the same reason, only two people knew the exact schedule and hospital wards of 
the unannounced Trusted-to-care spot-checks in 2014.  
Though very rare and not necessarily revealed in HIW’s inspection reports, some 
hospital inspections have been requested by the LHBs themselves. HIW also receives 
invitations to participate in the LHBs’ internal inspection schemes, which it is reluctant to 
accept with regard to its scarce resources. 
4.3.3 Inspection process, methods and tools  
The preparation for a Dignity and Essential Care Inspection (DECI) starts a week prior 
to the inspection with HIW’s review manager receiving pre-inspection intelligence from 
HIW’s intelligence team and continues with a team meeting shortly before the inspection. 
On arrival at the hospital, HIW informs the key stakeholders about the unannounced 
inspection, introduces the team members and conducts the inspection, unless there are 
legitimate reasons not to enter a particular ward. 
‘You spent ten minutes when you go in, talking to whoever is in 
charge, or a quarter of an hour. Ask them to show you around, ask if 
there is somewhere where you shouldn’t go, in case you got an 
infection, you know, or somebody in the last days of life, you know, 
it’s not appropriate. And then, you say, you know, “I am going to 
speak to patients, staff, if there are relatives in the ward I am going to 
look at the patients’ notes, the patients’ forms and charts, and then I’ll 
come back to you if I have any queries, and then I’ll feedback to you 
before we leave”.’ (IN38) 
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Later, the team meets to discuss the findings, necessary corrective actions and the 
feedback for the subsequent debriefing with relevant professional and managerial staff.  
The process of independent hospital inspections is not dissimilar to the above but 
appears to be well-established with clear individual responsibilities.  
‘We do the walk. [reviewer A] will look in every room and every 
cupboard and look at every document and he will go outside and look 
at the water chlorination tanks. […] [reviewer B], myself and [reviewer 
C] will look at the documentation, [reviewer C] will very well start 
speaking, just sitting quietly observing, talking to staff without 
interfering with their work, checking with patients, relatives and 
visitors. Anytime they would like to have a little discussion or talk is 
up to them, and so we gather our picture, slow but sure in the first 
three hours. […] We also arrange to meet at half past twelve, one 
o’clock, so we do debriefing amongst ourselves. It’s really important, 
because it may inform the focus of our next stage of visit.’ (IN13) 
The Cancer-peer-review8 process differs in that the inspected service completes in 
advance of the announced visit an online self-assessment. The peer reviewers are given 
sufficient time to critically review the strengths and weaknesses, interview the service 
providers and scrutinise the service.  
DECIs employ various methods: (i) document review, (ii) interviews, (iii) surveys and (iv) 
observation. 
(i) Reviewed documents include written policies, patient documentation and 
quantitative data. Since data are compiled and analysed at HIW’s head office 
prior to the DECI, the inspection team concentrates on gathering and reviewing 
complementary information at the site. 
(ii) HIW interviews patients, relatives and staff, which HIW aims to do without 
interfering. In NHS inspections, it is typically the lay reviewer’s task to interview 
patients and relatives. According to several peer reviewers, patients, especially 
the elderly, appreciate narrative interviews. Structured interviews were said to 
discourage patients from sharing information, particularly when the interviewer 
mechanically asked questions or writes notes in the patients’ presence. Recently, 
HIW also started interviewing senior managers from ‘the Health Board’ 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015h) or ‘the directorate’ (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015q).  
(iii) Surveys for patients, relatives and visitors were introduced in the course of 2014 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2014c). Though the tool has not been published, 
                                                 
8 The Cancer-peer-review programme had been supported until 2016 by HIW but was operated 
independently from HIW. 
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apparently the structured questionnaire allows patients to add comments and 
rate the care between 0 and 10 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015k). The 
thematic report, which contains the patient experience questionnaire results 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015n), does not present any scores, but the 
percentages for each of the three answer categories9 for 18 pre-formulated 
statements. Although HIW (2015n) received over 330 completed patient 
experience questionnaires from the 2014-15 DECIs, not all 46 DECI reports 
mention questionnaires. Later inspection reports in 2015 contain information 
about the results from self-administered staff questionnaires (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2016c). 
(iv) During general walks, the team members scan the physical environment and 
observe how patients are processed. Sensory evidence such as an aroma of 
mould or urine is used to establish patterns and informs further assessment 
activities. Reviewers explained that they try to underpin the first impression with 
factual evidence and analyse these clues to identify patterns. 
HIW’s cleanliness spot-checks and DECIs rely on comprehensive checklists. According 
to one HIW manager, the development of HIW’s inspection tools is informed by recent 
research and clinical guidelines issued by recognised bodies such as the Royal College 
of Physicians. For its cleanliness spot-checks HIW (2014d) adapted the Infection control 
audit tool, developed by the Nurses Association (ICNA)10. According to two peer 
reviewers, HIW’s first infection reviews in 2006/7 and the Dignity and respect spot-
checks in 2009/10 did not initially employ tested inspection tools. The interviewees 
described how a small team of clinicians developed the tools for the DECI programme in 
2011, piloted and adapted them subsequently. The basis for the tools were themes and 
topics that were extrapolated from official reports. At a later stage, the themes and 
findings were linked with corresponding healthcare standards.  
’So that when health boards got reports back, they could say: “This is 
our evidence against these standards.”.’ (IN44) 
The interviewed peer reviewers emphasised the need to regularly adapt the inspection 
tools with regard to new findings and events such as Mid Staffordshire. The peer 
reviewers described the development of effective inspection tools as a learning process 
and complained that existing tools were not often enough reviewed in the past. 
Conversely, new tools can initially cause disruption. 
                                                 
9 ‘Agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘disagree’. 
10 Renamed in 2006: Infection Prevention Society (IPS). 
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‘They were also using a new tool on that day, so they seemed to be 
kind of struggling with the new tool and… who was doing what, and 
they seemed a little disorganised’ (IN19) 
The tools, that HIW’s cleanliness spot-checks and DECIs rely on, are according to peer 
reviewers each between twenty and thirty pages long and require about six hours per 
ward to be administered. Not surprisingly, some peer reviewers referred to the DECI 
inspection as repetitive paperwork.  
‘The paperwork for the [Trusted-to-care] spot-check was a lot better 
from the one for Inspectorate Wales, because it wasn’t a lot of 
repetitive questions. […] generally, with the spot-check, you could 
ask whatever question that you wanted, which I think the patients 
benefited from and the staff benefited from.’ (IN41) 
Although noting an improvement in HIW’s 2014 inspections, one participant still saw a 
need for refining the tools, which she and reportedly many other reviewers fed back to 
HIW during a training and review meeting in 2014. Some participants contrasted HIW’s 
comprehensive inspection tools with the simple prompt cards11  that the Trusted-to-care 
review team chose, emphasising that the latter created a more pleasant interview 
atmosphere. The reviewers stated that they quickly internalised the topics and questions.  
‘With the prompt cards, once you get used what is on there, you are 
not juggling, looking at a piece of paper, then asking a question, 
because you already know what is on the prompt card after you have 
interviewed a couple of people.’ (IN41) 
Pointing to the trade-offs between elaborate checklists and prompt cards, an HIW 
manager explained: 
‘Prompt cards rely a lot on the professional judgement of the 
reviewer: this can mean that the judgements can be susceptible to 
the particular bias of a reviewer. It can also reduce the consistency of 
coverage.’ (IN11) 
Some HIW interviewees and various peer reviewers relativized the importance of tools, 
arguing that inspection tools can neither substitute human senses nor compensate for a 
lack of analytical skills. Therefore, they suggested a degree of flexibility and discretion in 
administering inspection tools. 
‘You have tools to guide you, tools do not judge you. Overreliance on 
tools and a checklist will very quickly lead to a path of no return as far 
as I’m concerned. You must have a knowledge based in skill. Often 
when we find breaches or disclosures made to us, you must have the 
ability to see where something is untold.’ (IN13) 
                                                 
11 Sheets with a heading and some orientating questions. 
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One HIW participant explained the weaknesses in CQC’s previous inspection 
programmes with an overreliance on checklists, combined with infrequent visits and not-
fit-for purpose inspectors. 
While previously inspection methodologies and tools had been published on HIW’s 
website (Cooper 2005; Jones 2005; Healthcare Inspectorate Wales 2006a; 2006b; 2008; 
2009), the later DECI tools were not. The early DECI reports in 2012 contain a link to the 
assessment tool which, however, ceased to be valid. Although one HIW participant 
conceded that the publication of inspection tools would increase transparency, she 
worried about the cost for the required translation into Welsh.  
Although HIW’s (2017b) guide on NHS hospital inspections does not contain assessment 
tools, in a comment on the draft thesis, HIW stated that:  
‘Specific tools are not confidential and are available on request.’ 
(IN11) 
4.3.4 Inspection team 
Inspection teams should, as several HIW participants explained, comprise a mix of 
relevant competencies, including professional and interpersonal skills as well as 
knowledge of healthcare regulation and standards. Amongst the 50 staff members are 
30 inspection and regulation staff12. In addition to its permanent staff, HIW has a pool of 
about 200 external reviewers. 
A typical DECI team consists of HIW’s review manager, one or two peer reviewers and 
a lay reviewer, though HIW acknowledged that several inspections in 2014 were 
accompanied for training purposes by more staff. Due to the broader scope, independent 
hospital inspections comprise, besides the inspector manager, a clinician, an engineer 
and recently also a lay reviewer. In the Cancer-peer-review programme13, a 
multidisciplinary team of clinicians, a lay reviewer and sometimes an HIW inspector 
reviews the self-assessments and conducts the announced visits.  
With its temporary assignments of peer reviewers, HIW continues the Healthcare 
Commission’s practice to buy in external clinical expertise and invite service users rather 
than exclusively relying on its own staff.  
The following sections summarise the findings concerning the different team members: 
review managers, peer reviewers and lay reviewers. 
                                                 
12 full time equivalents (European Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services 
and Social Care, n.d.). 
13 This programme was supported by HIW but run independently. 
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In 2014, HIW assigned one senior review manager for every LHB. HIW’s review 
managers are supposed to lead inspection teams and manage the inputs from peer and 
lay reviewers (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015r). According to an HIW manager, 
only four out of the 11 review managers in post in August 2015 had a nursing clinical 
background, amongst them was HIW’s inspection manager for the independent sector. 
Opinions amongst HIW managers varied on whether review managers required clinical 
expertise. While one HIW interviewee regarded the lack of clinical experience amongst 
review managers as potentially undermining HIW’s credibility, another HIW participant 
disagreed, pointing to the clinical expertise of peer reviewers within the inspection team.  
‘It is likely that this dichotomy of opinion comes from the fact that HIW 
sits within the civil service and as a result has previously employed 
generalist civil servants to undertake this work. […] The issue here is 
that it remains unclear whether HIW regards regulation and 
inspection as a professional task that should be undertaken by 
people with relevant knowledge and experience.’ (IN14) 
The interviewed peer reviewers drew a fairly positive picture of current and previous HIW 
review managers, praising some as ‘absolutely fantastic’, ‘amazing and brilliant’, ‘very 
good’ and ‘senior individuals, who were absolutely on the ball’. Yet, one peer reviewer 
also mentioned problems in the past that arose from an overstrained and inexperienced 
inspector, who replaced a senior colleague. Peer reviewers emphasised the importance 
of leadership and communication skills, which includes encouraging and listening to peer 
reviewers, expressing appreciation and taking informed decisions. In the presence of a 
strong peer reviewer, some review managers were reportedly reluctant to lead the team. 
HIW subsequent recruitment of experienced inspectors with a nursing or social services 
background has made, according to an HIW manager, ‘a significant contribution to the 
success of HIW’.   
DECI reports do not contain information about the inspection team, whereas other HIW 
inspection reports, particularly thematic reviews and independent hospital inspections, 
did or do specify names (Wales Audit Office & Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2013) 
and roles (2007b, 2011) or the team composition (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 
2012a, 2016b). The inspection manager for the independent sector can reportedly 
choose the external reviewers, which ensures that the team possesses the relevant 
competencies. It is not entirely clear whether all HIW review managers enjoy the same 
freedom or have the necessary experience to make such informed decisions. One HIW 
participant asserted that setting up the right team with experts to cover as many aspects 
of a certain system as possible is crucial for regulatory effectiveness. The same 
participant explained that new team members need to be supported in developing skills.  
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‘They [unexperienced inspection team members] have to have that 
confidence in you that you are not going to laugh about their 
inexperience… and the fact that they’ve got stripped from their skill 
base, that’s confidential and should be nurtured. Nurturing is very 
important in all aspects of any inspection for all parties involved in it.’ 
(IN13) 
According to the participant, a review manager should behave in a firm and polite 
manner, especially when conveying negative findings and enforcement decisions. A 
tough inspector with ‘a heavy hand’ can evoke non-cooperative behaviour by healthcare 
managers, who thence ignore or challenge the findings. While the participant expressed 
her respect for the managers of inspected hospitals, she also warned that an inspector 
had to be vigilant, because trust can be abused. Similarly, another senior HIW manager 
advocated for both cooperation with healthcare providers and vigilance. 
‘It’s a fine line between being captured, being cruised and being 
collaborative’. (IN6).  
HIW emphasised and peer reviewers confirmed that HIW peer reviewers are selected 
through a formal recruitment process. No peer reviewer reported about an inexperienced 
fellow reviewer. However, one peer reviewer noticed during an inspection that some of 
HIW’s earlier cleanliness spot-checks did not include a specialist peer reviewer and 
therefore, as she deduced, resulted in an unjustifiable clean bill. The same peer reviewer 
instanced an example where she had supported a small, independent hospital in 
reviewing its infection control policies after an inspection. 
HIW very positively referred to peer reviewers as its ‘ambassadors’ in the health sector. 
HIW participants elucidated the importance of peer reviewers by acknowledging the 
specific expertise necessary ‘to drill down’ in a particular specialty area. 
HIW confirmed that most of its registered peer reviewers are nurses with relevant 
experience. In the past, most peer reviewers were seconded by the NHS and not paid 
by HIW. HIW’s decision in 2014 to pay peer reviewers increased their commitment, as 
one HIW participant stated. Peer reviewers elucidated the difficulties in the past, which 
resulted from the secondment. They appreciated the change in HIW’s policy, i.e. to pay 
for their services, though two mentioned delays in the payment transfer. Peer reviewers 
explained that the need to coordinate the assignments with their main place of work in 
the NHS restricted their availability for HIW inspections, particularly when called at short 
notice.  
Lay reviewers, i.e. service users or other members of the public, are considered an 
important element in HIW’s inspection regimes and also in the Cancer-peer-review 
programme, which runs independently from HIW. According to one HIW participant, the 
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selected lay reviewers used to be matched with the profile of the inspected service. 
Typically, lay reviewers are charged with the task of approaching patients, relatives or 
visitors for feedback on their experience (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2017c). HIW’s 
policy to financially compensate its lay reviewers changed in 2016 and became the 
subject of a political debate (BBC, 2015). HIW explained the decision with financial 
constraints and the intention align its policy with similar bodies in the UK and Wales.  
HIW organises induction and training for its peer and lay reviewers. The meetings and 
feedback create the opportunity for discussion and changes to the inspection methods 
and tools. The recruitment of new reviewers can bring in new ideas and viewpoints, 
which one HIW participant regarded as very positive. The interviewed peer reviewers 
appreciated the gatherings, that HIW had organised in 2014, yet they pleaded for more 
regular meetings. One peer reviewer recommended organising regular meetings, e.g. 
every three to six months, to exchange information between HIW and its peer reviewers, 
particularly to gather feedback and proposals for the improvement of inspection tools 
and methods. 
Participants in the Cancer-peer-review14 training especially remembered the role play, 
which some described as a good and fascinating exercise.  
‘We did role play. So, what’s it like being inspected or peer reviewed, 
and what’s it like to be the reviewer. And it was a fascinating 
exercise. We used real data, and we were a real team. […] I left there 
feeling really assured about that process.‘ (IN36) 
The training and team-building that the Trusted-to-care spot-check reviewers described, 
reportedly helped them later to act as a team and discuss the findings.  
4.4 Post-inspection 
The findings presented below refer to the aspects and activities within the inspection 
process, which take place after the hospital has been inspected. This relates to the (i) 
immediate feedback, (ii) inspection reports and their publication, (iii) action plans, (iv) 
follow-up and (v) enforcement. These components are supposed to inform the relevant 
stakeholders about the degree of compliance with regulations and standards and, if 
necessary, enforce that corrective actions are taken. 
4.4.1 Immediate feedback 
HIW’s hospital inspections usually conclude with a debriefing on site, during which the 
inspection team presents the findings and highlights the necessity for immediate actions. 
                                                 
14 Until 2016, HIW supported this programme through guidance, (lay) reviewers and 
organisational arrangements. 
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In a preparatory internal meeting, the inspection team collates, summarises and 
discusses their findings in order to verify and agree upon the statements to be made 
during the debriefing. 
HIW considers oral feedback, particularly concerning actions that the hospitals will be 
required to do, as an effective element in the inspection regime. Particularly, independent 
hospital managers were said to often proactively approach HIW inspectors for specific 
advice during and outside inspections. 
‘We do have a lot of response. Because for them [acute independent 
hospitals] it’s their life line of business. Feedback is essential to them. 
As a corporation and in terms of their image.’ (IN13) 
Peer reviewers noticed variations in the composition of participants at the debriefings, 
which they interpreted in many ways. Two peer reviewers saw in the mix of participants 
a barometer of how seriously the inspected organisation took the inspection. Another 
peer reviewer deduced from the attendance of very senior LHB managers a large interest 
in the initial cleanliness spot-checks and interpreted the later prevalence of junior 
managers as a sign that the inspections lost their impetus. Conversely another peer 
reviewer noticed that after the prominent failings in UK healthcare LHBs increasingly 
valued HIW inspections.  
HIW intends to apply a non-confrontational approach and present both, positive and 
negative findings.  
‘I will always give a rationale as to why I have formed an opinion or a 
judgement. […] And you can’t rely upon a list. Not with the big 
players. They sense weakness. There is no other word for it. […] 
“When you’ve done an inspection, and you’re sitting in a board room 
or conference room or wherever it may be, and you have two or five 
reviewers, and you have six people, seven people at the other side of 
the table, all ready to challenge every review, every remark unless 
you can evidence it, you have to be extremely sure of your facts, and 
you have to know how to move things along”.’ (IN13) 
According to the peer reviewers, HIW’s inspection teams carefully check and triangulate 
evidence prior to the debriefing. 
‘If only one person saw something, you had to triangulate. […] You 
couldn’t report at the end of the day something that only one person 
saw, unless it was really serious.’ (IN44) 
Reviewers sometimes reported about challenging and emotional discussions, 
particularly with healthcare managers who took criticism personally. 
Prior to 2015, NHS managers, other than the ward manager, were usually not 
interviewed in the inspection and thus the debriefing constituted the first opportunity for 
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senior managers to enter a dialogue with the reviewers. Especially, the presence of the 
(clinical) peer reviewers gives their counterparts at the hospitals the possibility to learn 
at first-hand about the findings and challenge them.  
‘A strength is that we use peer reviewers, that we immediately 
feedback our findings at the end of the inspection. So, if the… ward, 
or director nurse or whoever is there want[s] to challenge, then we 
have that challenge then, and we come away knowing exactly what 
we are going to say about them, and that there is no surprise.’ (IN18)   
It is HIW’s policy to address quality and safety issues that require immediate corrective 
actions at the debriefing and by a management letter to the healthcare organisations 
within two days after the inspection, copied to the Welsh government for follow-up. 
Examples of immediate resolution can be found in HIW’s (2014g, 2015j) DECI reports. 
According to its own account, HIW issued 68% of immediate assurance letters within the 
target time in 2014/15 (2015c). An HIW interviewee described a rigorous handling of 
serious breaches in independent hospitals, though a rare phenomenon. It is unclear 
whether all HIW review managers demonstrate a similar behaviour and commitment in 
NHS inspections, where the requirement for immediate actions is not unusual. 
4.4.2 Reporting 
As HIW (2015s) depicted in its strategy map, the inspectorate considers reporting as a 
means to provide assurance and promote improvement. Factors that help to increase 
regulatory effectiveness through reporting are (i) addressing and activating the target 
readership, (ii) accuracy and timeliness, (iii) accessibility and (iv) readability. 
Opinions amongst HIW participants varied concerning the target readership of inspection 
reports. Given the length and ‘impenetrable’ language of HIW’s previous reports, one 
recently recruited HIW manager presumed the healthcare professionals as the target 
audience in the past. Another HIW participant considered the patients as the current and 
ultimate focus, because their informed choices increase the effectiveness of an 
inspection regime.  
Although, as one HIW manager explained, in theory people opt for healthcare providers 
with positive inspection results and thus force poor healthcare providers to improve or 
terminate their services, in reality, other factors come into play such as geographical 
distance and cost. Allegedly, HIW has experienced many requests for information and 
inspections reports concerning independent hospitals. Based on her conversations with 
potential and actual users of independent hospitals, one HIW manager considered the 
majority of users as well-informed, using various sources of information to choose 
amongst independent hospitals. According to the same participant, cross-reading 
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inspection reports has been a common practice within the small and competitive 
independent hospital community.  
While HIW admitted that NHS patients, unlike private patients, typically do not have a 
free choice amongst different hospitals in Wales, the inspectorate emphasised the right 
of the public to learn about hospital inspection results. As an HIW participant explained, 
negative reports may prompt the population to approach their local representatives. 
Moreover, local or national media have been instrumental in raising awareness and 
political pressure on healthcare providers through interventions of social and political 
actors. Another HIW interviewee referred to the role of the Welsh government. 
‘Ministers did, both individually and collectively, so, individual reports 
and individual organisations, they were taken very seriously and 
acted upon.’ (IN6) 
For consistency reasons, it is the task of HIW’s reviewer manager to draft the inspection 
report and that of the respective peer reviewers to review the draft. The interviewed peer 
reviewers appreciated the opportunity to revise incorrect or wrongly contextualised 
formulations in the draft reports. Some peer reviewers complained that, in former 
inspection regimes, they were at times excluded from reporting. The exclusion led to 
inaccuracies in the published reports, particularly when the author, i.e. the HIW review 
manager, had no clinical background. 
Within three weeks after the inspection, HIW (2014f) aims to send the draft report to the 
inspected body for a factual accuracy check and within 3 months to publish the final 
report. Target times were previously longer, i.e. twelve weeks for draft reports and four 
months for the publication. During 2012-2013, HIW massively exceeded its targets with 
some inspection reports being published 12 months and more after the inspection 
(Cairns, 2013; Duerden & Hopkins, 2013; Taber, 2013). Timeliness improved during 
2014/15 with HIW issuing 61% of the draft and 67% of the final inspection reports within 
the target time (2015c). However, 17% of the inspection reports were published after 
more than 100 days, four of which after more than 150 days (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales, 2015c). HIW’s managers were aware of the reputational damage that the severe 
delays, which were also raised during public inquiry in 2013 (Health and Social Care 
Committee, 2014), caused. 
HIW participants mentioned a variety of factors, which caused or contributed to the 
severe delays in the past. Firstly, there were capacity problems resulting from turnover 
of staff between 2012 and 2014, maternity leave and long-term illness. Secondly, delays 
were explained with a perceived lack of leadership resulting from the announced change 
of HIW’s senior management in 2012/13 and thirdly, HIW’s obligation to produce bi-
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lingual reports consumes extra-time. One peer reviewer explained that due to their 
secondment in the past, peer reviewers lacked the time and financial incentive to write 
their part of the report immediately after the inspection. 
HIW publishes reports on its website. Its user-unfriendliness and the lack of updates 
were criticised during the public inquiry (Health and Social Care Committee, 2014). Plans 
to overhaul HIW’s website existed in 2012 but were not implemented until 2014. Most 
LHBs present inspection reports and improvement plans either on their website or via 
links to HIW’s website (Abertawe Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board 
2014; Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board 2016). LHBs also report about inspection 
results in their annual reports. The DECIs in 2014/15 generated a large quantity of 
inspection reports, which informed HIW’s (2015n) thematic report  across Wales. 
Moreover, HIW published for each LHB in August 2015 annual reports that highlight key 
themes that were identified during HIW’s inspections. The inspection manager for the 
independent sector reportedly encouraged hospital managers to share good practice in 
order to learn from each other and improve healthcare. 
HIW uses public and social media to announce inspections and inspection results. HIW 
admitted the challenge to convey a balanced message to the public through the media, 
given the media’s preference for negative news.  
‘Health is a big and constant story and good news stories don’t make 
the media, means that, I think the public receives a very misleading 
picture of the state of healthcare in Wales through the media. And it’s 
very challenging for us to give them a more balanced presentation’ 
(IN11).  
Many HIW managers saw the need to improve not only timeliness, but also the content, 
structure, language and style of reporting. Since 2014 HIW has introduced changes to 
make the reports more consistent and readable for all potential readers, which 
considering conflicting expectations poses a dilemma. One HIW manager, informed by 
her regular contact with patients, stated that 90 percent of patients of independent 
hospitals would not appreciate the new reporting format. Another HIW interviewee 
wondered whether the public finds word-of-mouth recommendations more meaningful 
for their decision-making than inspection reports.  
The most obvious changes in the DECI reports since 2013/14 relate to structure and 
layout. HIW managers emphasised that the new reporting format contained explicit 
conclusions about the provided healthcare and the judgement about the healthcare 
service, which the previous reports lacked. In its attempts to make a judgemental 
statement, HIW has neither returned to its former traffic-lights scheme nor to CQC’s 
recently introduced framework.  
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‘Because if you look at the work that CQC have put in, to say whether 
it’s outstanding or whatever, we simply don’t have the capacity to 
introduce that level of consistency at the moment.’ (IN11)  
4.4.3 Action plan 
HIW expects the inspected organisation to submit a draft improvement plan in response 
to negative findings. Former and current HIW managers described their experience with 
improvement plans15 as variable.  
‘If you look at some of the action plans that we reviewed recently, 
[name] and I, there were some that were very good, and there were 
others where there were lots of words, and lovely language, but 
actually it was a meaningless pile of management nonsense.’ (IN14) 
One peer reviewer therefore proposed that HIW should consult the respective peer 
reviewers concerning the quality of improvement plans.  
DECI reports include either the agreed improvement plan or a template as an appendix. 
Every DECI report states that the improvement plan, which the inspected organisation is 
required to submit ‘within two weeks of the report being published’ (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015f), will be published on HIW’s website. Many improvements 
plans have not been published in spite of being submitted and agreed (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2014b) and reminders by LHBs (Cardiff and Vale University Health 
Board, 2014). This shows, as HIW admitted in 2015, that the process was not working. 
At the time of publication, the action plan might have already been partially implemented. 
‘We write our report, we publish it within three months, we receive an 
action plan back from the health board which is also published on our 
website. And, by which state, when we are publishing our report, 
actually, the health board has put a lot of this action into place.’ 
(IN22) 
4.4.4 Follow-up 
With NHS organisations responsible for the implementation of corrective actions and 
accountable to the Welsh government, HIW’s role used to end at assuring the quality of 
the submitted action plans. This architecture initially worked, but then ‘decayed’ with very 
little follow-up and further assurance sought by the government. 
‘the theory was working OK: the inspectorate inspects, it quality-
assures the action plan, basically says: Yes, the action plan, if they 
do it, will actually meet all these things, but because we are not 
legally able to hold you to account, because we don’t have that kind 
of relationship, we’ll give it to you, health department. [] It worked for 
five years. [] but then that kind of decayed - that is the best word to 
                                                 
15 In its earlier reports, HIW uses the term ‘action plan’, since 2014 ‘improvement plan’  
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say - after 2009, because of the reorganisation, we ended up 
with.’(IN6) 
With regard to the importance of external follow-up visits and accountability mechanisms, 
several HIW managers and reviewers regarded the rare or inconsistent follow-ups a 
weakness of HIW’s inspection regimes. However, one participant claimed that HIW 
conducts follow-up visits when necessary and expressed her view that the healthcare 
organisations implement the improvement plans in anticipation of a possible follow-up 
visit.  
In its efforts to maximise the impact of its inspections, HIW (2015c) has reviewed its 
follow-up practice. Since 2014/15, its inspection reports have documented follow-up of 
previous inspection findings (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2016b, 2016e), including 
those of the Trusted-to-care spot-checks (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015m, 
2015u). Moreover, HIW conducted six follow-up visits in 2014/2015. Four of those visits 
were, however, prompted by the legacy of HIW’s internal problems in 2013. All six follow-
up inspections were announced, which in the opinion of one HIW interviewee, had no 
influence on the findings.  
For practical reasons, HIW’s follow-up visits at NHS hospitals are not necessarily 
conducted by the same team that carried out the preceding inspection. While one peer 
reviewer considered the same team composition as ideal, conversely, HIW relies on the 
consistency of its inspection methodology and the review manager. In the independent 
sector, HIW conducts as many follow-up visits ‘as necessary’. 
‘Depends on the criteria, I am just trying to think … As many [follow-
up visits] as necessary, but we will still monitor their plan, and 
compliance, that is normally by email to confirm. In terms of their 
action plan, they may submit once, every twenty-four hours for the 
first seven days, depending on how serious the breach is. Then it 
goes to weekly to tell us the progression by which time they may 
have had another one or two visits anyway.’ (IN13) 
  
4.4.5 Enforcement  
On its own, HIW has no regulatory powers to put an NHS organisation under special 
measures, fine or close it down, in contrast to CQC in England. Conversely, HIW uses 
several formal and informal mechanisms to influence compliance and improvement. 
Thereby, the inspectors should use their own judgement and not lose sight of the main 
goal of regulatory inspections, as a senior manager explained.  
‘Compliance doesn’t give you assurance, it gives you compliant 
behaviour. […] A safe hospital is much more than be[ing] compliant 
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with regulations. It is actually demonstrating behaviours of safety, a 
culture, a climate, an active management of risks.’ (IN6) 
According to this participant, HIW interacts with the inspected hospital through 
negotiation. This includes tactical manoeuvres like threatening the hospital to take 
enforcement actions such as closing a facility, to require weekly meetings and progress 
updates, or to publish weekly updates and statements. Although this participant stated 
that ‘there was nothing stopping HIW closing a unit down’, to date this has not happened.  
‘There’s a little bit in those formal systems, so you got to have a little 
bit of flexibility, because if the law doesn’t say it, interpret the law … 
to give it a leverage.’ (IN6) 
The participant instanced severe, but admittedly very rare cases, where HIW tested ‘the 
limits of legislation.’ She did not see the need for extra powers.  
‘The publicity, the publication of information about the organisation 
would be enough leavers. To have the ability to fine you won’t do 
anything […] action plan, updates, and letters.’ (IN6)  
Due to the Welsh government’s responsibility to manage NHS performance, HIW 
forwards relevant information to the Welsh government. One HIW participant instanced 
the example of a serious issue that HIW reported by letter to the government in 2014. As 
a result, the Welsh government contacted the LHB for further explanation on the 
corrective actions to be taken.  
In the past, HIW had exercised influence through informal contacts to the government. 
This included as a former HIW manager stated ‘occasionally a phone call to the minister’, 
which another HIW manager considered unthinkable for the CQC to do. Until April 2014, 
information between HIW and the Welsh government was exchanged, and action taken 
on an ad hoc basis. Since then, formal mechanisms are in place to deal with serious 
issues. Besides the regular bi-annual meetings, HIW can ask for an extraordinary 
meeting to open a case and advise the government together with the Wales Audit Office 
to escalate and enforce measures for a particular NHS organisation (NHS Wales, 2014). 
The framework comprises four escalation levels.  
Several HIW interviewees regarded the close interaction between HIW and the Welsh 
government as very effective. One participant weighed the potential benefit of receiving 
more enforcement powers with the legal challenges and the need to train reviewers in 
how evidence findings appropriately. Although considering the CQC regulatory role as 
more powerful than HIW’s, another participant admitted that the CQC refrains from 
closing NHS premises. 
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Several HIW interviewees deemed the existing powers over the independent sector 
sufficient, which include imposing conditions or sanctions. Although HIW has the 
authority to revoke the registration of an acute independent hospital, this never 
happened. Nevertheless, one HIW manager associated HIW’s regulation powers as 
decisive for the higher effectiveness of HIW’s independent hospital inspections 
compared to NHS inspections. Independent hospitals in Wales are, however, much 
smaller in size and scope of services than their giant NHS counterparts which are 
subjected to closer scrutiny, exercised by numerous review bodies and schemes. 
‘The bigger question is the extent to which such a fragmented 
approach to regulation and performance management is the most 
effective way to drive improvement of NHS healthcare in Wales.’ 
(IN14) 
4.5 Wider impact 
Neither the findings from the document review nor the interviews suggest that HIW had 
installed until 2015 mechanisms to regularly and systematically assess the effectiveness 
of its hospital inspection regimes16. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for HIW to 
assess the impact of its inspection regimes. Some sporadic follow-up visits had been 
conducted in the past which assessed the progress hospitals had made in implementing 
the action plans. The documented follow-up of previous inspection findings during 
subsequent inspections since 2014/15 could be a first step to establish internal 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2016b). 
Judging from HIW’s reported sporadic follow-up, evidence provided during the Welsh 
Assembly’s inquiry and the research interviews, it seems that HIW has been effective in 
some areas and with some healthcare organisations. An example are the follow-up visits, 
which HIW conducted as part of its cleanliness spot-checks and which found that ‘a 
number of the issues we identified had been addressed and that staff had worked hard 
in order to achieve this’ (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2012b, p. 27). 
Another example are the announced follow-up inspections in 2014/15, which showed 
varying degrees of progress amongst the NHS wards (viz. section 4.4.4 Follow-up). The 
reports declared ‘excellent progress’ only for one of the four wards revisited in 2014 
(Jones, 2014) and required one of the two wards revisited in 2015 to complete a further 
improvement plan (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015e). HIW’s (2015c) annual report  
presents the follow-up visit in March 2015 as evidence of HIW’s impact, without 
mentioning that it was announced. Several unannounced DECI reports, which made 
                                                 
16 In 2016, HIW (2016d) did, however, evaluate its homicide investigations.  
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reference to previous inspection findings, expressed disappointment about several 
previous findings that had not improved (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015m).  
In general, HIW participants seemed in agreement that the inspection results were more 
positive in the independent sector and inspections comparatively less effective in the 
NHS. 
‘In fact, it’s one of those things we are coming across this year, 
certainly where they are saying: You know, you can regulate very 
stringently, which you do, which in most parts they welcome because 
it embeds good practice, good attitude, good culture working. What 
about the NHS? You read their reports and it’s repetitive, repetitive, 
repetitive, year after year.’ (IN13) 
4.6 Conclusion 
The findings showed several, mostly externally-driven developments, which positively or 
negatively affected HIW’s inspection regimes and thus regulatory effectiveness, such as:  
(i) The prominent failings in UK healthcare raised awareness for regulatory 
effectiveness amongst policy makers, healthcare professionals and HIW itself.  
(ii) The self-assessments, which the government introduced to shift the responsibility for 
quality assurance to healthcare providers, overburdened HIW and thus undermined 
HIW’s regulatory effectiveness. 
(iii) The cooperation with other review bodies has been instrumental in sharing data and 
soft intelligence and strengthened HIW’s clout. 
(iv) The staff vacancies and turnover in 2012-14 weakened HIW’s capacity to conduct, 
report and follow-up inspections. With the new recruitments in place, HIW managed 
to strengthen its analytic capability and inspection capacity. 
HIW has faced several difficulties in implementing its inspection regimes. The limited 
funds and capacity have often forced HIW to strike a balance between different types of 
activities and tactics. HIW is not able to annually inspect every NHS hospital and 
therefore has to pre-select inspection sites. The lack of ward-specific data does not 
wholly support targeted inspections, despite HIW’s repeated claims to apply a 
proportionate or risk-based approach. Given the variability of performance across wards, 
it seemed wise for HIW not to entirely rely on retrospective, self-reported, aggregated 
data, but in addition to use soft intelligence and inspect hospitals with good performance 
data. The small number of inspections conducted in 2012-14, delayed reports and 
insufficient follow-up in the past jeopardised the effectiveness of HIW’s inspection 
regime. HIW did not sufficiently show local presence, which would have kept hospital 
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managers on their toes, and thereby presumably failed to detect non-compliance at the 
uninspected hospitals.  
External reviewers with inside, clinical expertise (peer reviewers) and personal 
experience and empathy (lay reviewers) are recognised as a major strength in HIW’s 
inspection regime. HIW has been honest in admitting that the scope, depth and duration 
of its inspections do not facilitate a general statement about the healthcare quality of an 
inspected hospital. Room for improvement was identified in the post-inspection process, 
especially concerning the delayed reporting and infrequent follow-up. HIW has 
recognised its (previous) shortcomings and taken steps to solve issues.  
Over the years, HIW’s inspection regimes underwent significant changes regarding 
thematic scope, frequency and methodologies. Inspection regimes adapted to external 
events, new policies and findings to maintain or increase their effectiveness. Differences 
exist in the regulation and inspection between NHS and independent hospitals, the 
legitimacy of which is difficult to comprehend. Differences are also noticeable in the 
inspection results. The findings suggest that HIW inspections have been more successful 
and thus effective in independent hospitals, which seems to result from a variety of 
factors. These, amongst other findings, will be further studied in the next chapter, which 
examines HIW’s inspection regime from the healthcare managers’ perspective. 
  
73 
5 Being inspected 
This chapter describes HIW’s hospital inspections from the perspective of inspected 
healthcare organisations. It summarises the interviews with 31 NHS and eight 
independent healthcare managers and includes statements by peer reviewers when 
made from a ‘being inspected’ perspective. The first section sets the scene for the 
analysis of the three process stages. The latter sections describe how the different 
components of the inspections were conducted and the problems that occurred. 
Moreover, the chapter examines which elements worked or did not and summarises the 
changes that the managers of the inspected organisations recommended to increase 
regulatory effectiveness. 
5.1 Situational context and background 
Although some interviewed healthcare managers alluded to a possible political 
motivation behind certain actions or omissions by HIW, none of the participants seriously 
questioned HIW’s professional objectivity. Participants from the independent sector, 
which HIW has been regulating since 2006, acknowledged HIW’s impartiality which they 
contrasted to the Welsh government’s disinclination towards the private sector.  
NHS managers stated that the reorganisation of NHS Wales in 2009 had led to larger 
size and increased complexity in some Local Health Boards (LHBs). This widened the 
divide between the executive managers at the top and the healthcare providers at the 
frontline and thus made quality assurance more difficult. HIW was perceived to play a 
potentially beneficial role by informing and externally validating the LHB’s internal 
assurance systems. 
As in the previous chapter, the ‘small country’ context of Wales was seen as both, 
positive (facilitating conversation and shared experience) and negative (self-centred, 
with a limited pool of reviewers and the risk of closed ranks or capture). Moreover, 
healthcare managers noted that the reductions in public expenditures had increased the 
pressure on NHS hospitals to an extent that made it difficult to provide effective, safe 
and compassionate healthcare. NHS managers saw a role for HIW in addressing factors, 
that compromise healthcare, in its reports and communication with the Welsh 
government.  
None of the participants questioned the necessity of external inspections, by contrast 
many hospital managers advocated a strong inspectorate with competent reviewers and 
robust inspections. Participants generally considered HIW’s focal topics relevant, some 
few topics were, however, classed as ‘whims’. Several NHS managers, including peer 
reviewers, considered the DECI’s focus on nursing care as rather narrow, proposing a 
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broader thematic spectrum and multidisciplinary approach. During 2014 and 2015, many 
participants noticed modifications in the design, themes and particular topics that HIW 
inspections pursued, such as meal times, infection control and medicine management.  
Independent hospital managers noted a more thematic focus in 2014, contrary to the 
development in HIW’s NHS inspections, where the thematic scope had noticeably 
widened. Opinions amongst NHS managers on what would constitute the best focus for 
HIW’s inspections varied. Suggestions ranged from reviewing hospital governance 
systems at the top level to healthcare delivery at ward-level as well as patient pathways 
across different healthcare services. Some participants suggested an improvement-
oriented inspection approach, using thematic clusters, which, when the hospitals met or 
exceeded the expectations, would move on to the next cluster.  
Most of research participants appreciated the Cancer-peer-review programme, which 
runs independently from HIW, as a useful and good model to transfer professional 
knowledge and best clinical practice.  
‘It’s an opportunity to think about your own service and to comment 
upon it. Sometimes, none of us are perfect, and we can learn from 
each other with peer review, which is why I would encourage anyone 
to be a peer reviewer, to go and have a look at somewhere else.’ 
(IN15) 
Some healthcare managers critically noted that the Cancer reviews did not coordinate 
with HIW’s hospital inspections. 
5.2 Pre-inspection 
The findings presented under the pre-inspection process refer to those aspects or 
activities within HIW’s inspection regimes, which take place before the inspection team 
arrives at the hospital. These components are supposed to direct the healthcare 
organisations, establish a common understanding of the expected performance and 
inform HIW’s decisions on inspection topics and criteria as well as inspection sites.  
5.1.1 Healthcare standards 
NHS managers reported that frontline staff were familiar with the ‘Fundamentals of Care’. 
Yet, the acceptance of these professional standards amongst NHS staff did not 
automatically lead to positive inspection results. Due to the resource limitations and work 
pressure, NHS participants found it challenging to consistently adhere to these 
standards. According to one NHS participant, the healthcare standards ‘tend to drive 
mediocrity’ in large NHS organisations rather than quality improvement.  
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‘In an organisation as large and complex as any NHS body, it would 
be difficult ever to other than be somewhere in the middle, because 
you will get variance and inconsistency across services. (IN10) 
Similarly, another participant advocated for more ambiguous standards. 
‘Patients deserve excellent care, really. And if you set your standards 
low and everyone can tick the box, … then there is no great impetus 
to improve.’ (IN3)  
Other participants referred to particular sets of standards and guidelines, which they 
considered more demanding and thus potentially more effective to drive improvement. 
Numerous NHS managers criticised the room for interpretation that the generic 
standards left and illustrated diverging interpretations of certain standards during 
inspections. 
‘If the inspectors are not grounded, they may think of a platinum 
standard, that we would struggle to meet even in a good day or a 
medium day.’ (IN46) 
Many healthcare managers advocated for more specific, quantifiable outcome-oriented 
indicators, which would give less cause for diverging interpretations. None of the 
independent managers conveyed difficulties or disagreements with HIW’s interpretations 
of the standards. Only one independent manager referred to occasional inflexibility of 
some peer reviewers.  
 ‘There is sometimes interpretation by some of the inspectors that are 
bit over-dogmatic, I would say that [name of inspector] as the lead 
inspector has a reasonable sense of balance about what’s 
reasonable.’ (IN7) 
In general, independent healthcare managers expressed more positive views concerning 
the standards than their NHS colleagues. The appreciation for the standards did not 
seem to derive from the regulatory status, as some HIW interviewees had suggested (viz 
4.2.1 Healthcare standards). Essential for the acceptance and thus effectiveness 
of the standards was, as one participant explained, the involvement of the independent 
sector in the development process.  
‘My view is that the current regulations and the current standards are 
reasonable, because we understand what they are trying to achieve.’ 
(IN7) 
In the interviews in 2014, several NHS participants asserted the need to revise the 
healthcare standards and thereby welcomed the invitation for healthcare organisations 
to participate in the review process. After the review, one NHS participant argued that 
the revised standards had not sufficiently incorporated the participants’ contributions in 
2014/15 and thus failed to foster ownership. 
76 
5.1.2 Registration  
Until 2015, only one acute independent hospital was newly built and registered. The 
participants reported that HIW’s guidance in the preparation process was constructive. 
The early involvement of and close cooperation with HIW resulted in the successful 
registration of the new premises. The interviewed hospital managers confirmed that the 
regular meetings and contact persons on each side helped to establish a professional 
relationship and mutual respect. 
‘They [HIW]… really really worked incredibly well with us. So, we 
went to regular meetings with them. We would give them updates on 
the plans. We would talk through everything […] And that would give 
us a really good involvement and articulation with them about what 
we were doing. Were we going to meet the regulation and 
compliance - to see if we were still on track and to ensure that we 
were going to get commissioned and approved … on time. […] If ever 
I rang HIW they would always come back to me.’ (IN1). 
While the hospital managers appreciated HIW’s efforts before and during the registration, 
they expressed, however, their disappointment about the infrequent inspection visits 
thereafter. 
5.1.3 Self-assessment 
Participants generally regarded self-assessments as a useful means to strengthen 
responsibility and described the initial self-assessments as rigorous. Nevertheless, many 
interviewees highlighted the difficulties NHS organisations faced due to their 
restructuring in 2009 and insufficient guidance from HIW. From the lack of recent detailed 
feedback, the participants concluded that HIW no longer had a role in reviewing the self-
assessments. 
‘It was a huge undertaking by Healthcare Inspectorate Wales. I think 
they underestimated the volume of information they would receive. 
Because, health boards, that were probably trusts at the time, were 
very unclear of exactly what was required. And of course we didn’t 
want to do our organisations an injustice. So, the first two years, I 
think it was very difficult on both sides. Over time, they’ve withdrawn 
from that process. So, they don’t actually come in now, and assess 
us against the standards, and they rely on a self-assessment process 
by the organisation itself.’ (IN29). 
As several NHS managers stated, HIW’s perceived withdrawal and lack of feedback had 
undermined the motivation within LHBs to conduct thorough self-assessments. Several 
participants highlighted the continuing need to embed the healthcare standards and the 
self-assessment process vertically across their organisations. Moreover, participants 
reported about deviating self-assessment mechanisms, tools and attitudes, which 
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caused variability in format, quality and content of annual governance statements and 
thus obstructed comparison and benchmarking across the LHBs. The assumption that 
HIW’s inputs could be reduced, once self-assessments had been established, appeared 
to be unrealistic. This became evident during the interviews with NHS participants, who 
considered their organisation as not sufficiently mature to be left alone with the self-
assessment.  
‘They rely quite a lot on self-assessment, and self-assessment needs 
to be done very carefully, because otherwise it will be like ‘turkeys 
voting for Christmas’.’ (IN17) 
Regarding the onerous paperwork and the insufficient validation, many interviewed NHS 
managers assessed their efforts to complete the self-assessment as not proportionate. 
Their negative experience and HIW’s apparent resource constraints made several 
participants question HIW’s ability to provide accurate assurance and more generally the 
effectiveness of the entire approach.  
Independent hospital managers recalled HIW’s efforts to introduce self-assessments in 
the independent sector in 2008/9 (Jewell & Wilkinson, 2008), but explained that those 
were abandoned after HIW’s convoluted electronic assessment tool proved to be 
unsuitable. Participants, however, explained that the independent hospitals share the 
documentation of their internal assessments with HIW reviewers.  
5.1.4 Selection of inspection sites and pre-inspection information 
Most NHS managers said they did not know how the HIW had selected the inspected 
sites. Some interviewees did not see a rationale in HIW’s choice of inspection sites, 
arguing that a particular hospital or ward had been frequently inspected without any 
evident reason, while other wards remained uninspected for years. One participant 
interpreted the absence of HIW inspections at her hospital as a good sign:  
‘They [HIW] will be looking at public figures around C[lostridium] 
Diff[icile], or MRSA, and they’ll go in and target. So; they are…They 
are looking at where there are issues and then going in and 
reviewing, in my experience. We haven’t had a visit from them.‘ 
(IN31) 
In the light of HIW’s rare inspections in 2012-14, this interpretation seems rather 
speculative and bearing the risk of false assurance.  
Other participants presumed or knew that HIW used prior intelligence such as complaints 
from the ombudsman, poor performance data or information from Community Health 
Council inspections to preselect particular NHS hospitals and wards. One NHS 
interviewee referred to the past, when despite increasing rates of clostridium difficile, 
HIW did not undertake an inspection. More fundamentally, one NHS manager 
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questioned whether HIW’s inspection regime should target weak services, arguing 
instead for a representative or random selection of inspection sites.  
Many NHS participants commented on the variability of care within the same hospital. 
Participants shared the common view that healthcare managers should not be involved 
in the selection of the inspection site, due to the temptation to pick the best-performing 
wards. Therefore, they regarded the independent selection of inspection sites by HIW as 
an important factor for rigour and potential effectiveness. 
Some interviewees noted that HIW’s initial choice of the inspection site was not 
irrevocable and expressed their appreciation for HIW’s flexibility not to inspect a ward, 
which had only a few patients or faced a problem with nosocomial infections caused by 
Norovirus or Clostridium difficile. 
Some participants doubted that HIW made sufficient use of available data. Peer 
reviewers and participants with specialist knowledge recommended analysing certain 
hospital performance data and databases.  
‘[…] the Welsh Healthcare Associated Infection Programme - they 
gather data on a whole range of markers and publish it, and health 
boards are required to make that data publicly available on their 
websites. So, that is actually a good model that isn’t in place in 
England at the moment.’ (IN3) 
Interviewees also advocated for an intelligent use of data, arguing that transparent 
organisations tend to report more robustly than non-transparent organisations with a 
poor safety culture. One peer reviewer conceded that HIW would find it difficult to get 
access to decisive, ward-specific data such as hand hygiene, infection control, pressure 
ulcer and attrition. Another peer reviewer highlighted the potential inaccuracies in the 
self-reported data. 
‘Up to a couple of years ago, almost without fail we have got ward 
sisters who do monthly hand hygiene audits, hundred percent, 
hundred percent, hundred percent. […] I have no faith in self-
assessment, in any way, shape or form.’ (IN43) 
Similarly, participants, referring to the prominent failings in UK healthcare, warned that 
review bodies should not rely on self-reported information without validating site-visits. 
‘You need to validate. If we are saying that everything is wonderful, 
which we are not, but if we were, you need to go in and validate 
anyway, don’t you? So, I think their programmed visits need to 
sharpen up and so that it’s consistent.’ (IN31)  
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5.3 On-site inspection  
The findings presented below refer to the aspects and components which are relevant 
at the time when the hospital is inspected. This relates to the (i) frequency, duration and 
depth, (ii) mode, (iii) inspection methods and tools as well as the (iv) inspection team. 
These factors are instrumental in detecting whether a hospital is compliant or not with 
the respective regulations and standards.  
5.3.1 Frequency, duration and depth 
The participants from the independent sector expected annual HIW inspections as an 
integral part of their quality assurance systems and as a service in exchange for the fees, 
which were introduced in 2011 (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2013a). One 
independent manager contrasted the rare HIW inspections with the regular CQC 
inspections. 
‘[Name of organisation] are used to the Care Quality Commission 
where they came out religiously every year and inspect. And then you 
had Healthcare Inspectorate… that we never saw a sight of for two 
years, no contacts or anything.’ (IN1)  
Although none of the independent managers recognised a negative effect on healthcare 
provision, resulting from the reduced frequency, one participant acknowledged that such 
a discontinuity could induce non-compliance. Also, several LHB managers called for a 
higher frequency of HIW inspections, such as six-monthly inspections per hospital, 
covering different seasons. 
As the interviews progressed in 2014, NHS participants were less likely to criticise the 
lack of inspections but started instead complaining about the burden of inspections. Apart 
from HIW’s resumed DECIs and the LHB’s internal inspections, participants referred to 
Community Health Council and Trusted-to-care spot-checks. Against the background of 
external and internal inspections, senior LHB managers felt over-inspected 
‘I had [counting] fourteen inspection in, I think it turns out to be about 
eight weeks […] we ended up having Welsh Government inspections, 
the DECI inspections and the Community Health Council inspections, 
which I haven’t counted in those fourteen. But they were all running 
at the same time, so the staff were beginning to think “Well, who’s 
coming next?” And some of them, were the same wards... Because 
we also run our own-‘ (IN27) 
Usually, NHS participants did not specify how many external inspections they considered 
adequate. One NHS manager regarded three DECIs at three different hospitals within 
three months as too frequent, explaining that the DECIs could lose their power, because 
people desensitise. Upon further inquiry, it became clear that it was not the frequency as 
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such, but the recurrent negative assessment results that caused frustration and 
desensitisation. The interviewee explained that middle-level NHS managers do not have 
much control over resources and thus feel powerless. She and other participants stated 
that frontline staff, who often presume that their facilities are selected based on prior 
intelligence, become anxious, when external inspections happen in short intervals. Some 
participants considered longer intervals between the inspections within a LHB as 
potentially more effective than the close succession of DECIs in the last six months of 
2014. They argued that with longer intervals each inspection report would be read and 
acted upon more thoroughly. Conversely, other participants, amongst them one peer 
reviewer, noted a positive effect of frequent inspections, which allegedly results from 
frontline staff and managers, who recognise the positive role that inspections, which 
focus on learning and supporting, play in quality assurance.  
With reference to the Trusted-to-care spot-checks, two interviewees advocated brief 
inspections, which combine several hospital wards. They argued that skilled reviewers 
would be able to quickly identify issues. The managers of independent hospitals, which 
are smaller than most NHS acute hospitals, considered the current one-day inspections 
as adequate and effective. One independent manager, however, regarded the 
‘inspection and support system in England’ for independent hospitals as ‘more robust’ 
than HIW’s. Though, she and other independent managers acknowledged that HIW 
inspections were thorough thanks to HIW’s inspection manager and reviewers. Similar 
views were expressed by most NHS managers.  
 ‘They were thorough. Very thorough. I think maybe, better, more 
thorough this time, with a more rounded understanding than 
previously. I think sometimes, previously, they just picked on anything 
to be able to report.’ (IN42)  
Informed by her previous experience in England, one NHS participant considered two-
day inspections with specialist reviewers as very effective. In the past, she had 
experienced CQC’s hospital inspections as ‘shallow’, often missing critical issues. 
Several other managers saw a potential benefit deriving from unannounced out-of-hours 
visits, referring to those as common practice in HIW’s mental healthcare inspections and 
the Trusted-to-care spot-checks. 
‘It helps you to see how the hospital works together or not at night, 
what challenges the staff face at night.’ (IN45) 
‘Because staff are a lot shorter at night that they are by day, but their 
patients aren’t cut down.’ (IN41) 
81 
Many Trusted-to-care spot-checks took place during evening or early morning-hours and 
four during weekends. A peer reviewer admitted, however, that this intensive regime, 
which covered 70 wards within seven weeks, was very tiring.  
5.3.2 Inspection mode 
Several participants considered both inspection modes, i.e. announced and 
unannounced, as potentially effective, depending on the circumstances, design and 
purpose. Given the advantages and disadvantages of both, some healthcare managers 
contemplated on a mix of unannounced and announced inspections.  
‘You could have a double tail model, so you could have that they 
come unannounced this Friday, but actually in a fortnight's time, we’ll 
come back and sit down with you to have a discussion.’ (IN30)  
The majority of NHS and independent managers expressed their preference for 
unannounced inspections. They argued that unannounced inspections were more 
authentic, because they left no time for preparation, therefore reflected the reality of 
healthcare (on that day) and thus provided accurate assurance to senior managers and 
the public. Some managers explained that their appreciation for unannounced 
inspections was rooted in the culture of their organisation, the confidence in the 
organisational settings and the presumed positive effect on organisational learning. 
Nevertheless, many participants also highlighted that HIW’s short, unannounced hospital 
inspections provide only a snapshot view, which might not be representative.  
‘An unannounced visit, that’s sort of a very short visit, just gives you 
that snapshot view of what happened on that day, at that time, in 
those circumstances. And that can be very positive in one way, but it 
also can have negative effect, in the sense that, there may well have 
been extenuating circumstances to provide a situation on that day. Or 
it could give you a false sense of security. It depends on how long the 
visit is, and the purpose of the visit.’ (IN28) 
Therefore, some interviewees warned against generalising specific findings. Conversely, 
some senior NHS and independent managers stated that they were keen to learn 
whether a healthcare service was functioning under difficult conditions or when the senior 
management team is not around, and thus test the organisational systems. 
Participants associated unannounced inspections with potential risks for patients, 
arguing that unexpected inspections distract or pull away clinical professionals from 
administering medication or patient care. Some examples were instanced, where 
managers had stepped in to fulfil nursing duties on the ward. Moreover, participants 
noticed increased levels of stress amongst frontline staff resulting from the unexpected 
visit.  
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‘It is nerve-wrecking for some nurses’ (IN38) 
Conversely, another interviewee instanced an announced inspection that caused 
distress for the staff for many days in advance. 
Healthcare managers appreciated HIW’s efforts to create a non-threatening atmosphere 
during the inspections. Though, these efforts did not necessarily erase or diminish the 
anxiety amongst frontline staff. One interviewee had experienced HIW inspections in 
NHS hospitals as more intimidating than the much friendlier inspections in the 
independent hospital, where she currently worked. Some healthcare managers stated 
offering moral support to strengthen their subordinates’ confidence. A very positive 
attitude expressed one participant, who attempted to demystify HIW’s inspections by 
encouraging fellow professionals to become peer reviewers. Some had gone further in 
their attempts to help their staff ‘understand what to expect’ and to reduce the anxiety. 
‘We have prepared them, that if they meet and greet, and are warm 
and welcoming, and host the inspectors, that that is a very positive 
first impression for the ward. So, I think there is an art to receiving the 
inspectors. […] Certainly, I’ve done work directly with my previous 
hospital to say to the ward sisters “They might be looking for this, so 
make sure you highlight this good practice.’ (IN37) 
NHS organisations have also introduced internal inspection schemes and some piloted 
unannounced DECI-type mock-inspections, using HIW’s criteria and tools. 
Interestingly, one NHS manager, who initially mentioned that the frontline staff felt 
‘inspected to death’, described that the unannounced internal inspections helped in 
preparing frontline staff to deal with external inspections.  
Experiences and perceptions of what constitutes an unannounced or announced 
inspection varied amongst the participants. Firstly, participants admitted that the 
unannounced inspection would not be a surprise anymore on the second day.  
‘If we went in at six o’clock in the morning on one ward, and we were 
going to do another ward at twelve o’clock, those wards would know 
we were already there. So, the first ward is fine and it’s 
unannounced. But the second ward is not unannounced.’ (IN41) 
Secondly, one participant stated that given the history of issues and inspections, the 
healthcare organisation, that she worked at, could expect at any moment a CQC 
inspection. Thirdly, another participant considered the unannounced Trusted-to-care 
spot-checks in 2014 as announced:  
‘We knew that they were coming, but we did not know when they 
would be coming. It was in a two-month time slot. […]  the one we 
just had, ‘Trusted Care’. It was unannounced but announced. You 
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know what I mean. Didn’t do it. They turned up when they turn up and 
we see what happens on the day. So, to be fair, we did not change 
anything because we did not know where they were going or when 
they were coming.’ (IN16) 
Lastly, an NHS participant had previously experienced that the LHB’s Chief executive 
was informed by phone half an hour before the inspection team entered the selected 
ward. In this interim period, the nurses on the ward can be and, as the participant had 
witnessed, have been replaced by senior nurses. In October 2015, another NHS 
manager noted that this practice had stopped.  
Participants acknowledged that announced inspections give the healthcare organisation 
the opportunity to 
• ensure the availability of staff, which will be particularly valuable for governance 
reviews and investigations  
• vacate appropriate venues for interviews and meetings  
• compile sufficient copies of relevant documentary evidence, which are typically 
required by thematic reviews and  
• prepare special presentations to showcase particular improvements, outcomes 
or monitoring mechanisms or to highlight areas of risk and concern.  
Despite these potential advantages, many participants expressed reservations, amongst 
them one peer reviewer, who experienced generally more positive assessment results 
in announced inspections. Several NHS managers argued that the inaccurate depiction 
of the real situation could generate ‘a false sense of security’ amongst senior managers, 
who miss the opportunity to learn about and from the identified shortcomings. 
Participants substantiated their reservation or suspicion concerning announced 
inspections by arguing that it was human nature to prepare for an inspection and 
instanced several examples of potential preparations. These might include, for example,  
• deploying more staff or more skilled professionals on the inspected ward 
• informing, sensitising or instructing staff 
• preparing the paperwork and ‘anything that might not be up to scratch’ 
• shifting temporarily more material resources, such as pillows or drips, onto the 
ward and  
• generally sprucing up the ward. 
Nonetheless, some participants argued that an announced visit with a robust inspection 
methodology would detect persistent shortcomings.  
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‘If a ward is truly failing, you can’t hide that. Even if you know about, 
even if there is a known inspection, you can’t change that data. […] 
Doesn’t matter if people know you are coming or not. If you have the 
right assessors, in my opinion, with the right assessors, trained 
properly, and the right tool to look at, you can go, even if they know 
you are coming, and still find issues. You can’t hide them if they are 
truly there.’ (IN44)  
Some NHS executive managers reported about HIW inspections, which they or their LHB 
had requested. According to the research participants, the triggers to invite HIW or other 
external experts can be  
• internal, such as  
‘a feeling that something wasn’t right’ (IN16),  
or  
• external, such as  
‘a very significant high-profile complaint’ (IN27).  
The managers explained that they commissioned independent experts due to a lack of 
specialists inside the organisation, distrust or a perceived business myopia. The external 
experts are expected to help the executive managers by verifying or refuting the 
existence of a problem, by analysing the problem and by preparing recommendations. 
Some participants stated that they would like to invite HIW to conduct announced 
inspections at a particular ward. Other managers referred to previous or ongoing 
arrangements with the Community Health Council or the Royal College of Nursing to 
conduct unannounced visits at a particular site following complaints from patients or staff. 
5.3.3 Inspection methods and tools  
Many participants compared the DECIs with the Trusted-to-care spot-checks, stating that 
DECI themes were very similar, but DECI methods and tools are more sophisticated. 
According to one participant the Trusted-to-care spot-checks looked at the nurses’ 
documentation but did not review patient notes or medical documentation. Participants 
from independent hospitals noted a lack of coherence in how different review bodies 
expected hospitals to present documents and evidence. Other participants criticised 
HIW’s focus on the process of care, rather than outputs and outcomes. 
‘They wouldn’t necessarily know whether or not on this particular 
ward we are killing people. […] they don’t ask us for mortality data for 
that ward or that consultant. […] they gather from the health board no 
intelligence to inform the visit.’ (IN27) 
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Some interviewees noted that HIW increasingly checked the staffing levels (= input) of 
the inspected ward. One participant advised caution with the reliance on nursing 
documentation, instancing the case of a patient’s nutritional assessment sheet that was 
meaningless because it was incorrectly filled in.  
Although some NHS participants mentioned that the inspection team ‘looked at the 
environment’ during DECIs, this seems to be more prevalent in independent hospital 
inspections. Many participants with experience as reviewers in internal or external 
inspection schemes maintained that their professional expertise and their olfactory and 
audio-visual senses helped them to spot problem areas. Although several interviewees 
declared that they were able to identify, whether a ward was run well or not, based on 
their first impression, none of them suggested relying on intuition only. There was, 
however, some contraction amongst nursing managers.  
‘When they did the unannounced visit, they were here for a couple of 
hours, looking at medicines, and looking at a few case notes and 
things. And l don’t think you can say that’s completely representative 
of all the care given. [I recommend] just spending longer and 
observing. For me, there is something about the mystery shopper 
type scenario. They come in, and it’s truly unannounced. […] I really 
do like the idea. I would welcome anyone coming in to one of our, 
obviously you couldn’t go into the clinical area. But things like out-
patients, and you can get a feel. I truly believe that, within five 
seconds, you can smell and feel it. (IN26) 
One NHS participant argued that individual patients’ views were subjective and not 
necessarily representative, referring to a meal that a patient considered as cold. Another 
participant wondered how authentic the information from inpatients was, given that 
inpatients tend not to complain while being treated at the hospital. 
NHS managers perceived HIW’s questionnaire for structured staff interviews as very 
detailed. One participant criticised that her staff were asked leading questions.  
some of the questions have asked our staff, can be very leading. “So, 
it looks as if you’re short of staff. Are you?” […] And… to some 
degree, there have been times, when people have been… “Tell me, 
is there something you want to share with me, that you are 
concerned? Because we can tell management to sort it” (IN46) 
Several participants stated that their staff sometimes volunteered information to the 
inspection teams. From an inspection report, one NHS manager deduced that the ward 
sister had confided in HIW. 
‘I know that there was one thing fed back, that was her [ward sister’s] 
manipulating. Which is fine, because I tried to get money for it. And it 
was very interesting that she must have done that independently. 
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Because there is no way they would have identified that, unless 
somebody pointed them in that direction.’ (IN37) 
Several participants noted that frontline staff often felt uncomfortable about being 
interviewed due to their lack of experience. One interviewee stated that particularly junior 
nurses, who do not have the full overview, tend to be rather negative in their views. 
Another interviewee described a rather comical situation, when a nurse after her return 
from a long period of absence was interviewed about the hospital’s improvement 
activities. 
 ‘[HIW] ask her about transforming care and dementia, and she said 
“I don’t know what you are talking about, we don’t do any of that 
here”. […] she was on the ward, it was like her second day back from 
maternity leave and… they took it to one side and… she might as 
well have stabbed me in the back […] ‘if they had asked anyone else 
who was on duty, it would have been absolutely fine. (IN15) 
Many participants critically commented that the DECI team predominantly interviewed 
nurses. Yet, some participants had noticed a wider range of interviewed staff in the 
second half of 2014, including support workers, domestic and catering staff, physicians 
and pharmacists. Several participants regretted that HIW aimed to minimize the 
interaction with senior managers during the inspections. They argued that interviewing 
senior managers would help the inspection team to understand the ward management 
and prevent them from forming wrong assumptions.  
Some few senior managers stated that they had approached the inspection team to 
convey a positive image. 
‘I felt I had to go in and really shine a light on the positives we were 
doing. […] On this occasion, I deliberately went and intercepted them 
before lunch. And I dragged them around to areas that I thought we 
were doing, you know, “I want to show you this because this is a 
project that we are doing” and they were “Oh, gosh, we didn’t realize 
that.”’ (IN37)  
Similarly, another participant proposed dedicating ‘quality time’ for interviews with senior 
managers to learn about ongoing improvement activities. The interview of one NHS 
manager at directorate level during a hospital inspection in 2015 indicates that HIW had 
changed its previous practice.  
Many NHS and independent managers stated that they were neither given nor shown 
the inspection tools. 
‘If we are going to have true transparency, we should be able to 
understand: “what are the standards?”, and how are they measuring 
us against those.’ (IN27) 
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One NHS participant explained that she had encouraged her staff to become HIW peer 
reviewers and thus get access to HIW’s assessment criteria and tools. Two NHS 
managers stated that the DECI tools were currently used in the internal inspection 
schemes of their LHBs. Two peer reviewers were convinced that the tools were still 
publicly available on HIW’s website, although they were not.  
‘They [tools] are all on the website. So, the methodology about how 
the tool was written. And the tool was available on HIW’s website and 
all health board had access anyway. It was allowed to share that 
detail.’ (IN44)  
Another peer reviewer added that infection control nurses in the healthcare organisations 
were familiar with the ICNA17 audit tool, which was adapted and applied in HIW’s 
cleanliness spot-checks.  
5.3.4 Inspection team 
Healthcare managers shared HIW’s view that inspections should be conducted by a 
multidisciplinary team with relevant competencies, emphasising particularly the 
importance of appropriate clinical expertise. One participant criticised the ineptitude of 
CQC’s generic inspectors. 
‘They [CQC] didn’t have specialist inspectors as part of that 
inspection. No. … So, in fact they gave us a clean bill of health on 
infection, for barring a few minor, minor issues. Whereas actually, we 
knew internally and reporting to our board that there were some more 
major things that we needed to deal with.’ (IN3) 
Independent hospital managers positively portrayed HIW’s inspections and inspection 
teams as objective, fair and balanced, professional and very courteous. Independent 
managers acknowledged the scrutiny of HIW’s inspections and valued the 
professionalism and commitment of the HIW’s inspection manager, who has been in this 
position for many years. Explicitly, they expressed respect for HIW’s inspection manager, 
who remains at the inspection site, until an identified issue is tackled, and who urges 
HIW’s head office to fax immediately a management letter.  
Due to their limited exposure, NHS managers were generally less explicit about HIW 
review managers. They reported about their different experiences of how individual HIW 
reviewers perceived their role. Experiences varied from ‘an inspector who is very rigid 
and punitive’ to another, ‘who is trying to help make things better’. One participant 
experienced a non-confrontational, but professionally challenging behaviour as 
supportive and effective in the Cancer-peer-reviews. Participants stated that the quality 
                                                 
17 Renamed in 2006: Infection Prevention Society (IPS). 
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of HIW inspections in the NHS varied depending on the particular reviewers and their 
level of expertise. One NHS interviewee positively noted that HIW had addressed the 
‘lack of clinical input’ (Royal College of Nursing, 2013) by recruiting peer-reviewers with 
a clinical background, yet another NHS manager reported about HIW using retired peer-
reviewers.  
‘Some of the people who assess, may have not have been in clinical 
practice for quite some time, and therefore the ability and the realism 
is not always there.’ (IN45) 
Therefore, some NHS participants wished to receive more precise information about the 
professional expertise of the reviewers.  
‘It would be quite helpful if they said in their reports, who comprised 
the teams, actually.’ … ‘it provides a level of assurance to the public 
as well, doesn’t it? About how many people came in, who they were, 
what their backgrounds are.’ (IN29)  
Healthcare managers expressed their appreciation for reviewers, who are experienced 
specialists in the relevant field. In this regard, some participants preferred the Trusted-
to-care spot-checks, whose reviewers were practicing clinicians or very recently retired, 
and/or the independent Cancer-peer-reviews. 
‘The difference here is, the people who are asking them, interviewing 
them, looking at their service, are experts. They run those services 
themselves somewhere else in the country. So, where there is a long 
waiting list for… breast cancer treatment for example, you would 
have a breast oncologist sitting there, and a specialist nurse sitting 
there, who says “what are you doing about these waiting lists? What 
impact is that having on outcomes?” Getting to the bottom of where 
things are not absolutely clear in what the team is submitting. So, I’ve 
been part of the training for that. And we did role play. So, what’s it 
like being inspected or peer reviewed, and what’s it like to be the 
reviewer.)’ (IN19).  
NHS managers particularly appreciated HIW’s cleanliness spot-checks as valuable and 
effective due to the peer reviewers’ expertise in infection control. Several interviewees 
opined that peer reviewers needed to be familiar with the healthcare standards and 
practices in Wales. Opinions on what constituted the right expertise sometimes varied 
amongst the interviewees and were sometimes controversial: while two NHS managers 
complained about the ignorance concerning ‘how our systems work across Wales’ 
amongst particular expert-reviewers from England and Scotland, whom HIW had 
recruited previously, a senior manager of the same LHB suggested recruiting expert-
reviewers from England, since there were not sufficient experts in Wales in certain fields. 
As an alternative to HIW’s current approach, one NHS interviewee proposed a rotation 
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scheme by which clinical specialists would work for a fixed period as review managers 
at HIW’s head office. 
Some independent participants highlighted the need for reviewers to understand the 
context of the independent sector. Similarly, some NHS managers argued that the 
reviewers needed to be familiar with the NHS.  
‘I think one of the things with the inspection teams is, you need 
somebody on there, with experience of the independent hospitals. 
[…] from individual inspectors [peer-reviewers], who have had no 
experience or contact particularly with the independent sector. There 
has been a degree of bias in the past.’ (IN25) 
Conversely, a reviewer, who was described by an independent manager as particularly 
dogmatic, had private sector experience.  
Like HIW, healthcare managers positively judged the double role of peer reviewers, 
which ‘increases skill and knowledge on both sides’ and through the exposure to different 
clinical practices enables them to compare and challenge poor practice in their own 
organisation. Peer reviewers noted a change in their own attitude towards inspections 
and quality improvement. Given the above, several NHS participants called for more 
peer-review schemes, similar to the Cancer-peer-reviews, to promote learning across 
healthcare organisations.  
Many participants stated three people as adequate size for a typical hospital inspection, 
yet some acknowledged that the ideal team size and composition depend on the purpose 
of the inspection and the inspected site. NHS managers noted that the DECI teams 
increased from three members prior to 2014 to four and more since then. The team size 
also varied in independent hospital inspections: while one participant noticed an increase 
from two or three to ‘between four and six people’, another participant counted only two 
people in an HIW inspection in the same period.  
Some NHS hospital managers raised concerns about large teams, though opinions 
differed concerning how many team members were too many. Interestingly, one 
manager did not take offence at six people, particularly, because HIW had explained and 
apologized for the larger size. With her experience in the independent Cancer-peer-
review programme, another NHS participant considered four to six inspectors as the 
‘minimum size’. 
Participants argued that massive inspection teams generally could or did disrupt the care 
process and distract frontline staff. To minimise the disruption, one interviewee 
suggested splitting up the team to visit two wards. Another participant acknowledged 
HIW’s existing efforts to reduce the stress levels of nurses. 
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Many participants argued that the inspection team needed to comprise at least one 
member with clinical experience and a specialty corresponding to the inspection theme. 
Suggestions were made concerning the participation of other clinical professions, as with 
physicians, physiotherapists, pharmacists and geriatric nurses. Participants argued that 
their non-representation in the inspection team allowed medical professionals to distance 
themselves from HIW’s inspections. Referring to the Cancer-peer-review programme, 
one interviewee emphasised that peer-to-peer inspections are more likely to be accepted 
amongst the medical profession. 
Some participants used the term ‘lay reviewers’ in two different ways, referring either to 
HIW inspectors without a clinical background or to external lay reviewers. The role of 
HIW review managers without a clinical background seems to amalgamate with that of 
the lay reviewer. 
Most participants appreciated the involvement of lay reviewers, particularly due to  
• their different perspective and experience as (potential) service users 
• their ability to enter a more informal dialogue with patients and relatives, and thus 
gather more genuine information and  
• their lack of clinical knowledge and thus their tendency to question established 
practices and behaviours. 
This also applies to the Cancer-peer-reviews, which recruit from the same pool of lay 
reviewers.  
‘The ones [lay reviewers] I worked with were spot on and had an 
understanding of the context of the Welsh NHS. […] I think … 
certainly there needs to be the confidence to dig a bit deeper. Not to 
accept the first response. To keep digging. But also have the ability to 
be pleasant, and articulate, and not… it’s almost like encouraging a 
response, rather than actually… requesting or challenging.’ (IN28) 
 Despite predominantly positive narratives about ‘really good’ lay reviewers, a few 
participants suspected the motivation of certain lay reviewers. One interviewee, who had 
worked for the Trusted-to-care spot-checks, which did not comprise lay members, 
wondered whether HIW’s lay reviewers truly represented the patient population, arguing 
that some lay reviewers were retired nurses, and suggested instead a closer cooperation 
with Community Health Council. Conversely, another NHS participant stated that 
amongst Community Health Council reviewers were some retired nurses. 
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5.4 Post-inspection 
The findings presented below refer to the components and activities within the inspection 
process, which take place after the hospital has been inspected. This relates to the (i) 
immediate feedback, (ii) inspection reports and their publication, (iii) action plans, (iv) 
follow-up and (v) enforcement. These components are supposed to inform the relevant 
stakeholders about the degree of compliance with regulations and standards and, if 
necessary, enforce the corrective actions. 
5.4.1 Immediate feedback 
In general, healthcare managers appreciated the debriefing at the end of the inspection 
as an opportunity to  
(i) Familiarise themselves with the findings and ask for more detailed information, 
(ii) Explain and clarify possible misunderstandings or inaccuracies, 
(iii) Provide contextual information, e.g. about ongoing improvement activities, 
(iv) Discuss and challenge the relevance and substance of findings and legitimacy of 
conclusions, 
(v) Exchange views about corrective actions. 
The overwhelming majority of interviewed managers had personally attended HIW 
debriefings. Yet, many senior NHS managers pointed to practical impediments for 
attending the debriefings of unannounced inspections, such as tight schedules and far 
distance. Independent hospital managers stated that they use their ‘record of absolutely 
every remark’ which the inspectors made during the visit and at the debriefing, to be able 
to act upon the oral feedback promptly, ideally on the day of the inspection. Also, several 
NHS managers mentioned taking notes during the debriefing. They explained that the 
notes helped them to establish the discrepancies between the debriefing and the later 
report. Often, participants experienced more positive statements in the debriefing than 
in the later reports.  
‘The feedback that we had, which was really fantastic feedback, it 
was absolutely fabulous, we were glowing after it, all of my staff, it 
was in one of our hospitals, [wards]. But there report, bore no 
resemblance with the fabulous feedback’, but ‘looked like a different 
report.’ (IN24) 
In contrast to some of HIW’s reports, one NHS participant praised the Trusted-to-care 
spot-checks for their constructive verbal feedback, that ‘matched the report’. While some 
participants explained the absence of praise in HIW’s reports with HIW’s general caution, 
others related the discrepancies to HIW’s personnel changes and the large time gap 
between the inspection and the report. To prevent disappointment amongst hospital staff, 
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one manager suggested forewarning the audience during the debriefing that the praise 
will not ‘appear in the report’. 
Many healthcare managers acknowledged that the inspection teams generally tried to 
present ‘good and bad’ findings during the debriefings. 
‘It’s a bit of an ordeal, always been told where you could improve 
things. But they usually give lots of positives as well. So, they don’t 
just look at the negatives. And that is really helpful.’ (IN35)  
However, participants also noted a tendency for peer reviewers and the audience to 
focus on negative findings. Several interviewees considered those inspections useful 
and thus effective that compare the inspected body against other organisations and steer 
the inspected body with feedback about good practice. According to one participant, 
positive feedback from reviewers helped to positively influence the attitude of frontline 
staff towards inspectors.  
‘I felt very proud. We had the chief executive sitting there. These are 
issues that are largely to do with nursing, so it was a great 
experience. Also, for the [title] nurse, who runs the [specific] program 
here, I invited her to the feedback, so that the chief could see all the 
fabulous work that she and the team were doing’ (IN19) 
Only one NHS participant noticed that HIW had overlooked critical data during an 
inspection: 
‘I was expecting very different feedback, […] when I heard they were 
in this particular ward. […] I suppose it depends on how they 
triangulate the information. […] The information was publicly 
available, and there were a few indicators that were publicised on a 
board inside the ward, that would have also been pretty obvious.’ 
(IN46) 
NHS participants mentioned the frustration they felt, when inspections repeatedly 
criticised issues that they had no control over, such as the storage capacity or the layout 
of hospitals. Some interviewees wondered whether the expectations of the inspection 
team were always realistic, instancing examples of criticisms such as patients helped 
fellow patients during meal times and not every patient's room had a clinical sink. 
One manager, who challenged findings and added contextual information, appreciated 
that initially incorrectly interpreted data and vague or unrealistic oral recommendations 
did not find their way into the later report. Healthcare managers stated that they wished 
to understand the justification for the findings and proposed actions. Some participants 
noticed a variation amongst individual reviewers and instanced cases, where single 
findings were generalised and not sufficiently substantiated.  
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Several participants recognised the difficulty, especially for junior reviewers, to provide 
feedback to top and senior NHS managers. In this regard, one NHS manager noticed an 
improvement in the leadership in the inspection teams. One peer reviewer found it more 
effective when a peer reviewer instead of a review manager without clinical background 
presented the findings.  
Several interviewees reported about inspections which imposed immediate corrective 
actions on the hospitals as a difficult and upsetting experience. NHS and independent 
managers stated that they would take major concerns seriously and act upon them 
immediately.  
5.4.2 Reporting 
In the interviews, HIW’s reporting was by far the most criticised component in HIW’s 
inspection regime. Almost all healthcare managers complained about the severe 
reporting delays in the preceding years. Moreover, some HIW inspections in 2012-13 
never generated a report and one report of an HIW inspection in 2013 appeared to be 
temporarily lost at HIW’s head office (a phenomenon, which another NHS participant 
stated she had experienced previously with CQC). As the situation at their hospitals had 
allegedly changed after the inspection, many participants considered publishing severely 
delayed reports as ‘almost pointless’. They criticised that outdated reports created a false 
impression amongst the public and undermined the morale of the hospital staff. 
Conversely, one NHS manager very optimistically concluded from the absence of the 
report that the inspection results must have been positive, otherwise HIW would have 
raised concerns ‘at the time’. Independent managers explained that the delays of positive 
inspection results, which were to inform the hospital’s performance management, 
caused frustration.  
We did get our report. […] It was an amazing report, which was duly 
deserved, but it sort of lost its momentum because it lost its 
momentum because we waited so long for it. …. (IN1)  
Several healthcare managers perceived severe delays as disrespect and/or a sign of a 
dysfunctional inspection regime, which, as they said, undermined HIW’s credibility. 
Participants associated the delays and the low frequency of inspections with HIW’s 
capacity problems in 2012-2014. One interviewee blamed previous ‘weaknesses in the 
second layer’ of HIW’s organisational structure for the temporary difficulties. Others, 
however, noted that timeliness had always been a problem.  
During 2014 and 2015, several healthcare managers noticed a significant improvement 
in the submission of HIW reports, but some draft reports were still overdue.  
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Healthcare managers valued the opportunity to check HIW’s draft inspection reports for 
factual accuracies as ‘good practice’. Opinions amongst the participants differed 
regarding the prevalence and significance of inaccuracies. Several interviewees 
considered the inspection reports ‘in the majority of cases’ as accurate and sufficiently 
substantiated, though often lacking precision in certain details. Some participants 
interpreted previous inaccuracies, poor English grammar and style as a lack of 
professionalism, which in their view undermined HIW’s credibility. Other participants 
considered HIW’s refusal to dispute factual findings as adding rigour and credibility to 
the inspection regimes. 
Reportedly, it has not been unusual for healthcare managers to go beyond mere 
accuracy checks, by commenting on perceived misinterpretations, adding contextual and 
explanatory information and suggesting textual changes, which HIW in several cases 
accepted. 
One independent manager explained previous errors and omissions with the large time-
gaps between the inspection and report-writing and expressed full satisfaction with the 
timeliness and objectivity of reports in 2014. In contrast, an NHS participant related the 
severe and frequent factual inaccuracies in CQC’s previous draft inspection reports to ‘a 
lack of understanding’ amongst CQC inspectors. 
Some participants were sceptical whether the population was aware of HIW and its 
inspection reports. Due to the lack of direct feedback from patients, most hospital 
managers did not know and/or doubted that many patients read inspection reports or 
respective news. One peer reviewer noted that many relatives had asked during the 
inspections for the publishing date of the inspection report, which she was unable to 
announce given HIW’s notorious reporting delays. 
Healthcare organisations typically cascade HIW’s inspection reports down from the 
board members and senior nurse teams to the quality and safety committee and the 
patient liaison group. Two interviewees commented that frontline staff might be too busy 
to read the full inspection reports and therefore proposed short summaries.  
One participant critically noted the lack of a mechanism, by which LHBs are early and 
proactively informed about poor findings of inspected healthcare providers in Wales and 
England. Not many interviewed managers had actively searched and read HIW’s 
inspection reports of other LHBs. Most participants stated reading reports sporadically, 
when they learnt about particular inspections from other colleagues or the media. 
Amongst NHS managers, LHB nursing directors appeared to be the most familiar with 
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inspection results of other LHBs due to their peer-group networking and their motivation 
to learn from poor or best practice.  
‘We have a nurse here […] and she does read the inspection reports 
of other organisations, to see if there are common themes or 
anything that we can learn.’ (IN29) 
Some participants noticed and welcomed particular changes in the structure and format 
of HIW’s recent inspection reports. A few participants suggested reintroducing a traffic-
light assessment system, referring to the perceived advantages, such as: giving a 
message, which is easy to understand for non-professionals, highlighting strengths and 
weaknesses, and facilitating benchmarking and monitoring over time and across LHBs. 
Other participants pointed to the weaknesses of such a reductionist approach, if applied 
without differentiating between hospital areas. Many managers stated that they would 
appreciate Wales-wide benchmarking, informed by a comparison of self-assessments 
and inspection reports, using the healthcare standards as a framework.  
Some interviewed healthcare managers interpreted inspection reports quantitatively, 
including one participant, whose hospital allegedly ‘scored the highest’ in the 2014’s 
Trusted-to-care spot-checks, which is surprising, since the reports do not contain scores. 
Another participant interpreted her DECI report as ‘very good’. 
High-level LHB managers appreciated HIW inspections as a means to inform them, 
whether LHB policies, such as hand-hygiene and incontinence, were implemented. 
Participants referred to various sources, which they use to cross-validate findings, since 
inspection findings and conclusions sometimes differ across review bodies. Two 
members of the same LHB stated that HIW reports in combination with similar 
recommendations from other organisations were instrumental in convincing a particular 
staff group of necessary changes.  
Though NHS managers considered most of HIW’s recommendations ‘reasonably 
sensible and straightforward’ and ‘practical’, one NHS participant strongly criticised 
HIW’s recommendations as based on the subjective view of a reviewer and not current 
best practice; idealistic and not feasible given the current infrastructure and lack of 
resources; vague and not specific enough; and too many and not risk-
assessed/prioritised.  
The same participant stated that ‘timeliness, credibility, objectivity, based on standards, 
consistency’ of inspection reports would increase the LHB’s ownership and thus the 
effectiveness of HIW’s inspections. To support the corporate risk management, 
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healthcare managers proposed that HIW should differentiate within the findings between 
major, systemic issues and insignificant, one-off issues.  
Participants generally acknowledged HIW’s intention to produce balanced reports and 
opined that the media are ‘not particularly interested in good reports’. Nevertheless, NHS 
managers predominantly commented on negative inspection reports and the very 
‘demoralising’ effect on frontline managers and staff. Participants explained that staff and 
managers felt powerless due to their limited managerial control over financial and human 
resources.  
‘The clinical leaders are under the most incredible pressure. That 
they can’t win, can they? They are in a sandwich position. They have 
the pressure from the team and the patients, you know, the clinical 
floor. And then they have the managerial pressure. And you almost 
have sideways pressure as well. So, they are completely 
sandwiched. We say we want to empower them, but actually we 
disempower.’ (IN37) 
Other NHS participants confirmed this by explaining that negative inspection reports 
typically trigger further investigations and actions from the top management. Some 
healthcare managers reportedly comforted and encouraged their staff to constructively 
deal with HIW’s criticism. Participants argued that when staff understands the justification 
of HIW’s criticism, they comply more readily with the corrective actions and thus HIW 
inspections become more effective. One NHS manager described her repeated efforts 
to convince the senior nurse and the ward sisters that HIW’s inspection report was ‘very 
good’. She suspected that the misinterpretation resulted from both, HIW’s focus on 
negative findings in the report and the staff’s distorted perception. 
Some participants described the preventative effect that negative inspection results can 
have on other healthcare organisations, highlighting the role of media, such as television, 
newspapers and photographs in HIW’s cleanliness spot-checks. The latter were, 
according to one peer reviewer, taken seriously from the beginning due to the 
involvement of the Welsh government and the immense media attention on the very first 
inspection in an NHS hospital. NHS participants stated that they felt ‘disappointed, upset, 
anxious’ and ‘embarrassed for’ the staff of the exposed hospitals. The anticipation of 
reputation-damaging inspections reportedly motivated some managers to introduce their 
own internal inspection schemes.  
‘I think what was very effective, there was a time when they [HIW] 
were doing the cleanliness inspections, when… what they did was 
name and shame. They photographed evidence. That was very 
powerful. And… I personally wasn’t subjected to… it was another 
health board. And, my God, I felt embarrassed for them. And certainly 
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it helped motivate us to do our own name and shame spot checks.’ 
(IN37) 
One NHS participant described that patients became frightened after a prominent person 
had publicly named and shamed her LHB. On the request of the manager, HIW paid an 
unannounced visit to the hospital thereafter, but the LHB could not refer to the inspection 
report. The manager seemed very mature and professional in her reflection about the 
case. 
‘[…] the [ward] report published, which HIW did, nobody knows [...] 
that that was the ward. […] we are not allowed to publicly respond, 
because it would be breach of confidentiality. So, it is a very difficult 
position to be in. But, she [the person who made the allegations] is 
the best thing that has happened to me. Because she sits on my 
shoulder. And every time […] I think about what we are going to 
publish in the public domain, she is there, nagging me, saying “What 
would she say if she saw this?” And actually that is very helpful, 
because… we have to be able to suffer the scrutiny of our public. 
That’s our duty, we are public service. So, if we don’t have an 
investigation team, that is challenging enough, and therefore 
publishing our reports so we improve the standard, then something is 
not right.’  (IN27) 
As a reassurance to the public, some NHS participants wanted HIW’s reports emphasise 
positive findings. Healthcare managers reported about publicising positive HIW findings 
for public relations purposes. 
Also, independent managers regarded the publication of positive findings as excellent 
for managers, staff and the business. Though, they did not consider HIW’s inspection 
reports decisive for their clients’ ultimate choice but reassuring as an independent source 
of information. Many participants assumed or had experienced that positive inspection 
reports positively influenced staff morale. Some healthcare managers stated that they 
tried to reinforce these feelings in their oral and written communication with the frontline 
staff.  
‘We do celebrate our successes, very much, with the staff.‘ (IN25) 
One NHS participant criticised that the HIW inspection reports did not facilitate learning 
from best practices.  
‘It’s very difficult to get from the report what are the best practices.’ 
[…] if we wanted to do this from a learning and improvement 
perspective, it [HIW report] does not say what areas of a board are 
good at’. (IN46) 
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5.4.3 Action plan  
At what time NHS organisations generate an improvement plan seems to vary. While 
some healthcare managers stated that their organisations usually acted upon feedback 
straightaway after the inspection and/or drafted immediately an improvement plan, other 
participants explained that their organisations waited until the inspection report arrived 
or was agreed. The rationale for the latter were potential discrepancies between the 
verbal feedback and the report, disagreements about whether HIW’s recommendations 
were feasible, and the necessity to base the allocation of financial resources for the 
improvement plan on an official document. Participants agreed that HIW’s severely 
delayed reports should not serve as an excuse for not acting upon oral feedback. Some 
managers complained that HIW required the LHB to submit an action plan based on 
HIW’s outdated report, even though the original recommendations had become 
‘irrelevant’. This demand appeared unreasonable and not contributing to regulatory 
effectiveness. 
Many participants considered the response time of one week that HIW allows for 
submitting the draft plan as insufficient to involve internal stakeholders. They 
emphasised the importance of involving frontline nurse managers to create a sense of 
ownership, thereby enhancing the implementation of improvement actions and thus the 
effectiveness of the inspection regime. One NHS manager explained that she 
circumvented the problem by producing two versions of improvement plans: one concise 
plan for HIW and another more detailed for internal use.  
Hardly any of the respective NHS managers had noted before the interview that HIW 
had not always published the improvement plans with the DECI reports. After realising, 
they criticised that the omission potentially casts a bad light on their LHB. A practical 
solution could be, as one NHS manager proposed, an online database, which allowed 
LHB’s to upload and update improvement plans. 
Several NHS managers complained in 2014 about the time and resources required by 
the numerous action plans in the wake of internal and external inspections. Participants 
deemed that these resources would be better invested in executing the plans, solving 
problems and delivering healthcare. The mere existence of improvement plans does not 
guarantee implementation, particularly when not sufficiently followed-up. 
‘an action plan doesn’t make change happen. […] one of the things 
that really struck me in the Mid Staffs reports was, there’s hundreds 
of action plans within the NHS. Hundreds. But that isn’t what effects 
change. And that isn’t ever checked.’ (IN26) 
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5.4.4 Follow-up 
Many NHS participants considered external follow-up visits and accountability 
mechanisms necessary, irrespective of the LHBs’ internal monitoring and submission of 
progress updates to HIW. Numerous NHS managers expressed their dissatisfaction 
about HIW’s rare or inconsistent follow-ups in the past. Although they emphasised that 
their organisations implemented the action plans, poor follow-up was regarded as 
potentially undermining the effectiveness of HIW’s inspection regimes. 
None of the interviewed independent managers had personally experienced an intense 
follow-up scheme, such as the respective HIW manager described. However, 
independent hospital managers were convinced that HIW would keep coming back, until 
a severe issue was resolved. Two independent participants recalled follow-up visits of 
their hospital within a month in 2012 and of another hospital in 2014.  
‘[HIW’s lead inspector] exercises sensible judgement about what she 
considers to be a risk and the purpose of her role is to keeping 
patients safe, not just ticking a box, because it says it in the rule book 
and then applying a judgement to whether she feels confident that 
the hospital is going to address that risk in a timely fashion. […] So 
there has to be a mutual sense of trust. And I respect the fact that 
she uses that judgement wisely, and I don’t abuse that. We don’t 
abuse that trust.‘ (IN7) 
5.4.5 Enforcement 
Many NHS managers expressed their preference for a powerful inspectorate and ‘a 
robust process by which health boards are held to account’. Opinions differed concerning 
the need to grant HIW (more) regulatory powers over the NHS. Several participants 
considered HIW’s existing powers sufficient. One manager referred to a Cancer-peer-
review, where HIW’s lead reviewer threatened to close the section18. 
‘the HIW guy said: “You’ve got one week to put that in place or we 
will close you down.” So, I was really amazed that, it all seems very, 
very friendly, and everyone was being very professional, but this 
[HIW] is a tiger with teeth. It actually means something.’ (IN15) 
One healthcare manager wondered whether HIW was not ‘allowed’ to utilise its existing 
powers more often. Likewise, another participant instanced several NHS trusts in 
England, where CQC should have taken more rigorous and rapid enforcement actions 
to support the population in the catchment area. 
                                                 
18 Until 2016, HIW supported the Cancer-peer-review programme with guidance, reviewers and 
organisational arrangements. 
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Some NHS managers had experienced interventions by the government, subsequent to 
HIW’s critical findings. In one case, the government’s reaction was induced by an internal 
paper on the follow-up of an HIW inspection, which ‘leaked to the press’. 
‘We are obviously agents of Welsh Government, and therefore they 
will, if there is a series of critical reports, […] be looking at different 
performance and accountability arrangements within the board or 
different escalation or looking at different levels of assurance as parts 
of the system.’ (IN10) 
One independent manager highlighted the positive impact which the public debate on 
NHS failings had on NHS managers and thus on the effectiveness of HIW’s inspections. 
‘If you’re an NHS manager now, in light of Keogh and Francis, you 
would absolutely want your NHS to look as if it had implemented and 
built its NHS services on the recommendations.’ (IN1) 
5.5 Wider impact  
Interviewees stated that a systematic, external inspection with a multidisciplinary team 
could help the healthcare organisations to identify problematic areas and result in a ‘lot 
of learning’. However, participants could hardly instance any examples, where HIW 
inspections had detected substantial problems that they had not identified already. 
Usually, healthcare managers stated that the inspections spotted minor issues that they 
were not aware of, brought up issues that they knew already and were working on, and/or 
raised the priority of issues that had been given low priority by the healthcare 
organisation.  
Results of independent hospitals inspections are in general more positive than those of 
NHS hospitals. It is, however, not clear how far these differences can be directly 
attributed to HIW’s inspection regime. Independent managers mentioned several factors, 
which allegedly drive compliance and high performance in their hospitals. Positive factors 
included the commitment to clinical excellence and patient orientation amongst many 
independent providers, appreciation of HIW’s advice on best practice, the different 
clientele and resources and a positive attitude towards inspections. Negative factors 
were the fear of independent hospitals losing their licence and the competitive 
environment, in connection with concerns that negative publicity could affect reputation.  
The latter was also mentioned regarding the cancer network, where one peer reviewer 
recognised healthy competition amongst the LHB. Cancer-peer-reviews were generally 
perceived as successful in driving improvement and promoting best practice, particularly 
due to peer pressure mechanisms and peer reviewer training.  
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‘There was a serious concern that we need another [specialty] nurse. 
So, I’ve been part of helping put together the business case in order 
to approach our managers just to say “actually, with the number of 
[type] cancers we are not meeting the commitments of, say, even 
giving all of these patients a key worker”. ‘So, that’s been as a direct 
result of peer review.’ (IN15) 
Conducive factors seemed to be the small community of cancer specialists in Wales 
(who know each other) and the particular setting (a network with a small, well-managed 
NHS trust in its heart). 
Many NHS participants recognised a positive impact of HIW’s inspections, describing 
external inspections as a lever for change and instancing improvements concerning 
factors such as estate/infrastructure resources, staffing levels, and pathways of care. 
Hospital managers explained that HIW’s authority as an impartial, regulatory body and 
its formal and systematic inspections provided evidence and validation, which added 
‘extra credibility and weight to an argument’ and convinced the decision-makers to 
release funding or particular stakeholders, such as consultants, to accept changes in the 
healthcare process. The participants confirmed that HIW’s findings and 
recommendations had helped to effect positive changes in hospital care.  
A peer reviewer assessed HIW’s former cleanliness spot-checks as very effective in 
improving the hospital environment and patient experience. The cleanliness spot-checks 
reportedly gave the environment committee ‘the stick’ to argue for more environment and 
infection control measures. Over time, however, the cleanliness spot-checks seemed to 
have lost their impetus. 
‘There had been little or no investment in patient environment, which 
was then impacting on infection control. So, they [cleanliness spot-
checks] were absolutely right for the time, and I personally feel that 
they made a huge difference in improving the environment for 
patients, not just from an infection control perspective, but from 
privacy and dignity perspective.’ (IN43) 
Some participants instanced cases, where they or other staff had deliberately tried to 
influence the inspection team to investigate an area. Participants especially appreciated 
the impact of HIW’s inspections, after their own efforts to effect change remained 
unsuccessful. This, however, made them realise their own lack of power and the 
perceived unnecessary delay. For example, in one case the executive managers, who 
had rejected the appeal that one participant had previously made for funds, pretended 
not to have known about the storage shortage prior to HIW’s inspection. In another case, 
the infection control nurses had been advocating for more attention and investments 
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without success, because ‘infection control wasn’t as high on the agenda as it should 
have been’ and as it became through HIW’s spot-checks. 
As several participants explained, NHS nursing directors do not necessarily have direct 
financial responsibility, yet, a ‘very strong individual’ can influence decisions. Two peer 
reviewers emphasised the central role of leadership, support and ownership for the 
effectiveness of external inspections. Several participants asserted that HIW’s 
recommendations have influenced decision makers to redefine priorities and mobilise 
unscheduled funds, such as ‘end of the year money’ and ‘charity funds’. While one 
participant with a nursing background complained that sometimes  
‘professional ethics are compromised by the financial […] 
management decisions’, (IN22) 
another manager without nursing background explained: 
‘You can’t spend a million pounds in a building that is only worth half 
a million pounds.’ (IN40) 
Some managers instanced examples of HIW’s recommendations with questionable cost-
effectiveness, such as  
‘televisions for an area that shouldn’t have televisions’ and ‘hot food 
in an A&E department’ (IN42) 
Several participants pointed to the financial constraints and low staffing levels as 
underlying causes of the problems in the NHS and argued for interventions and change 
at governmental level. Participants from three NHS organisations provided different 
explanations on why they had not solved the problems prior to the inspection: 
 ‘we are not strong on identifying areas of concern, addressing them, 
learning lessons, spreading that across and stopping that from 
happening again.’ (IN23) 
‘they [HIW] did come back with some very good comments. Very, 
very positive feedback, and actual fact. And some things that we felt 
were relevant comments to make, and things that we worked 
towards. Things like, what I talked about, related to the estate as a 
matter of fact. And those sorts of things are helpful for us, in order to 
try to get capital, more capital money from Welsh Government.’ 
(IN32)  
‘I value other opinion for the very reason that we do become 
desensitized, and think you see things that perhaps others don’t. So, 
I do think inspections are important.’ (IN31) 
Some NHS participants referred to Mid Staffordshire and/or questioned why HIW had 
not flagged up the issues at Abertawe Bro Morgannwg (Andrews & Butler, 2014) and 
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Betsi Cadwaladr (Wales Audit Office & Healthcare Inspectorate Wales 2013) earlier. One 
peer reviewer, who recognised achievements at the Princess of Wales hospital through 
the Trusted-to-care and the DECI, wondered whether the identified problems (Andrews 
& Butler, 2014) could have been prevented by regular, proactive inspections. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The interviews with healthcare managers indicated that HIW’s inspections can and have 
effected improvement. The extent of compliance with standards has varied across 
different inspection regimes and hospitals and healthcare improvement is generally 
moderate. HIW’s inspections appeared to be instrumental in detecting and raising 
awareness for non-compliance issues, triggering or changing the priority of improvement 
actions. The inspections were particularly valued by independent hospitals for allowing 
them to share advice on best practice beyond mere compliance.  
Differences between large NHS healthcare organisations and the small independent 
hospitals are evident. They concern not only ownership, funding and size, but typically 
also the scope of managerial responsibilities, customer-focus and individual attitudes. 
Despite these general factors, variability exists in the performance and thus inspection 
results across different wards within the same (NHS) hospital.  
Variability also exists and is unavoidable across HIW’s inspections. NHS inspections 
especially are conducted by different teams comprising review managers with or without 
a clinical background, and peer and lay reviewers with different expertise and 
experiences. Contrary to their NHS colleagues, independent hospital managers rarely 
highlighted shortcomings prior or during the inspection. Independent managers seemed 
keen to exceed the required standards and benefit from HIW’s expertise.  
Problems that many NHS and some independent managers referred to mainly related to 
the pre- and post-inspection process. This included 
(i) Occasional disagreement in the interpretation of healthcare standards 
deriving from the generic nature of healthcare standards and the resource 
limitations of the healthcare organisations. 
(ii) HIW’s perceived withdrawal from reviewing and validating the self-
assessments. 
(iii) HIW’s claim to apply a targeted approach in the selection of inspection sites, 
which may lead to the false assumption that hospital services are safe, 
because they are not inspected. 
(iv) Discrepancies between oral and written feedback, which undermined staff 
morale and the attitude towards inspections. 
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(v) Severe delays in previous reporting and insufficient external follow-up, which 
could have delayed the implementation of corrective actions. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the key findings from all the interviews with HIW and 
healthcare managers. It brings together the key points from chapter 4 (inspecting and 
chapter 5 (being inspected).   
TABLE 6 SYNOPSIS OF KEY FINDINGS 
Key findings  
across the interviewed HIW and healthcare 
managers 




• The generic healthcare standards leave room for 
interpretation and thus potential disagreement 
between HIW and hospitals, particularly NHS. 
• The involvement of healthcare managers in the 
development and review of healthcare standards 
has increased understanding and ownership of and 
thus compliance with healthcare standards – 
particularly in the independent healthcare sector. 
Healthcare managers: 
Particularly large NHS 
organisations struggle to deliver 
healthcare above the minimum 
standards.  
Registration 
• The close cooperation between HIW and the 
independent hospital managers has increased the 
understanding of registration requirements, mutual 
respect and thus compliance with requirements. 
 
Self-assessment against healthcare standards 
• The intended quality assurance / improvement 
through self-assessment by LHBs and external 
validation by HIW failed. 
• Not all healthcare organisations are sufficiently 
mature to regularly and rigorously conduct self-
assessments - without external quality control and 
feedback. 
Healthcare managers: HIW, with 
its limited resources, was 
overwhelmed by the workload. 
Healthcare organisations lacked 
guidance (from HIW). 
HIW: Healthcare organisations 
became complacent. 
Selection of inspection sites 
• HIW’s resources are not sufficient to annually 
inspect all acute-care hospitals in Wales. 
• HIW applies various strategies, criteria and sources 
of information to select inspection sites. Not all 
inspections are ‘risk-based’ or targeted. 
• Although HIW’s analytical capacity has improved, it 
is difficult to identify poorly performing wards. 
Peer reviewers: Self-reported 
data can be flawed and should 
therefore not be the only basis to 
select inspection sites. 
Access to ward-specific data 
would be important due to the 
variability of healthcare across 
hospital wards. 
Frequency, duration and depth 
• The small number of inspections in 2012-13 
undermined HIW’s reputation and effectiveness. 
• Given its limited resources, HIW tries to strike a 
balance between the frequency, duration and depth 
of its inspections. 
NHS managers: Frequent, 
uncoordinated inspections with 
negative assessment results can 
frustrate and desensitize hospital 
staff (and managers), who feel 
powerless. 
Inspection mode 
• HIW’s unannounced inspections are deemed to 
reflect a more authentic picture of the situation 
(than announced) and thus constitute a reality 
check for hospital managers (and HIW). 
NHS managers: Unannounced 
inspections are more disruptive 
(on the day of inspection) than 
announced inspections. 
Inspection methods and tools 
• HIW applies a mix of different methods and tools, 
this includes the use of including olfactory senses. 
NHS managers: Misperceptions 
have happened when senior 
hospital managers are not 
interviewed during the inspection. 
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Key findings  
across the interviewed HIW and healthcare 
managers 




• HIW approach to use external peer reviewers and 
lay reviewers is one of HIW’s major strengths. 
• (Peer) Reviewers with relevant up-to-date clinical / 
professional expertise add to the credibility of HIW 
inspections, the willingness to accept findings and 
implement recommendations.  
Healthcare managers: 
Misperceptions have happened 
because of peer reviewers 
without up-to-date 
clinical/professional expertise. 
Oral feedback and immediate action 
• Findings and recommendations are more willingly 
accepted when substantiated and presented by an 
experienced team leader and/or specialist. 
• Oral feedback and management letters help the 
organisation to act quickly upon inspection findings. 
• Some managers, particularly from the independent 
sector, approach inspectors proactively for advice 
on best practice. 
NHS managers:  
Some NHS organisations start 
only taking corrective action upon 
the inspection report.  
Reporting 
• Outdated reports, due to severe publication delays 
in the past, have undermined HIW reputation and 
effectiveness. 
• HIW has improved the timeliness of its reporting. 
• Reports, which are less positive than the oral 
feedback, disappoint NHS staff and managers. 
NHS managers: There are no 
further mechanisms to share best 
practice identified during the 
inspections. 
HIW: Inspection results inform 
decisions of independent hospital 
users. 
Action plans and Follow-up 
• In the recent past, neither the Welsh government, 
nor HIW have systematically followed-up how far 
action plans were implemented by NHS 
organisations.  
• HIW inspection manager has rigorously checked 
and followed-up any breaches in the independent 
sector. 
NHS managers: Improvement 
plans have not always been 
published together with the 
inspection reports on HIW 
website. This can create a wrong 
perception. 
Enforcement 
• HIW uses informal and formal mechanisms to act 
upon non-compliance, though HIW has (on its own) 





• HIW inspections have been effective in some areas 
and with some organisations. This particularly 
concerns improvements of the physical 
infrastructure of hospitals, staffing levels and, to 
some extent, clinical care / behaviour. 
• HIW inspections helped to change priorities and 
reallocate funds to implement the recommended 
actions. 
NHS managers: HIW inspection 
findings give additional weight 
and leverage to convince 
decision makers or certain 
professional groups. 
 
The next chapter will reflect on the above findings, examine the mechanisms which 
contribute to regulatory effectiveness and discuss them in light of previous studies.  
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Part III. Reflections on the research findings 
The third part of the thesis critically reviews the findings from the interviews and 
document review, which were presented in part II. Chapter six mainly discusses the two 
research questions: (i) which elements and mechanisms of the inspection regimes have 
shown to be effective or not in which setting and (ii) what modifications to the inspection 
regimes are likely to improve their effectiveness. Chapter seven summarises the major 
conclusions and recommendations and thus completes the thesis. 
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6 Effective elements and mechanisms of HIW’s inspection 
regimes 
The current chapter discusses the findings of this thesis and compares them with other 
studies. Following a theory-driven realist evaluation approach, the aim of this thesis is to 
examine under which circumstances particular elements of HIW inspection regimes are 
effective or not. By comparing the identified patterns with findings from evaluations of 
hospital inspections in similar and dissimilar settings, particularly England, the discussion 
aims to test and refine the initial conjectures and identified configurations. Furthermore, 
the chapter contemplates possible improvements to the inspection regime, either 
proposed by the participants or the author herself, and reviews their potential success. 
The discussion generally follows the thematic framework, but at times goes beyond the 
boundaries of the three stages of the inspection regime, i.e. pre-inspection, on-site 
inspection and post-inspection, in order to establish effective mechanisms across the 
regime.  
6.1 Pre-inspection 
The discussion starts with the four elements within HIW’s inspection regimes, which are 
supposed to direct the healthcare organisations, establish a common understanding of 
the expected performance and inform HIW’s decisions on which issues and sites to 
inspect. These comprise (i) healthcare standards, (ii) registration, (iii) self-assessments 
and (iv) selection of inspection sites.  
6.1.1 Standards 
The interviews suggest that noncompliance of NHS hospitals in Wales neither results 
from unfamiliarity with nor unattainability of the healthcare standards. Due to resource 
limitations and work pressure, NHS managers tend to interpret standards less 
ambitiously than their counterparts in the independent sector. The contextual factors, 
limited funding and high work load, inhibit the potential of HIW’s inspections to drive 
improvement in the NHS. The involvement in the standard development process, specific 
indicators and guidance on how to meet the standards facilitated understanding and 
acceptance amongst independent hospital managers. To foster ownership, the standard-
setting process needs to be transparent and ‘genuinely consultative’, which concurs with 
Walshe (2003, p. 19) and Hilarion et al. 2009. This entails that alternative proposals are 
discussed, and rejections explained. In this respect, the previous development of 
independent sector standards in Wales seems more successful than the review of health 
and care standards in 2014/15.  
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Regular reviews can ensure, as many participants and also Dixon and colleagues (2012, 
p. 13) argued, that the standards ‘remain up to date’. However, the regular reviews of 
the generic healthcare standards in Wales seem not so much triggered by a ‘use-by-
date’, but a change in the fashion of how to formulate standards. The generic standards 
in Wales possess a high face-validity, but they do not stem from clinical evidence, which 
according to Shaw (2003b) is not unusual for standards in statutory inspections. The 
vague formulations require proficiency on both sides, i.e. operationalisation by the 
hospitals and professional judgement by experienced reviewers. The flexibility and 
leeway for reasonable judgement seem to work effectively in independent hospital 
inspections.  
The use of the term outcomes for the non-quantifiable healthcare standards in Wales 
(NHS Wales, 2015b) is, as Malley and colleagues (2014, p. 188) also noted for England, 
‘non-conventional’, but in line with the shift from conformance towards performance 
improvement (Flynn, 2012, p. 168). The initial enthusiasm for outcome-based standards, 
‘the elusive aspiration of all inspectorates’ (Day & Klein, 2004, p. 47), has substantially 
diminished due to the conceptual and practical difficulties (Gray 2001). It is therefore not 
surprising that the associated criteria, which the consultation process in Wales defined 
for the ‘health and care standards’, still leave room for interpretation.  
Explicit, specific, quantifiable outcome-oriented indicators, which several healthcare 
managers advocated for, potentially make inspectors’ judgments more consistent and 
reliable (Tuijn et al., 2011) and thus acceptable for hospital managers. Yet, they may not 
necessarily serve the purpose (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1995). Moreover, specifying 
standards and criteria for each healthcare service can be a lengthy undertaking, which 
according to Boyne (2003) may quickly turn into conflict.  
The recognition by one senior NHS manager that the standards drive mediocrity within 
her organisation corresponds with Walshe and Boyd’s (2007, p.29) attribution of minimal 
standards ‘as a limit on rather than a stimulus for improvement’. Judging from the 
interviews and documentary evidence, this effect seems more likely to occur in large, 
complex NHS organisations in Wales than in small, specialised hospitals or wards with 
dedicated managers and clinicians. In this respect, the large size and thus the 
manageability of healthcare organisations seem to influence the effectiveness of HIW’s 
inspection regimes beside the above-mentioned amount of funding and work load. 
Butterfield and colleagues (2012) argue that published reports of external peer reviews 
make it more difficult to hide mediocre healthcare, yet, this implies that organisations are 
regularly peer-reviewed and reports published and read. 
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6.1.2 Registration 
Although close cooperation between HIW and applicants prior to registration is more 
resource-intensive for HIW than a mere registration-inspection, the investment in time 
and efforts can be effective and seems worthwhile, as the example presented earlier 
(viz. 5.1.2 Registration) showed. The better understanding of HIW’s expectations may 
have contributed to the positive inspection results after the registration. The mutual 
respect which evolved through the intensive cooperation apparently enforced a positive 
attitude towards inspections amongst the hospital managers. This finding corresponds 
with Walshe and Boyd’s (2007, p. 21) description of positive relationships between the 
regulator and regulated organisations, which is based on a ‘shared sense of purpose, 
and mutual recognition of each other’s expertise and contribution’. Such a relationship 
has the potential to promote improvement (Walshe, 1999). The small number of acute 
independent hospitals in Wales as a contextual factor facilitates the development of 
relationships and better insight. 
HIW’s failure to conduct annual inspections in the years after the registration, however, 
undermined the confidence of the hospital managers in HIW’s inspection regime. The 
decision not to inspect a hospital with excellent performance data on an annual basis 
would have been a legitimate reason regarding HIW’s limited resources and its 
proportionate inspection approach, yet the inspectorate failed to communicate the 
reasons to the hospital managers. 
The suggestion to expand the registration and licensing to NHS organisations, as 
currently practised in England, appears at first glance legitimate, but it is questionable 
whether this would lead to more regulatory effectiveness. Given the NHS’s predominant 
role in Wales, such a decision would be highly political and symbolic. It is hard to imagine 
that, in case of a serious breach of standards, an NHS organisation would take HIW’s 
threat to revoke the registration seriously. The threat itself, however, would be a serious 
disgrace, which any organisation would be advised to avoid. 
The recent introduction of HIW relationship managers and lead review managers for 
each Local Health Board aimed to facilitate the relationship with NHS bodies and thus 
may have the potential to achieve a similarly positive effect in the NHS as the 
independent sector. However, the contextual factors, such as larger size of health 
boards, many hospitals, limited financial resources and high work load, are much less 
conducive in the NHS. 
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6.1.3 Self-assessments 
The internal information, which healthcare managers have access to, puts them in a 
much better position than HIW to make an accurate assessment about a hospital ward. 
The large size of many Local Health Boards (LHBs), however, impedes monitoring and 
requires corporate quality assurance and governance mechanisms. This finding 
coincides with Gilad’s (2010) conclusion that organisational complexity inhibits 
compliance and learning from failures.  
The attempt to embed the standards in the healthcare organisations through self-
assessments (Thomas 2013) has only partly been successful in Wales. The enthusiastic 
expectation that this ‘radical new’ approach would enable HIW to target resources ‘on 
areas where they are most needed’ (Jewell & Wilkinson 2008, p.309) ignored the 
contextual factors, particularly the resources required for HIW’s reviewing and testing. In 
the attempt to shift the cost of assessing compliance to the LHBs, the approach added 
regulatory burden without adding value, since HIW could not sustain the cost of reviewing 
and validating the self-assessments. 
By their nature, self-assessments are judgements, which entail a certain leeway. The 
examples of Mid Staffordshire, Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells show the danger of 
inaccurate, insufficiently tested self-assessments (Bevan, 2008; Francis, 2013). Given 
the apparent deficiencies with the self-assessment, it is unclear on which basis the Older 
People’s Commissioner for Wales concluded that HIW had ‘pre-empted the criticisms 
made in the Francis report’ (Rochira, 2013). The self-assessments cannot solve the 
underlying problem of the principal-agent-relationship between the government and NHS 
bodies. 
Continuing the self-assessment process despite the lack of considerable feedback 
requires a mature organisation that recognises the benefit of the approach. According to 
the participants, not all healthcare organisations in Wales are sufficiently committed, 
open to identify issues and willing to learn and improve. In some NHS organisations, self-
assessments seem to have degraded to a paperwork exercise with limited value. The 
incoherence in self-assessment mechanisms, content and format across NHS bodies as 
well as the few publications of self-assessments are not conducive for benchmarking 
and shared learning.  
The statement of a senior HIW manager that each method and tool have their merits, 
but become increasingly obsolete over time, seems to hold true concerning self-
assessments in Wales.  
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6.1.4 Selection of inspection sites and pre-inspection information 
Despite HIW’s (2012b; 2014a) claim of a risk-based approach, its previous hospital 
inspections were not induced by a thorough intelligence-based risk assessment. Neither 
the very few hospital inspections in 2013/14, which reflected HIW’s organisational 
difficulties, nor the much higher volume in 2014/15, which was motivated by HIW’s desire 
to show presence and restore public confidence, mirrored lower or higher risk levels of 
hospital care.  
HIW’s former practice to predominantly inspect hospital sites randomly and without 
announcement presumably depicted NHS care in Wales realistically and prevented 
staging.  
The interviews and the literature review (Adil, 2008; Bevan & Cornwell, 2006; Walshe & 
Phipps, 2013) suggest certain prerequisites for effective risk-based inspections, 
including  
(i) Access to relevant, material, reliable and timely information and data, which 
ideally are consistent and comparable to ensure ‘predictive validity’ (Walshe 
& Phipps, 2013), 
(ii) Capability to analyse and interpret the data,  
(iii) Capacity to act promptly. 
While the exchange of intelligence across the review bodies in Wales has reportedly 
improved (Thomas 2013; Rochira 2013), access to essential ward-specific data would 
help HIW to more effectively spot and select poorly performing wards as inspection sites. 
Variations inside one hospital are not restricted to Wales (Berwick et al., 2013). This 
corresponds with Dixon and colleagues’ (2012, p. 13) statement that ‘very few providers 
are consistently either substandard or excellent across all their services’. The difficulty 
to determine a set of crucial indicators for risk rating is not HIW-specific (Day & Klein, 
2004; Griffiths et al., 2016). 
The interviews and document review clearly showed that HIW did not always utilise 
intelligence from other stakeholders and take appropriate action (Anon 2013; Community 
Health Council 2013; Thomas 2013; Andrews & Butler 2014). The criticism mainly relates 
to the period between 2012 and 2013, when HIW’s ability to analyse and promptly act 
upon identified risks was undermined by limited funds and staff. While, since then, HIW’s 
capability has slightly improved through the recruitment of data specialists, the task to 
choose the right set of indicators from a vast amount of available data is rather 
Sisyphean. Likewise, HIW’s flexibility and thus its ability to act promptly have increased 
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through the expanded pool of peer reviewers. The latter, however, need lead time to 
arrange for their secondment, an inherent downside of the peer review approach. 
A weakness in applying a data-driven approach is the dependence on retrospective and 
partly self-reported data, which are, as the peer reviewer’s example of 100% compliance 
with hand-hygiene procedures demonstrates, not always reliable. Arguably, good 
performance data do not automatically signify good healthcare. If an inspecting body 
only relied on self-reported data (Mears, 2014), hospitals may feel tempted not to report 
incidents (European Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and 
Social Care, 2012) or to manipulate data reports. Yet, no evidence has been found during 
the interviews that hospital managers in Wales deliberately manipulate data to 
circumvent inspections.  
This study found no evidence, either, that prior knowledge of positive performance data 
had incorrectly shaped the reviewers’ judgement and led to less vigilant inspections. 
Though, HIW managers and reviewers expressed their awareness that prior knowledge 
might frame the reviewers’ expectations. HIW’s failure to notice a problem during an 
inspection, which one participant mentioned, cannot be explained by a positive bias, 
since the respective LHB was under enhanced monitoring and the suboptimal 
performance data were openly displayed.  
The example of the Trusted-to-care spot-check, which identified severe problems 
despite ‘wonderful data’ either signposts a case of false data or an unrepresentative ‘bad 
day’. Whatever the case was, the external inspection alerted the hospital (and the public) 
about the issues and required counteraction. The problems on that ward on that day 
would have remained unidentified, had the spot-check omitted the hospital site with 
‘wonderful’ data. This exemplifies the legitimacy of deviating from a targeted, purely data-
driven inspection approach and may prevent 'game playing' (European Partnership for 
Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and Social Care, 2012, p. 36). Conversely, 
a purely random selection of inspection sites, which might generate a more 
representative and positive image of Welsh hospitals, would potentially prevent HIW from 
detecting poor wards with poor performance data. This can neither be in the public’s 
interest nor, in the long run, in the LHB’s interest. Stratified sampling would require that 
hospitals can be accurately assessed and clustered prior to the inspection (European 
Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and Social Care, 2012). 
The findings also demonstrate that large intervals between inspections combined with 
the pretence of a risk-based approach can create the false impression and thus false 
assurance that hospital services are not inspected, because they are safe. This 
jeopardises HIW’s role in providing assurance. Contextual factors, such as the large size 
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of healthcare organisations and aggregated data make it more difficult for HIW to identify 
poor performing parts of the organisation, and thus for the inspection regimes to become 
more effective.  
6.2 On-site inspection  
The discussion continues with the five aspects and components which are relevant at 
the time when the hospital is inspected. This relates to the (i) frequency, duration and 
depth, (ii) inspection mode (iii) methods and tools as well as the (iv) inspection team. 
These factors are instrumental in detecting whether a hospital is compliant or not with 
the respective regulations and standards. 
6.2.1 Themes and topics 
The thematically more focused inspections in independent hospitals in 2014 and the 
contrary development towards a wider thematic scope in NHS inspections at the same 
time can be interpreted as an approximation between the independent and NHS 
inspection regimes, which Walshe (2008) noticed earlier in England. To the researcher, 
the differentiation between the two inspection regimes does not seem plausible with 
regard to HIW’s (2015a) role as ‘independent inspectorate and regulator of all health 
care in Wales’. A unified inspection regime would facilitate a comparison of inspection 
results amongst independent and NHS hospitals.  
The changes in HIW’s hospital inspections, which many participants noticed during 2014 
and 2015, reflect the findings of the Andrews and Butler (2014) report and the 
subsequent Trusted-to-care spot-checks (NHS Wales & Welsh Government, 2014a) in 
2014. This indicates HIW’s responsiveness to changes in the contextual conditions as 
well as its regained operational capability. The envisaged development of specific 
modules and their integration in the inspection regime can increase HIW’s flexibility. The 
regular updating will require external expertise and sufficient funding. In the past, the 
Welsh government had strongly influenced HIW’s inspection themes. HIW’s affiliation 
with the Welsh government undermines HIW’s claim to be an independent inspectorate 
and regulator, yet, a more active engagement by the government could be instrumental 
in enforcing corrective actions and/or improving healthcare.  
Although this study did not find any hard evidence, it can be assumed that healthcare 
managers are more willing to act upon HIW’s recommendations, when they consider the 
inspection topics important and not ‘whims’. The variety of opinions amongst the 
participants as to which topics and aspects HIW inspections should focus on, reflects the 
complexity of healthcare and the difficulty that any inspectorate faces when designing 
inspection regimes. They relate to the different theories of inspections (Davis & Martin, 
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2008) and models of improvement (Boyne, 2003). Arguably, reviews and inspections 
should encompass both, analysing the appropriateness of the hospital systems and 
governance arrangements as well as testing practical healthcare delivery at frontline 
level. Also the suggestion to review patient pathways seems very topical due to the 
complex challenges of cutting across specialties and organisations (Butterfield et al., 
2012). 
HIW’s thematic reviews, which go beyond the level of individual hospital inspections, can 
inform the government and other stakeholders about current trends and common issues 
in Wales. Marks (2014) called for a balance between individual inspections and thematic 
reviews given the considerable impact of the latter. HIW’s (2015n) thematic DECI report  
draws conclusions from the individual DECIs and thus provides added value. It would be 
worthwhile investigating how thematic reports are being used and can be further 
improved to drive learning and improvement across different healthcare organisations. 
6.2.2 Frequency, timing and duration 
Given the imbalance between HIW’s inspection volume and the potential inspection 
sites, HIW ability to provide quality assurance to the local health boards (LHBs) and the 
public is restricted. The low frequency of inspections between 2012 and 2013 
undermined HIW’s credibility severely. Not surprisingly, LHBs subsequently established 
corporate governance systems, which include internal inspections. This shift can be seen 
as a form of enforced self-regulation (Hood, James, & Scott, 2000), though it occurred, 
alerted by the prominent failings in UK healthcare, as a voluntary reaction, unlike the 
self-assessments, which were imposed by the government. NHS organisations began to 
understand that they cannot rely on external inspections only, although it is convenient 
to blame the regulator for failures, as in case of CQC (Torjesen, 2012). 
Restricted by its resources and conscious of the interdependency between the quantity 
or frequency of inspections on one side and the length or intensity of each inspection on 
the other, HIW has apparently experimented to find the optimal balance. HIW’s practice 
in 2014/15 to inspect only one ward within a hospital might have been instrumental in 
identifying patterns across NHS hospitals in Wales, but it failed to identify further-
reaching conclusions and common themes across the wards within the same hospital. 
The increase in inspection sites per hospital in 2015/16, which seems to be inspired by 
the Trusted-to-care spot-checks and which several participants advocated for, paid 
tribute to the variation of care within a hospital and thus facilitates comparison. The 
downside is a reduction in the number of hospital inspections and, admittedly, in the 
depth of each ward-inspection. Nevertheless, the findings do not suggest that the shorter 
duration per ward generated less reliable inspection results. HIW should consider 
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occasional out-of-hour hospital visits with regard to the benefit they showed in HIW’s 
mental health inspections. 
The quick succession of HIW inspections, which many participants complained about in 
2014, and their adverse impacts are not an uncommon phenomenon. Walshe (1999) 
noticed already in 1999 an inspection fatigue resulting from many inspections in short 
sequences. The complaints about being over-inspected seem to predominantly derive 
from uncoordinated inspections amongst the various review bodies. This included in 
2014/15 the Community Health Councils’ (2014) Hospital Patient Environment visits in 
420 inspected areas within eighteen major acute hospitals and sixteen community 
hospitals and the Welsh government’s Trusted-to-care spot-checks of 70 wards in 20 
district hospitals (NHS Wales & Welsh Government, 2014a).  
The figures that interviewees presented as evidence for their complaints were not always 
plausible. The claim by one senior NHS participant about fourteen DECIs and Trusted-
to-care spot-checks within two months does not correspond with the published figures, 
unless the participant included in her calculation the LHB’s own internal inspections, 
which her hastily added half-sentence suggests: ‘because we also run our own […] 
internal inspection function.’  
There is clearly a need for the various review bodies to coordinate, which concurs with 
Marks (2014). Joint or coordinated inspections can reduce cost and the burden for 
healthcare providers (Hampton, 2005), i.e. negative impacts of regulatory practice.  
6.2.3 Unannounced and announced inspections 
The appreciation for unannounced inspections amongst most of hospital managers 
seemed genuine, particularly since the participants express their preference voluntarily. 
It is plausible that senior managers of large LHBs appreciate external inspection findings 
as instrumental in identifying problems, which they struggle to spot due to the hierarchical 
gap and physical distance. 
Announced inspections are very likely to induce preparation and thus potentially give, as 
some participants warned, false assurance to the senior managers. The suspicion that 
announcements lead to preparation is supported by the experiences which peer 
reviewers and hospital managers shared during the interviews. The instanced examples 
are similar to those that Walshe and colleagues (2014) reported for CQC’s announced 
pilot inspections. The accounts from Wales highlight that the distinction between 
unannounced and announced inspections can be ambiguous, particularly, when a visit 
is foreseeable.  
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The statement of one manager that her hospital did not change anything due to the 
unknown inspection area and date implies that the organisation would otherwise have 
taken precautionary measures. This indirectly confirms the potential of inspections, that 
are announced or likely to happen, to drive rapid improvements, if time, resources and 
managerial/professional competencies suffice. A pre-emptive or catalytic effect (Day & 
Klein, 2004) can potentially arise from the fear that an unannounced inspection could 
arrive at any moment, discover shortcomings and make them public. HIW’s increased 
use of public and social media can help to create an impression of inspection frequency. 
A pre-emptive effect is unlikely to occur, when an inspectorate hardly conducts any 
inspections and/or hospital managers consider their hospital unlikely to be targeted, as 
in case of HIW in 2012-2014. A more frequent, comprehensive regime of unannounced 
inspections would enable HIW (2016e, p. 11) to go beyond capturing ‘a snapshot’. More 
frequent and intensive inspections, however, add to the regulatory burden and inspection 
fatigue (Walshe, 1999), i.e. negative side-effects.  
External inspections are, no matter how unobtrusively conducted, disruptive. 
Unannounced inspections disturb the care process more than announced inspections, 
since hospital managers cannot allocate sufficient staff to the inspected ward in advance 
to compensate for the staff time that HIW inspections tie up. The anxiety of being under 
scrutiny, which most participants reported about, is a common phenomenon that is not 
confined to unannounced inspections. It also occurred during CQC’s announced 
inspections (Walshe et al. 2014). In contrast to unannounced inspections, the prior 
knowledge of an announced inspection can trigger distress amongst staff and had, 
according to one interviewee, undermined operational activity days before HIW’s visit. 
As the interviews revealed, the level of anxiety depends on various contextual factors, 
such as the personality and previous experience of the hospital staff, the conduct of the 
inspection team and specific circumstances, such as work pressure. Here, many 
healthcare managers seem to play an intermediary role in providing moral support to 
frontline staff.  
HIW’s fear of information leaks has apparently hampered coordinated scheduling 
amongst review bodies and thus potentially increased the distress and regulatory 
burden. It cannot be determined whether the participant’s experience of more 
‘intimidating’ NHS hospital inspections is representative. It is plausible that an inspection 
of a smaller and better resourced (independent) hospital might detect less negative 
findings and therefore cause less distress amongst the inspected staff.  
Regarding its capacity and existing inspection schedule, it is understandable that HIW 
does not accept all invitations. When it does, hospital managers appreciate HIW’s 
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findings and recommendations. The example of an invited HIW review, which started in 
October 2011 and comprised seven people and inspections of nine different hospital 
areas, indicates the implications for HIW’s (2012a) resources. The time-span of 
approximately 18 months between the LHB’s request of the review and the publication 
of HIW’s report illustrates the practical limitations. 
6.2.4 Inspection methods and tools 
HIW’s approach to combine various methods and thereby use all the human senses 
rather than exclusively relying on pre-inspection data analysis has proven right with 
regard to the criticism that CQC had previously faced (Hawkes, 2011; Strategy Group 
Department of Health, 2012). The confidence in HIW’s inspection methods, which 
healthcare managers expressed in general, reflects their agreement with this approach 
and speaks for its potential effectiveness.  
The criticism that HIW inspections concentrate on process-related data and information 
rather than on quantifiable outcomes is understandable regarding the prominent failings 
in recent history, which were associated with higher mortality rates. Internal processes 
are indeed, as Boyne (2003, p. 222) explained ‘only rough proxies’ for service 
improvement. In the absence of a more appropriate method and based on the 
observation that hospitals with ‘better processes of care have better outcomes’ (Brook, 
McGlynn, & Shekelle, 2000, p. 291), processes are predominantly measured to assess 
healthcare quality.  
A mixed assessment approach could help to relate the weaknesses in the process of 
healthcare (i.e. not only nursing care) and inputs with the outputs and outcomes. Though, 
HIW’s (2015m, 2015o) inspections started paying more attention to staffing levels, which 
is a critical input factor for patient safety (Berwick et al., 2013; Francis, 2013; Veillard et 
al., 2004). It remains unclear why HIW inspections have not gathered and reviewed 
(more) outcome data for the inspected wards, as several participants criticised. This 
might relate to (i) the difficulty to identify a set of meaningful outcome indicators or (ii) 
the lack of analytical skills of the reviewers on site. Also Walshe and colleagues (2014) 
noted difficulties CQC reviewers had to interpret quantitative data. Here, HIW’s data 
analysis team could support the reviewers in identifying which ward-specific data to 
collect and how to interpret.  
HIW’s claimed patient-focus has manifested itself through the assignment of lay 
reviewers and patient interviews. Given the importance of appropriate interview 
techniques for gathering authentic information, HIW’s training of lay reviewers seems a 
good investment. However, the patients’ perspective of quality healthcare typically 
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concentrates on their perception of care and wellbeing (Jenkinson, Coulter, & Bruster, 
2002) rather than on medical treatment and clinical effectiveness. Since interviews with 
inpatients may be biased (Bowling, 2005), statements should ideally be triangulated. 
Healthcare managers doubted the claims made by HIW’s peer reviewers that patient 
statements and single observations were always triangulated. More transparency can 
help to build or restore trust in the inspection methods. Where available, more objective 
assessment methods, such as measuring the temperature of patients' food, should be 
used, before generalising singular statements of patient experience. 
If the patient survey in 2014/15, as the thematic DECI report states, covered 46 wards, 
then approximately seven questionnaires were on average returned per ward 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015n). This figure matches with a DECI at Powys 
Teaching Health Board were seven out of 20 distributed questionnaires were returned 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015l). The low response rate might result from the self-
administration, which conversely can ‘encourage reporting of some sensitive information’ 
(Bowling, 2005, p. 288). Such a survey is hardly representative of the healthcare on a 
particular ward throughout the year, yet, the analysis of all ward surveys may help to 
identify issues and patterns across NHS hospitals in Wales.  
The evidence from the interviews and HIW reports (see example below) clearly shows 
that HIW inspections received information from interviewed staff, which otherwise would 
be very difficult to obtain. 
‘We held conversations with ward staff and were informed that there 
had been a number of occasions when the ward had not been able to 
obtain a sufficient stock of pillows to ensure patients’ comfort.’ 
(Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015j, p. 11) 
It is plausible that frontline staff may not have the full overview on the organisation, 
especially when they are young and new or just returned from a long absence. Concerns 
that junior staff are generally more negative in their views were also raised over CQC 
inspections (Walshe et al., 2014). According to Walshe and colleagues many hospitals 
in England therefore prepared their staff for a CQC visit. Senior NHS managers in Wales 
try to ‘prepare’ their staff through internal inspections, which, however, adds to the 
perceived burden of inspections. Negative views may not necessarily result from a lack 
of knowledge or experience, but possibly from stress, overwork and organisational 
culture. Ideally, the healthcare organisation should have internal mechanisms in place to 
deal constructively with criticism. External inspections can and have activated staff to 
come forward with criticism. While leading questions by HIW reviewers might promote 
the information transfer, they undermine the credibility of inspections amongst hospital 
managers.  
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Some middle-level NHS managers have expressed a positive attitude towards 
inspections by allegedly encouraging their staff to speak out during the inspections, 
thereby hoping to influence the LHB’s top management decisions. This shows that 
managers aspire to play a more active role during HIW inspections and corresponds with 
Day and Klein’s (2004, p. 3) finding that inspections can give extra leverage to those who 
are ‘seeking to change organisational practice and attitudes.’  
Despite HIW’s claims to conduct discussions with senior managers, the latter used to 
become involved only after the hospital inspection: either during the debriefing or when 
HIW’s draft report arrived. This practice differed from (i) HIW’s independent hospital 
inspections where discussions with senior managers form part of the inspection 
methodology and (ii) CQC inspections, which interview executive managers, clinical 
directors, matrons and service managers (Walshe et al. 2014). HIW’s previous 
reluctance or avoidance to meet healthcare managers during the inspection, which NHS 
participants perceived as deliberate, can be attributed to HIW’s attempt to minimise the 
risk of capture. However, senior healthcare managers can potentially add information 
that contextualises the inspection findings and prevents misinterpretation. HIW’s (2015o) 
later inspections in 2015 included ‘Discussions with senior management within the 
directorate’ and ‘consideration of quality improvement processes’. Also the interview 
during an inspection in 2015, which a senior NHS manager reported about in this 
research (viz. chapter 5.3.3 Inspection methods and tools, page 85), signifies a change 
in HIW’s practice. 
Though HIW aims to minimise the adverse effects during the inspection, interviews with 
hospital staff will unavoidably tie up human resources, as discussed above. The lack of 
coherence amongst review bodies, in how hospitals have to present their documents 
and evidence, adds to what various authors (Dixon et al., 2012; Hampton, 2005) describe 
as regulatory burden. A more coherent approach would be preferable. 
While there is no doubt that reviewers need to have some tools, which ensure 
methodological consistency, it seems difficult to find the right balance between structure 
and room for professional judgement. Though, even highly structured evaluation tools 
do not seem to eliminate the variation in the interpretations of criteria and evidence 
(Øvretveit, 2005; Tuijn et al., 2011). While many interviewees perceived long, structured 
questionnaires as tedious, structured interview and inspection tools help reviewers to 
detect and address relevant aspects (Tuijn et al., 2011). The tendency for inbuilt 
redundancy across the various tools is not confined to Wales. In the piloted CQC 
inspections in 2014, the attempt to capture the particularities of the inspected areas by 
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expanding the prompt cards-like ‘key lines of enquiry’ led to duplication (Walshe et al., 
2014, p. 37). 
Finding the right balance also applies to the renewal of tools: while some reviewers 
advocated for more frequent reviews, introducing new tools and methods requires 
reviewers to learn and adapt. Both, developing tools and (re)training reviewers, costs 
time and money.  
In the past, inspections relied on long questionnaires and checklists. The new trend 
seems to be prompt cards, as CQC’s pilot inspections, the Trusted-to-care spot-checks 
and the internal visits of one LHB (Cwm Taf University Health Board, 2014) suggest. 
Also, HIW’s assessment tools for independent hospitals are like prompt cards. They are 
structured by headings with much space for notes. However, due to their complexity, 
they contain many sheets. The prompt card approach requires an experienced 
professional with the necessary specialist background, who is able to ask the right 
questions, interpret the answers and ask more profoundly when necessary. The example 
of the Trusted-to-care spot-checks shows that reviewers can master the loosely 
structured tools successfully. Newly recruited peer reviewers may find this difficult and 
reviewers without a healthcare background are likely to fail. Moreover, prompt cards 
require additional time and a good memory to write up the notes after the interview.  
While prompt cards allow for more flexibility, structured interviews with a standardised 
tool suggest a higher consistency. As several participants emphasised, overreliance on 
structured tools can lead to incorrect conclusions. In CQC’s pilot programme, which 
employed many specialists, inspectors emphasised the importance of allowing ‘space 
for inspectors to use their professional judgement’ (Walshe et al., 2014, p. 38). Prompt 
cards seem to be a good compromise between structure and flexibility (Argy & Johnson, 
2003). 
The degree of transparency has varied across HIW’s inspection regimes and over time. 
The fact, that some NHS organisations possess the DECI tools, (while others 
presumably not) creates inequality amongst the healthcare organisations and may distort 
the inspection results. 
It would be interesting to investigate in future studies 
• How far the prior knowledge of tools affects the inspection results and the 
effectiveness of the inspection regime,  
• Whether hospital managers and staff concentrate on the areas captured by the 
tool and neglect the others or 
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• Whether poorly-performing hospitals are too weak to take advantage of the prior 
knowledge of the tool. 
6.2.5 Inspection team 
The opinion that inspection teams should comprise a mix of relevant competencies, 
which HIW and healthcare managers expressed, is widespread (Butterfield et al., 2012; 
Walshe, 2003; Walshe & Phipps, 2013). Although most participants focused on the 
importance of specific clinical expertise within the inspection team, the interviews also 
highlighted other essential competencies, including leadership and communication skills 
as well as familiarity with the healthcare standards in Wales. The multitude of 
requirements calls for a multidisciplinary team with complementary skills. It seems that 
a team size, which ranges between three and five members per inspection site, is 
generally accepted by hospital managers and sufficient for HIW’s regular inspection 
regimes.  
In contrast, CQC’s inspection teams in 2013/14 ‘averaged approximately 30 members 
for a single site acute hospital NHS’ (Walshe et al., 2014, p. 26). Unsurprisingly, the 
evaluators noticed difficulties resulting from large teams and questioned sustainability 
(Walshe et al. 2014). Large inspection teams are not feasible in Wales with regard to the 
government’s and HIW’s financial limitations, the disruptions and likely resistance. 
The interviews with peer reviewers and healthcare managers suggest that a clinical 
background of HIW’s review managers adds to the credibility of HIW’s inspection 
regimes. Moreover, clinical proficiency reduces the review managers’ dependency on 
peer reviewers and positively affects their position in the team. Nevertheless, the positive 
experiences that peer reviewers described with HIW review managers prove that also 
non-clinicians can successfully act as inspection leader as long as they have other 
relevant skills. The problem that one peer reviewer experienced with an overstrained, 
inexperienced HIW inspector apparently relates to HIW’s organisational problems during 
2012-2014. This and the reported reluctance of some review managers to exert 
leadership may stem from an unclear distinction of tasks and/or the perceived natural 
authority of (clinical) peer reviewers with a strong personality. Also Walshe at al. (2014, 
p. 31) found ‘some areas of confusion regarding the breadth of the role of external 
inspectors’ in CQC pilot inspections. A clear delineation of responsibilities may help to 
overcome some of the ambiguity. 
The way reviewers act and interact with people most likely influences the effectiveness 
of inspections: 
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• From the interviews, it can be deduced that a lax reviewer, who superficially 
inspects, neither commands respect nor prompts changes in healthcare 
organisations,  
• Neither are healthcare managers inclined to act upon findings and 
recommendations, which come from a reviewer who acts with unreasonable 
and confrontational rigidity. 
The interaction between the independent managers and HIW’s inspection manager 
seemed to have developed into a relationship of mutual respect, which has been 
conducive for HIW inspections and did not show signs of fraternisation or capture. 
The variable quality of inspections, which NHS participants related to varying levels of 
expertise of particular reviewers, is not dissimilar from the ‘varying levels of experience 
within and across inspection teams’, which Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 27) 
observed in CQC inspections. It is naturally more difficult to compose and manage a 
suitable team for a new and large inspection regime than for a small and established 
inspection regime, such as HIW independent hospital inspections. It is plausible that the 
discontinuity in HIW staff during 2012-2014 and the subsequent recruitment of new peer 
reviewers had contributed to varying quality, which NHS participants noted in HIW 
inspections.  
The decision to assign peer reviewers on a temporary, contractual basis and not to 
employ clinical specialists on a permanent basis was not only economically-driven. This 
arrangement has increased HIW’s flexibility to respond to specific or changing 
requirements. Permanently employed clinicians will find it difficult to maintain and update 
their clinical skills. The criticism concerning out-dated peer reviewers’ expertise points to 
the dilemma, HIW is confronted with:  
• Peer reviewers who work as clinicians tend to be familiar with the latest clinical 
developments but are time-wise less flexible. 
• Retired peer reviewers are time-wise more flexible, but out of practice. 
The rotation scheme, which one NHS participant proposed instead, entails potential 
downsides, which are related to the temporary employment, training needs and high staff 
turnover.  
Despite some disappointment with particular reviewers, the interviewed healthcare 
managers generally welcomed HIW’s approach. Documentary evidence confirms that 
some NHS organisations in Wales actively encourage their nurses to become peer 
reviewers in order to prepare for hospital inspections and address problems prior to an 
external inspection (Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, 2014). Fortunately, HIW 
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had never abandoned the original approach, while CQC’s earlier decision to replace the 
peer reviewers by generic staff had been blamed for the failure to detect severe 
shortcomings at the inspected hospitals.  
It is plausible that the interviewed healthcare managers accept findings more readily 
when they know that the reviewers are experienced specialists. Apart from the peer 
reviewers’ clinical expertise, HIW inspections benefit from inside knowledge of hospital 
systems and data manipulation. Also, Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 28) 
recommended in 2013/14 ‘that the specific composition of the inspection team 
(particularly the representation of clinical specialties) should be driven by any concerns 
identified in preliminary data gathering or routine monitoring.’ 
The great popularity that the Cancer-peer-review programme enjoyed amongst the 
participants signposts a potential for expanding similar programmes across Wales and 
beyond (Butterfield et al., 2012; Klazinga, 2000). The double role which peer reviewers 
play and the change of attitudes, that peer reviewers described, can help to generate 
sustainable behavioural and organisational changes. This seems particularly probable 
when peer reviews become widespread and include medical and other professionals. 
The absence of medical professionals within the review teams allows physicians to 
distance themselves from HIW’s hospital inspections, as several participants noticed and 
the failure to recruit medical professionals for this study demonstrates. Interestingly, the 
organisers of the Trusted-to-care spot-checks in 2014 failed to recruit medics to 
complement their teams.  
HIW’s practice of engaging lay reviewers is a relatively new concept. Many participants 
appreciated the potential for lay reviewers to establish a rapport with patients and thus 
collect authentic information. There is, however, no proof that other team members, such 
as non-clinical review managers, are not equally capable of performing this role. Lay 
reviewers do not per se have the necessary communication skills. The lay reviewer’s 
ignorance, which some interviewees valued as an advantage, may impede the inspection 
process, as does a dubious motivation behind becoming a lay reviewer. While review 
bodies such as HIW and CQC use previous service users in their mental health 
inspection schemes, it is unclear to what extent the profile of lay reviewers matches the 
thematic area of other inspections and whether this is essential. Though, it is plausible 
that lay reviewers with topical experience detect unacceptable practices by asking 
informed questions to patients and service providers.  
It seems unlikely that the change in the lay reviewers’ compensation will jeopardise the 
quality of inspections, as a conservative MP suggested by blaming HIW for ‘downgrading 
the only role in the inspection teams dedicated to monitoring the patient experience’ 
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(BBC, 2015). Intrinsically motivated lay reviewers are unlikely to be deterred by the new 
policy.  
Team bonding reportedly facilitated the work and effectiveness of the Trusted-to-care 
spot-checks and HIW’s independent hospital inspections. Large pools with many 
external reviewers and occasional meetings are hardly conducive for team building in 
NHS hospital inspections. Regular meetings and training sessions for external reviewers 
are, as the interviews revealed, important for the improvement of HIW’s inspections. It is 
advisable that HIW continues and, if funds allow, intensifies its training schemes and 
meetings to periodically review its inspections regimes. Induction and training potentially 
increase consistency across inspections. Due to the large pool of external peer 
reviewers, fixed teams do not seem an option for HIW’s regular NHS inspections. 
Nevertheless, HIW may consider special thematic meetings with a core team of external 
reviewers to further elaborate certain modules and elements of existing regimes.  
To avoid misinterpretations, HIW should ensure that peer reviewers who are recruited 
from outside Wales are sufficiently briefed and knowledgeable about the healthcare 
standards. 
6.3 Post-inspection process 
The discussion continues with the five aspects and activities within the inspection 
process, which take place after the hospital has been inspected. This relates to the (i) 
immediate feedback, (ii) inspection reports and their publication, (iii) action plans, (iv) 
follow-up and (v) enforcement. These components are supposed to inform the relevant 
stakeholders about the degree of compliance with regulations and standards and, if 
necessary, enforce corrective actions. 
6.3.1 Oral feedback and announcement of immediate actions 
HIW’s practice of conducting a debriefing on site corresponds with Dixon and colleagues’ 
(2012, p. 7) recommendation that regulators should support providers by ‘feeding back 
to staff the findings of inspections’.  
The interviews revealed that independent managers proactively seek HIW’s advice and 
act upon it. Informed advice reinforces the positive attitude towards HIW’s inspections 
and, by implementing the recommendations, most likely improves healthcare. For this 
mechanism to be effective, it is essential that HIW’s reviewers have the required and 
recognised professional expertise and, ideally, hospital managers appreciate HIW’s 
findings and recommendations as ‘free consultancy’ (Walshe et al., 2014, p. 67). In the 
interviews, NHS participants typically perceived HIW inspections as a means of external 
quality control or assurance, rather than quality improvement.  
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The practice of explaining the rationale for a judgement, as one HIW interviewee 
emphasised, conforms with good practice to ‘disclose the criteria’ that inspectors ‘use to 
form judgements’ (Office of Public Services Reform, 2003, p. 34). The healthcare 
managers’ complaints about insufficiently substantiated generalisations resemble some 
of the difficulties that Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 47) describe ‘concerning the 
categorisation/sorting, weighting/valuing, and synthesising of evidence’ in CQC 
inspections. The preparatory meeting can be instrumental in verifying and consenting 
the statements amongst the team members. ‘Corroboration meetings’ were also 
considered an important mechanism in CQC’s piloted inspections (Walshe et al., 2014, 
p. 41). Further investigation is needed to determine how to minimise the perceived 
variability in the quality of statements.  
Hospital managers who consider negative findings and corrective actions as purely 
arbitrary or too ambitious will presumably only half-heartedly implement the imposed 
actions. If expectations are deemed unrealistically high, managers are unlikely to accept 
the criticism or desensitise. Lowering the expectations to the absolute minimum, 
however, will not drive improvement. Therefore, inspectors should have the discretion to 
contextualise and prioritise the findings. As the interviews established, the debriefing is 
not a one-way communication, but involves healthcare managers, who can help to clarify 
issues, correct inaccuracies and challenge views.  
In emotive discussions, substantiating judgements with factual evidence seems as 
important as communication skills. These skills can be effectively rehearsed in role plays, 
as some of the newly trained peer reviewers evidenced. 
Contrary to the perceptions of some peer reviewers, the overwhelming majority of 
interviewed NHS managers showed a keen interest in HIW’s inspections and asserted 
to take the findings very seriously. This might relate to a self-selection bias in the 
recruitment of study participants. Similarly, Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 59) noticed 
that hospital managers took the feedback at CQC debriefings ‘very seriously’.  
According to the participants, not all initial findings and recommendations found their way 
in the inspection report, and vice versa. This entails both deliberate decisions to drop 
minor or unsubstantiated findings as well as accidental omissions due to the delay in 
reporting and non-involvement of peer reviewers. Such discrepancies were also noticed 
for CQC inspections (Walshe et al., 2014) 
While HIW understandably tries to be cautious about publishing over-enthusiastic 
judgements and findings, the inspectorate should avoid disappointment by forewarning 
the audience in the debriefings, as one participant suggested. 
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6.3.2 Immediate actions and management letters 
The interviews and documentary evidence suggest that healthcare organisations take 
HIW’s immediate assurance letters seriously, not least because of the potential 
embarrassment that is associated with their publication. In the absence of a rating, HIW 
and NHS managers seem to count immediate assurance letters as a (negative) 
benchmark. In its annual report to Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board (BCUHB), 
HIW ranked the organisation last in an imaginary league table: ‘Six Immediate assurance 
letters were issued to BCUHB following DECI inspections. This correlated to an 
assurance letter for every DECI that was undertaken – more than any other health board 
during 2014-15’ (Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2015d, p. 10). 
6.3.3 Reporting 
The variety of opinions amongst HIW participants, concerning the target readership of 
its inspection reports, reflects the common ‘problem of multiple potential audiences’ (Day 
& Klein, 2004, p. 29). It is left to speculation about who really reads HIW’s reports and 
how they can contribute to achieving HIW’s regulatory objectives of assuring and 
improving healthcare quality. Whatever the pathways are, for the inspection reports to 
become effective, the respective audience needs to (i) become aware of and get access 
to the reported findings, (ii) read and understand them and (iii) take informed decisions 
and actions.  
The previous delays in reporting have caused considerable damage to HIW’s reputation. 
While this study did not find any evidence of consequential poor healthcare, participants 
admitted that the loss or delay of reports can impede improvement. This is likely to 
happen, when the inspected bodies do not act upon HIW’s oral feedback but wait for the 
report and HIW’s subsequent request for an improvement plan.  
Not only were HIW’s final reports published with a severe delay, but also the respective 
draft reports were submitted to the healthcare organisations well beyond HIW’s target 
time. Reports that are written long after the inspection and possibly based on notes left 
by former reviewers are unlikely to accurately portray the situation of the inspected wards 
at the time of publication. Such reports, if not accompanied by updated action plans or 
at least a forewarning about the possibly outdated content, can misinform the reader. 
The lack of timely and accurate information hampers informed decision-making amongst 
the stakeholders, be it the hospital managers who were not present during HIW’s post-
inspection debriefing, service users or the government.  
If reporting plays, as HIW claims, an important role in the effectiveness of inspections, it 
is incomprehensible that HIW’s executive managers had left this problem unsolved for 
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such a long time. No single factor that HIW and other participants listed as a possible 
cause can explain the massive delays in reporting.  
HIW’s policy to submit its draft inspection reports to the inspected organisations for 
factual accuracy check is a good practice, which all interviewees appreciated and other 
review bodies exercise (European Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health 
Services and Social Care, 2012; Walshe et al., 2014). Occasional inaccuracies and 
misinterpretations in the draft report, which participants mentioned, signify a missed 
opportunity for clarification during the inspection process. The interviews with senior 
managers, which HIW has now embedded into its inspection methodology, and the 
involvement of peer reviewers in reporting-writing or checking are likely to improve the 
quality of draft and final reports.  
This study did not attempt to determine public awareness of and reaction to HIW’s 
activities. According to HIW reviewers, patients and potential hospital users contact HIW 
to receive information about certain (independent) hospitals. Negative publicity resulting 
from healthcare failures in England and Wales, the inquiry into HIW’s effectiveness and 
HIW’s increased physical presence since 2014 most likely raised HIW’s profile and 
visibility over the last few years. The redesign of HIW’s website in 2014 and 2016 as well 
as the use of social media show HIW’s willingness to engage more with the public and 
its responsiveness to changing contextual conditions.  
No information is available on whether the modifications in the reporting format, which 
were not consulted with the target groups, attracted more readers. What constitutes 
relevant content, appropriate language and style will most likely depends on the 
individual reader and the purpose of reading. Accommodating these potentially 
conflicting expectations in one report is a challenge for any review body (Day & Klein, 
2004; Walshe et al., 2014).  
The author of this study found DECI reports usually easy to understand for non-clinicians 
and thus the public. Summary chapters with sometimes three or more pages (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015g, 2016b, 2016c) positioned as the fourth chapter in DECI 
reports are, however, somewhat unusual. Potential readers may appreciate, as some 
participants suggested, a short overview with overall or detailed ratings. HIW’s 
disinclination for a rating system is plausible given its resource limitations and the 
difficulty to establish a robust rating system, a challenge which also CHI (Day & Klein, 
2004) and CCQ (Walshe et al., 2014) faced.  
There is only scarce, international evidence available that supports the assumption 
(Ketelaar et al., 2011; Laverty et al., 2012; Shekelle et al., 2008) that public reporting 
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influences patients’ choices. The effect seems to be rather selective and short-term. 
While there were some suggestions in this study that positive HIW inspection reports do 
inform potential clients of independent hospitals, it is not clear how far they influence 
decisions and attract new customers. A private customer might be motivated to actively 
seek information from the original source, i.e. HIW. The population in general is more 
likely to receive information through mass and social media. 
Negative inspection results are more prevalent in the media than positive and thus more 
likely to influence people’s perceptions. The population may not differentiate between 
wards or hospitals of a certain Local Health Board (LHB), though, quality and safety often 
differ significantly across wards. Since NHS patients in Wales are not generally ‘provided 
with a range of choices' (Longley et al., 2012, p. 18), the ‘selection pathway’ (Berwick et 
al., 2003) can hardly be an effective mechanism in HIW’s inspection regime. The 
interviews suggest that negative publicity does not necessarily deter NHS patients in 
Wales from using the hospital, but it can unsettle patients, when they come to the hospital 
for treatment. The predominant effect of negative inspection findings relates to the 
healthcare organisations directly. According to many interviewees, negative findings 
have triggered improvements at the inspected hospital and other healthcare 
organisations. Similarly, Laverty and colleagues (2012) and other studies established 
that high-profile investigations in England did not reduce patient numbers for more than 
six months, however, they prompted improvements inside the hospitals. A rating system 
which allows a direct comparison amongst hospitals could potentially increase 
competitiveness amongst LHBs. HIW’s recent inspection regimes have not actively 
supported comparison and benchmarking, as healthcare managers noted in the 
interviews and one LHB during the public inquiry (Duerden & Hopkins, 2013). This may 
stem from the Welsh government’s aversion to competition in public service provision 
(Bundred & Grace, 2008).  
Apart from the inspection reports, HIW has not offered tools or mechanisms to support 
learning across LHBs. HIW’s (2015n) thematic report on DECIs and HIW’s (2015b) 
annual reports to each LHB in 2015 seem first steps to facilitate comparison and learning. 
As these retrospective reports are issued only once a year, LHBs need to use their own 
real-time intelligence to identify problems and patterns. The Trusted-to-care spot-check 
reports were more pronounced, offering a separate section with positive findings called 
‘notable good practice’ (NHS Wales & Welsh Government, 2014b, p. 20) and promising 
a ‘Good Practice Directory’ (NHS Wales & Welsh Government, 2014a, p. 21) to share 
the positive findings. Sharing and promoting information about good practice is a 
challenge that other review bodies have faced (Day & Klein, 2004; European Partnership 
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for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and Social Care, 2012; Walshe et al., 
2014).  
The perceived focus of inspection reports on negative findings seems a universal 
phenomenon (Day & Klein, 2004; Mascini, 2013; Walshe et al., 2014). Conversely, 
inception reports that are perceived to be positive have a boosting effect on staff morale, 
as Walshe and colleagues (2014) noticed in England. 
Healthcare organisations are unlikely to challenge positive findings. Since senior 
managers might not be aware of the situation on the ground, (unjustifiable) positive 
inspection results can give false assurance to managers and the public. Andrews and 
Butler (2014, p. 31) raised concerns about HIW’s effectiveness, because the 
inspectorate had ‘last visited ABMU [Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board] 
two years ago and not seen or reported on what would have been at the time highly 
visible issues of poor practice’. The fact that, apart from that case, hardly any participant 
could recall an issue that HIW overlooked during the inspection implies that HIW 
inspections are usually thorough. 
A negative inspection report can help to create awareness of certain problems amongst 
managers or staff. External inspection reports seem to be particularly relevant for large 
LHBs with hierarchical gaps and impaired information flows between the top 
management and healthcare delivery. Yet, the interviews suggest that healthcare 
managers were already aware of most problems, before HIW inspections alerted them. 
This phenomenon has also been observed in England (Day & Klein, 2004; Walshe et al., 
2014). Healthcare managers in Wales gave similar explanations on why they had not 
rectified the problems as their colleagues in England, who said that ‘they were too close 
to the issue, or because practices had become normalised and routine’ (Walshe et al., 
2014, p. 67). 
Though all interviewed LHB managers appeared to be committed to providing quality 
healthcare, the LHBs would cause financial damage to themselves, if they ceased to 
refer patients to their own hospitals after a negative report. LHBs’ double role of 
commissioning and providing healthcare within their geographical borders is likely to 
cause a conflict of interest. As LHB managers explained, inspection reports can influence 
the LHBs’ decisions to commission healthcare from other organisations in Wales or 
England. This however requires that decision makers become aware of inspection 
results, which does not always happen in a timely manner, as the interviews revealed. 
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6.3.4 Action plan 
The interviews with HIW participants suggest that the quality of draft action plans has 
not generally improved. Enhanced action plans could provide an opportunity to increase 
regulatory effectiveness. It remains unclear why some healthcare organisations struggle 
to develop an acceptable improvement plan. If the difficulties are caused by a lack of 
experience rather than the shortage of time, HIW or other organisations could assist in 
the learning. HIW’s peer reviewers with their expertise and double perspective could play 
a supportive role inside their healthcare organisations and beyond. HIW could benefit 
from involving the respective peer reviewers in the assessment of draft plans, in case 
HIW’s review manager does not have sufficient expertise. A template with HIW’s 
recommendations can provide the necessary guidance and structure, though, some 
organisations have criticised the duplication of work resulting from numerous 
improvement plans produced in different formats for internal and external purposes. 
It is understandable that healthcare organisations that had already implemented the 
improvements complained about retrospective action plans, which HIW required them to 
submit after HIW’s publishing the outdated reports. Producing outdated improvement 
plans does not increase regulatory effectiveness, but instead adds to the perceived 
regulatory burden (adverse impact) and undermines HIW’s credibility. It would have been 
more transparent to inform the public that the healthcare organisation had resolved the 
problems. Likewise, HIW failed to ‘reassure the public that remedial action had been 
taken’ (Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, 2014, p. 4) by omitting to publish the 
agreed improvement plan together with the inspection report.  
Even more concerning is the practice of some few NHS organisations to withhold actions 
or action planning until they receive HIW’s recommendations in the final report. To start 
action planning and implementation based on the oral feedback – an approach, which 
independent hospitals and many other NHS organisations practice – exhibits a 
completely different attitude and culture. Here, small organisations have an advantage 
over the large organisations with more complicated internal approval and funding 
processes. Yet, not every improvement action requires extra funding and approval by 
the top management. This demonstrates the importance of contextual factors which are 
conducive for regulatory effectiveness. 
The convoluted post-inspection summits that CQC arranges to launch the inspection 
reports and develop action plans do not seem to be a suitable alternative to the process 
in Wales (Walshe et al., 2014), though the summit would be an opportunity to bring 
internal and external stakeholders together.  
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6.3.5 Follow-up 
The difficulties in delineating the responsibilities of follow-up between HIW, the Welsh 
government and other organisations, which have admittedly constituted a weakness in 
HIW’s inspection regime, are not unique. Similarly, ‘a lack of clarity’ was reported 
regarding the follow-up of CQC inspections (Walshe et al., 2014, p. 72) and a ‘significant 
gap’ concerning the follow-up of warnings by the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision 
(European Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and Social 
Care, 2012, p. 43). HIW seems to be caught in a dilemma: assuming the de-facto 
responsibility for the follow-up potentially increases the effectiveness of inspections but 
places a strain on HIW’s resources. HIW’s limited capacity and the opportunity cost 
drives HIW to conduct follow-up visits (only) ‘when essential’. Yet, it remains unclear 
which issues or contextual factors make a follow-up visit essential.  
Interviews with healthcare managers and some documentary evidence (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales, 2015c) support HIW’s view point that the healthcare organisations 
do implement the improvement plans. The fact that almost all participants complained 
about non-existent or infrequent follow-up visits highlights an inherent risk. The fact that 
in all six cases of reported HIW follow-up inspections in 2014/2015 significant progress 
was noted supports the hypothesis that announced inspections can be effective. It does 
not prove that the two LHBs would have acted upon the recommendations similarly, had 
they not been pre-informed about the inspection dates. Besides, the follow-ups showed 
varying degrees of progress amongst the wards, declaring excellent progress only for 
one of the four wards revisited in 2014 (Jones, 2014) and requiring one of the two wards 
revisited in 2015 to complete a further improvement plan (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales, 2015e). HIW’s (2015c) annual report presents the follow-up visit in March 2015 
as evidence of HIW’s impact, without mentioning that it was announced. HIW’s (2016e) 
annual report for 2015/16 and several unannounced DECI (Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales, 2015m) reports expressed disappointment about previous findings that had not 
brought improvements. This shows that HIW does follow-up previous findings (more than 
in the past), yet, not through a designated follow-up visit, but during the subsequent, 
routine inspection visit.  
Systematic follow-up visits would provide the public with updated information (if reports 
are published immediately), and in case of positive progress help to restore confidence 
(if the public becomes aware of the positive findings).  
6.4.6 Enforcement 
The now formalised escalation process seems to work effectively: the first NHS 
organisation that was put under special measures, the highest escalation level, was in 
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2015 Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board (Lewis-Parry, 2015; NHS Wales, 2015a). 
At the same time, four other NHS organisations were put under ‘enhanced monitoring’ 
(Welsh Government, 2016), the third-highest escalation level. In July 2017, Betsi 
Cadwaladr University Health Board was still in special measures and the status of three 
NHS organisations that were previously under ‘enhanced monitoring’ had been 
escalated to ‘targeted intervention’, the second highest escalation level (Welsh 
Government, 2017).  
It can be safely assumed that the regulation of the escalation process, which defines the 
shared responsibilities of HIW, Welsh Audit Office and Welsh government, is a lesson 
learnt from the prominent failings in the UK. Although, as an HIW participant claimed, 
the informal interactions with the Welsh government have worked well in the past, they 
depended on personal initiative and bore the risk of failure due to unclear responsibilities.   
The use of informal, tactical manoeuvres, which include threatening to close the hospital 
or requiring weekly meetings and progress updates (viz. 4.4.5 Enforcement, page 69), 
makes the inspectorate more powerful than it seems at first glance. The power games 
seemed to be effective due to the ‘human factor’ and the fear of negative publicity. This 
resembles the situation in England: Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 70) cited a 
participant who concluded that CQC’s ‘informal enforcement, and external and internal 
leverage for change, are at least as important and perhaps more important than the use 
of formal regulatory powers’. Although HIW has regulatory powers over the independent 
sector, the inspectorate does not seem to need them. The reputation of inspected 
hospitals potentially benefits from positive inspection reports and HIW’s advice on best 
practice (Healey, 2013), which independent hospital managers seek and accept. 
6.4 Impact and Context-Mechanism-Outcome patterns  
The numerous examples, which Healthcare managers and peer reviewers instanced, 
support the assumption that HIW inspections have resulted or contributed to positive 
changes at the healthcare organisations in Wales. HIW findings and recommendations 
have reportedly motivated LHB decision makers to revise priorities and financial 
allocations. The improvements were apparently determined by the thematic area of the 
inspection regime, but not confined to the inspected ward or hospital. HIW inspection 
findings have been used as an additional argument and leverage by internal 
stakeholders to convince decision makers or professional groups within their healthcare 
organisations. This experience corresponds with Walshe and colleagues’ (2014, p. 71) 
findings that CQC’s inspections ‘added weight to influence and drive change’ and Day 
and Klein’s (2004) conclusion that CHI played a catalytic role. As the participants from 
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Wales asserted, the power of persuasion increases, when several external bodies 
require the same changes and when the media get involved.  
Numerous contextual factors made these mechanisms work and generate positive 
outcomes (Pawson & Tilley 1997). At the healthcare organisations, the identified 
conducive contextual factors included understanding of and commitment to quality 
healthcare, professional (clinical and managerial) competencies, leadership, maturity 
and organisation culture, functioning quality and governance systems, flat organisational 
hierarchies with communication flows and informed decision making as well as a 
customer/patient focus. Many of these factors coincide with the findings Kringos and 
colleagues (2015) made in their systematic review on the effectiveness of hospital quality 
improvement strategies.  
Amongst the factors which appeared to jeopardise the improvement of healthcare quality 
at the healthcare organisations in Wales were an environment where managers and staff 
feel exhausted and powerless and thus become used to inadequate care and conditions. 
Here particularly the shortage of finance and staff, the high workload and the perceived 
‘unchangeable’ physical hospital infrastructure desensitised staff and managers.    
Influencing financial decisions does not necessarily require formal power. The redirection 
of existing resources bears, however, the unintended risk of withdrawing funds from 
other important areas, which are not the subject of the ongoing inspection regime, as the 
Trusted-to-care report anticipated (Andrews & Butler, 2014). This potential negative 
impact has not been identified in the interviews of this study. However, some NHS 
managers referred to idealistic interpretations and recommendations such as the 
provision of hot food in the A&E department, which would have required shifting funds 
from other (more priority) areas. Most of the questionable recommendations did not 
appear later in the inspection reports, which reflects HIW’s sound judgement. It is the 
duty of the managers to weigh up the circumstances and apply common sense in their 
decisions. Contrary to healthcare professionals, managers with financial responsibility 
cannot ignore the overall budget restrictions, competing needs and opportunity cost.  
That different review bodies sometimes come to different conclusions raises questions 
about the validity and reliability of inspection methods. Inspection methodologies should 
be assessed concerning their effectiveness, rather than deriving from mere opinions 
about what constitutes the best approach (Bundred & Grace, 2008). Though, HIW has 
recently strengthened its data analysis capacity and conducted follow-up inspections, 
more systematic evaluation would help to determine the effectiveness of HIW’s 
inspection regimes and methodologies. This is not dissimliar to other review bodies, 
which lack a systematic process to assess the effectiveness and possible impact of 
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activities (European Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health Services and 
Social Care, 2012). 
HIW’s limited inspection activities during 2012-14 reportedly encouraged LHBs to 
recognise their responsibility and install internal assurance systems. This was not HIW’s 
deliberate intention, but an unintended positive effect. Even if HIW had more resources 
at their disposal, it is unrealistic to have sufficient inspectors and inspections to monitor 
every nurse and doctor (Flynn, 2012). Moreover, an increase of HIW’s funding would 
mean a decrease of financial resources available for other areas, such as healthcare 
provided by the NHS.   
The revelation that healthcare quality varies within a hospital (Berwick et al., 2013), which 
HIW and healthcare managers recognised during this study, seems to have impacted on 
the design of internal and external inspections and may increase future effectiveness. 
The interviews manifested that improvements resulting from investments in furniture or 
interior decoration were comparatively easy to achieve. Much more effort and time 
require changes in individual and group behaviour, for example the hand hygiene or 
clinical procedures. Though some improvements were instanced, it remains unclear how 
far HIW’s inspections positively affected behavioural changes.  
Irrespective of the above mentioned positive changes, HIW influence on improvements 
in the NHS is limited. HIW inspections repeatedly detect the same problems amongst 
NHS hospitals and several LHBs had to be put under ‘targeted intervention’ or ‘special 
measures’ (Welsh Government, 2017). Although improvement and deterioration are, 
allegedly, likely to occur together (Boyne, 2003), more analysis is needed regarding the 
structural and organisational barriers and drivers of positive change in Welsh hospitals. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that regulatory effectiveness depends on numerous factors and 
mechanisms. Some of them can be actively managed by the inspectorate such as the 
inspection methods and tools, debriefing and reporting, others are not or only partly in 
the hands of the inspectorate or review managers such as setting standards, self-
assessments, access to data, action planning and enforcement. The budget, which the 
Welsh government allocates, defines the boundaries in which HIW can recruit and train 
staff and reviewers, conduct hospital inspections and perform the many other tasks 
according to its remit. The moderate impact, which HIW’s inspections seem to have on 
healthcare improvement, stems from various mechanisms which differ in their 
effectiveness across the various inspection regimes and between large NHS healthcare 
organisations and the small independent hospitals. As there is not one ideal inspection 
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regime that fits all settings and times, HIW needs to keep adapting its strategies and 
tactics before, during and after the on-site inspection.  
This study identified various mechanisms which contributed to regulatory effectiveness 
in Wales, amongst them the following: First, active involvement of healthcare managers 
in the development of healthcare standards supports the recognition of what the 
standards are ‘trying to achieve’ and ownership. Second, the communication between 
HIW and the healthcare managers helps to create common understanding of 
requirements, professional relationships and mutual respect, which can contribute to the 
success of the registration and effectiveness of later inspections. Third, HIW’s autonomy 
in selecting the inspection sites was identified as a factor for potential effectiveness, 
because it underlines HIW’s professional independence and thus increases credibility 
amongst the healthcare community. Fourth, managers with a nursing background 
acknowledge (and are therefore more inclined to follow) thorough scrutiny, validated 
findings, balanced feedback and recommendations by an inspection team which 
includes clinical professionals, who specialise in the respective area. Fifth, intrinsic 
factors, such as commitment to quality care, as well as extrinsic factors, such as the fear 
of being exposed in inspection reports and media, motivate compliant behaviour. Sixth, 
hospital managers occasionally use reviews and recommendations from credible, 
external organisations as ‘levers for change’ to convince other stakeholders to change 
behaviour or allocate the necessary resources for compliance and improvement. 
Seventh, senior managers, who are far from frontline provision, appreciate external 
reviews as a reality check of internal governance and quality assurance mechanisms. 
The following, final chapter will summarise the main conclusions of this thesis and 





The final chapter summarises the key findings of this thesis, reflects on methodological 
limitations and highlights implications for future research and practice. 
Following a theory-driven realist approach, this thesis aimed to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of HIW’s acute hospital inspection regimes. The document review and 
interviews with research participants from HIW and healthcare organisations in Wales 
helped to establish how HIW’s inspection regimes had been implemented and what 
problems were encountered during implementation. Applying a three-stage theoretical 
framework, the study examined the elements and mechanisms which have shown to be 
effective in particular settings and assessed what modifications are likely to improve 
effectiveness. The framework informed the design of data collection tools and structured 
the data analysis.  
7.1 Summary of findings 
The interviews did not detect unanimous, preconceived assumptions amongst HIW 
managers and reviewers on how particular elements of the inspection regimes are 
supposed to become effective. This is perhaps not surprising, given that inspecting 
constitutes for most HIW managers and reviewers a role or job rather than a profession. 
In the endeavour to reconstruct the underlying change mechanisms, which forms an 
essential part of the theory-driven approach, the researcher consulted various sources, 
including hospital managers and evaluation literature. Due to their dual perspective, 
contributions by peer reviewers and HIW managers with clinical experience proved to be 
particularly valuable.    
The evaluation showed that various political, socio-economic and other contextual 
factors influenced the design and implementation of HIW’s hospital inspections. This 
includes HIW’s funding. The differences in regulation between NHS and independent 
hospitals in Wales seem entirely politically-driven. HIW’s relocation and high turnover of 
staff in 2012-2013, which were largely influenced by external factors, undermined its 
ability to conduct inspections, caused severe delays in reporting and damaged its 
reputation. Although no evidence was found that lost or delayed reports had caused any 
(other) damage, delays in reporting can potentially impede improvement when the 
inspected organisation waits for HIW’s report before taking actions. With its new staff, 
HIW has improved its capacity to analyse data, conduct inspections and issue reports 
sooner. 
HIW uses various mechanisms and tactics to direct, detect and enhance compliance with 
standards. Many aspects of its inspection regimes, such as standard-setting, data-
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exchange, follow-up and enforcement, require close cooperation with the government 
and other review bodies. HIW has rarely faced the need to use its rather restricted 
enforcement powers, but predominantly relies on its credibility as an impartial, 
professional authority and, if necessary, on informal, tactical manoeuvres to effect 
necessary change.  
HIW’s regulatory effectiveness largely depends on the cooperation with the inspected 
health organisations prior, during and after the on-site inspections. A hospital manager 
may approach HIW concerning a suspected problem. Hospital staff (confidentially) share 
internal data and information with inspection teams. Senior managers of large NHS 
organisations use external inspections to identify problems which they struggle to spot 
due to the hierarchical gap and geographical distance. Hospital managers in Wales 
appreciate unannounced inspections as an authentic depiction of the situation on an 
inspected ward (spot-check), yet, the distinction between unannounced and announced 
inspections can be ambiguous. Certain stakeholders use inspection reports as levers to 
address an (already) identified problem, especially when other review bodies or 
stakeholders, including the media, require the same changes. 
While some improvements, particularly concerning hospital infrastructure, have been 
associated with HIW’s inspections, other problems keep recurring in NHS hospitals. 
Several NHS health boards in Wales have been put under ‘targeted intervention’ and 
one has been in ‘special measures’ since 2015. This suggests that HIW’s impact on NHS 
hospital care has been moderate. Inspection results are reportedly more positive in 
small, specialised healthcare organisations with fewer hierarchical levels, dedicated 
managers and sufficient funding. 
7.2 Contribution to research  
Many findings of this evaluation concur with previous studies, particularly Walshe and 
colleagues’ (2014) evaluation of CQC inspections and Day and Klein’s (2004) evaluation 
of CHI inspections. This includes (i) the catalytic effect of inspections, which induce self-
examination and pre-emptive actions, and (ii) the extra-leverage of external inspections, 
which help committed internal stakeholders to address notorious problems. The study 
also noted appreciation of targeted feedback amongst many hospital managers, which 
Walshe and colleagues (2014, p. 67) refer to as ‘free consultancy’. Yet, predominantly 
independent hospital managers were said to proactively seek advice for improvement 
from reviewers during HIW’s inspections. The suggestion that minimum standards tend 
to drive mediocrity seems to be valid for large NHS bodies. The positive examples of 
small, specialised (independent and NHS) hospitals in Wales show that minimal 
standards do not necessarily act as a ‘barrier for innovation’ (Walshe, 2003, p. 47) in 
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well-performing hospitals. The success of minimum standards in the independent sector 
can partly be attributed to the close involvement of hospital managers in the development 
of standards process that Walshe (2003, p. 19) described.  
This research study is the first to investigate and evaluate HIW’s inspection regimes. 
Previous evaluations have predominantly examined particular inspection regimes in 
England, such as the above-mentioned evaluations of CHI and CQC’s inspection 
regimes, which were commissioned by the review bodies. The evaluation of HIW’s 
inspection regimes did not restrict itself to one inspection regime only but examined 
inspections of acute NHS and non-NHS hospitals in Wales. The comparison of how the 
different elements are implemented and work across the different regimes and settings 
generated valuable findings, which can, in a very modest way, contribute to inspection 
theory and inform future practice and research. 
7.3 Limitations and implications for research  
The specific circumstances in Wales and the nature of this research mean that the 
findings of this study cannot be automatically transferred to other inspection regimes. 
The methodology chapter (viz. 3.5 Challenges of the research design and 
implementation) highlighted various challenges and limitations. The complexity of 
healthcare and healthcare inspections with many, often interrelated variables make it 
virtually impossible to objectively relate particular outcomes (e.g. improvements in 
healthcare) to one single intervention (i.e. hospital inspection). By inviting the two major 
stakeholder groups, i.e. the inspectorate and the inspected healthcare organisations, the 
study aimed to capture the most important aspects and insights. The efforts to balance 
the recruitment of research participants amongst the hospital representatives regarding 
their professional background and gender were only partly successful. The self-selection 
of participants and non-participation of patients, lay reviewers and medical professionals 
in the evaluation may have caused bias.  
Further studies of similar inspection regimes may help to refine the findings of this 
evaluation. A mixed-methodology approach, which incorporates participant observation 
and quantitative data from the inspectorate and the inspected organisations, would 
strengthen the research design. A broader contingent of participants, including medical 
professionals, lay reviewers and patients would help to view the inspections from a 
different perspective and most likely generate new findings.  
This study examined the process stages, elements and mechanisms of HIW’s acute 
hospital inspection regimes, but, due to time constraints and complexity, it did not 
research them in every detail. A more detailed examination will be necessary to establish 
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the influence of particular factors in specific settings. This will include, for example, how 
the selection of inspection sites can be optimised or how inspection reporting can be 
improved to become more effective.  
7.4 Lessons learnt for regulatory policy and practice 
Given the complexity of healthcare and moderate impact of external inspections, 
governmental decision-makers and hospital managers are advised to arrange for 
governance and quality systems which comprise different, complementary approaches, 
including internal and external peer review schemes. Continued cooperation amongst 
review bodies in Wales can be instrumental in improving coordination of inspections. 
HIW may wish to establish mechanisms to periodically review, evaluate, adapt or 
develop (new) inspection regimes or elements, methods and tools with the aim to 
maintain or increase regulatory effectiveness.  
The findings of this study suggest some options for improvement, amongst them are the 
following:  
• Access to and analysis of real-time, ward-specific data and multi-ward 
inspections could increase the potential to detect non-compliance.  
• Selecting expert-reviewers with the matching clinical skills, including medical 
professionals, can further increase the hospitals’ acceptance of advice and 
critical findings and thus their willingness to act upon those.  
• A higher portion of unannounced out-of-hour visits, as in HIW’s mental healthcare 
inspections, can serve as a further reality check for hospital managers.  
• Systematic follow-up of improvement plans, ideally involving the Welsh 
government, would keep hospitals on their toes and assure the public that 
healthcare services are sufficiently safe. 
As there is no one-size-fits-all inspection regime, inspectorates need to find the right mix 
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Appendix 2 Information leaflet  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (HOSPITAL) 
 
Watchdogs for Healthcare - a comparative study of the Healthcare Inspectorate 
in Wales (HIW) and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in England 
 
This evaluation study is being conducted by Ms Anne – Christine Hanser, as part of her 
professional doctorate studies in health at the University of Bath, and supervised by Dr 
Louise Brown. Their contact details are provided at the bottom of the information sheet.  
 
The purpose of the study is to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
regulation and inspection regimes being applied in acute care hospitals in England and 
Wales. 
 
The study will analyse and compare the differences in design and implementation of 
the inspectorate model in Wales and England. The views and evidence that you and 
other interviewees provide may help us to better understand the mechanisms that 
make hospital inspections work (or not) in their particular context. We will forward our 
findings including the suggestions for changes, which the study participants express, to 
the HIW and CQC for their consideration.  
 
You and the organisation you work at are being asked to take part in this study due to 
your previous experience with, involvement in or managerial responsibility for hospital 
inspections and spot-checks conducted by the HIW, CQC or the Welsh government. 
The participation is entirely voluntary, i.e. you can freely choose whether or not to 
participate. If agree to participate, but wish to withdraw from the study at a later stage, 
you just need to inform the evaluators of your decision. You can withdraw from the 
study at any time without penalty. 
 
Your participation in the study would entail: 
- Arranging an appointment for an interview at a time and place convenient to 
you.  
- Answering questions and sharing your views in a face-to-face interview with the 
evaluator. This will take approximately 45 – 60 minutes. The conversation will 
be audio-recorded during the interview and transcribed (written down) 
afterwards. The information that you share with the evaluator will be kept 
confidentially. This means that your name/identity will not be disclosed in the 
evaluation report, unless you explicitly wish this. The personal data will be 
stored in a safe, which only the evaluators will have access to. The interview 
tape and text will be destroyed after the evaluation will be completed.  
- Possibly, you will be asked at a later stage to (i) clarify particular questions or 
(ii) give feedback on how the evaluator interpreted the interview(s). The 
clarifications and feedback would normally be exchanged via email (or 
telephone). 
 
If you wish,  
- you will receive an electronic and/or hardcopy of the interview text, the major 
findings (summary) and/or the entire evaluation report.  
 
This project has been reviewed by and received ethics clearance through the Research 
Ethics Approval Committee for Health of Bath University. The study is not expected to 
impose any elevated risks to the participants. There are no direct benefits for the 
participants involved. We hope however that the study may have a positive, but indirect 
impact through the publication of its findings.  
164 
 
Please take your time to make your decision about whether you would like to be in this 
study. Please ask any questions that you might have before you decide.  
 
Our contact information: 
 
Evaluator:  
Anne Christine Hanser, professional doctorate student  
Email:   
telephone: +44-  (landline), +44 (mobile) 
 
Academic supervisor:  





Appendix 3 Consent form 
CONSENT FORM 
The title of the study: 
Watchdogs for Healthcare - a comparative study of the Healthcare 
Inspectorate in Wales (HIW) and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in 
England  
The name and status of the evaluators: 
Chief investigator:  




Other investigator:  
Anne Christine Hanser, professional doctorate student  
Email:  
telephone: +44-  (landline), +44-  (mobile) 
 
The purpose of the study:  
To determine the strengths and weaknesses of the different regulation and 
inspection regimes being applied in acute care hospitals in England and Wales. 
 
Declaration 
As a participant in the above evaluation study, I declare that I 
• have read the participant information sheet 
• have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and have 
received satisfactory answers to questions and any additional details 
requested 
• understand that I may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time 
by advising the evaluators of this decision 
• understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics 
clearance through, the Research Ethics Approval Committee for Health of 
the University of Bath 
• understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data 
will be stored, and what will happen to the data at the end of the project 













Appendix 4 Interview guides 
Appendix 4.1 Initial interview guide – for piloting 
Interview topic guide for semi-structured-interviews on inspections amongst 
- Hospital managers 
- HIW managers and inspectors 
- Healthcare policy and decision makers 
- Independent experts 
Note: 
Each interview is expected to last between 45 and 60 minutes. Due to the limitation in 
time and the specific profiles of the different informant groups, it will not be possible to 
cover all research topics in each interview. I will focus on the topic that is most relevant 
for the respective interviewee (category). Yet, all topics will be covered across the 
interviews. The following interview guide is a draft version, which will be refined in the 
document review/analysis (stage 1 of the PD-study) and the subsequent piloting. 
1 Introduction - approx. 5 minutes  
• Thank interviewee for participating in the study. 
• Introduce myself, interview will last approx. 45 – 60 minutes 
• Explain the purpose of the study: to determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
the inspectorate model comparing the HIW (Wales) and CQC (England). 
• Reassure re: written informed consent, confidentiality – the study report will not 
reveal names of informants and hospital sites, therefore nothing you say will be 
linked to your identity,  
• Asking for permission for audio-recording. 
• Explain importance of interviewee expressing his/her views. All opinions will be 
valid and helpful. 
• Check interviewee is comfortable with setting, expected duration, interview 
format and subject matter.  
• The interviewee may ask questions her/himself at any time during the interview, 
especially when clarification is needed. 
 
2 Informant Introduction - 5 minutes 
• Could you please introduce yourself (Interviewer: make sure that name, age, 
position corresponds and contact details, including email-address correct) 
• Your current position in the hospital [or inspecting body, or other organisation] 
and role in quality management etc. 
• Your involvement in inspections in THIS hospital [or inspecting body or other 
organisation etc.] - including when, how many, which kind of inspections, HIW 
or CQC 
• Have you been involved in other inspections outside THIS hospital [or 
inspecting body, organisation etc.], e.g. same or similar role as in this hospital 
[or inspecting body, administration etc.], or a peer reviewer/inspector [hospital 
staff/manager etc.]  
• Interviewer: exploring the respondents’ role and experience with hospital 
inspections will help identifying relevant topics to further discuss. Check 
interviewee’s body language for any signs of discomfort.  
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3 Research topics - 30 - 45 minutes 
• Interviewer: Make notes during the interview, i.e. important statements, 
emphasises, body language. 
Current inspection regime  
• I would like to ask about your experience with hospital inspections. 
• Please describe the last hospital inspection you were involved in / responsible. 
(Probe – current inspection regime) 
Further, more specific questions: [for key informants from hospitals] 
• What information did you receive about the HIW/CQC’s inspection prior to their 
visit to the hospital? (announced/unannounced, time in advance) How long did 
the inspection last?  
• Which wards in the hospital were visited? What was the (thematic) focus? 
• Who were the inspectors (team, qualification)? Profession of the counterparts at 
the hospital? How did both work together? 
• What was your specific role? How did the inspection affect your and your 
colleagues’ work? And the ward / hospital as a whole? (any positive or negative 
changes) For example: preparation before, cooperation during, and tasks to do 
after the inspection.  
 
General views and functioning mechanisms  
• What was your general impression of the inspection? Alternative: How do you 
judge inspections from your professional point of view?  
Further, more specific questions: 
• What effects have the following elements of the inspection regime had (in THIS 
hospital, if not THIS hospital – please specify which hospital)? 
o Set of (national) health quality standards for acute care hospitals (to be 
inspected against) have been developed in a transparent and professional 
way (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o The national health quality standards for acute care hospitals have been set in 
a way that makes it very easy for the majority of hospitals to reach them (- did 
this happen and if what effects)? 
o The national health quality standards for acute care hospitals are balanced 
and reflect all relevant performance areas (- did this happen and if what 
effects)? 
o Inspection / quality standards are being communicated by HIW/CQC (other 
third parties) to the hospital well in advance (- did this happen and if what 
effects)? 
o HIW/CQC (or other third parties) provide sufficient and useful guidance in 
advance to the hospital about how to operationalise inspection / quality 
standards in the hospital (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC informing the hospital in advance about an upcoming inspection (- 
did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC unexpectedly arriving at the hospital and conducting an unexpected 
inspection (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
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o HIW/CQC inspectors identifying the critical issues / problems at the hospital 
during the inspections? (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC inspectors assessing the hospital’s performance adequately during 
the inspections? (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC inspectors giving valuable advice & practical recommendations for 
improvements during the inspections (- did this happen and if what effects)?  
o HIW/CQC inspectors giving valuable advice & practical recommendations for 
improvements after the inspections (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC discussing and agreeing with the hospital on appropriate actions for 
improvements (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC submitting reports to the hospital for commenting before publishing 
(- did this happen and if what effects) 
o HIW/CQC publishing inspection reports (with their negative assessment) on 
their website (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC publishing inspection reports (with their positive assessment) on 
their website (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o HIW/CQC (or other organisation) reviewing the progress made after the last 
inspection / implementation of the agreed or imposed changes? (- did this 
happen and if what effects) 
o HIW/CQC or other organisation conducting other activities to enforce 
compliance with standards / improve performance? (- did this happen and if 
what effects) 
o Population, media, other hospitals, NHS, or other organisations or individual 
(please specify) have expressed positive or negative feedback after the 
publication (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o Patient have been more reluctant to use the hospital after he publication of a 
negative assessment (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o Patient numbers (or similar) increased after the publication of a positive 
assessment) (- did this happen and if what effects)? 
o Have you identified any other elements of the inspections or positive or 
negative effects that you associate with the hospital inspection? 
• What specific advantages does the current inspection regime have?  
o Versus previous regimes (or regimes other inspectorates employ)  
o Vs. alternative solutions like voluntary peer review or self-assessment 
as applied in accreditation, supervisory audits and commands in 
hierarchical supervision or market competition etc.  
o Vs. complete freedom 
• From your point of view, what are the major strengths of hospital inspections? 
(for key informants from hospital: at THIS hospital and acute care hospitals in 
general)  
• What are the major weaknesses of inspection from your point of view? What 
specific disadvantages does the current inspection regime have? Alternative: 
What negative ‘side-effects’, if any, have you observed within the hospital (or 
outside) since the introduction of hospital inspections? 
• From your point of view, what is the major purpose that hospital inspections 
seek to fulfil? (quality assurance, quality improvement, accountability)  
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• How far do you think does the current inspection regime achieve these 
objectives? (e.g. scale between 0 – 10) 
Development of inspection models/regimes 
• What changes did you experience concerning inspection models and regimes 
and their implementation at the hospital(s) over the last few years? 
• ((What triggered those changes from your point of view? Alternative: What 
factors or conditions do you think have led to the changes?)) 
• How did the hospital (i.e. hospital managers and staff) receive those changes? 
(Note: it might be necessary to address each change separately)  
 
• How did you regard these changes that time and how do you consider them 
now retrospectively? 
Proposed changes 
• If you were in power to design and implement a system that that addressed 
these objectives (quality assurance, quality improvement, accountability), what 
would be its major components? 
• If your task was to adopt the current inspection model/regime, which changes 
would you suggest? 
4 Wrapping up - 5 minutes 
• What do you consider the most important things that we’ve spoken about? 
• Is there anything else that you’d like to raise? 
• Any questions? 
• Informing about further proceedings: sending the typed interview-text, possibility 
of clarification, opportunity to give feedback on draft research report 
• Snowballing: it will be crucial for this study to interview more people (also those 
with possibly different views) from this organisation / hospital or other relevant 
organisations / hospitals. Could you please forward my contact details to such 
people or share addresses of people with me that you think might be interested 
in being interviewed. 
• Thank and close 
Further topics for the interviews with key informants from CQC&HIW, 
governmental bodies, independent experts 
 
Context & Cooperation  
• What motivated the establishment of CQC/HIW from your point of view? What 
have been the driving factors?  
• Who ‘benefits’ (most) from the work of CQC/HIW? (government, the public, the 
patients, the hospitals, the staff, the NHS et al.) 
• What is the relation between CQC and HIW? 
• What is the relation between CQC/HIW and other governmental or non-
governmental institutions that have similar objectives? 
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• What do you consider as the major differences between the CQC and HIW – 
and the setting the work in? 
• How far have CQC and HIW learnt from each other? (or other institutions)  
HIW and CQC as institutions 
• What are the characteristics of the two institutions: 
o Structure, profile, number of staff, budget, no. of health services to oversee 
o How independent are CQC/HIW? (funding, decision-making and reporting) 
o What are the mechanisms to assess the performance of CQC/HIW? 
(external/internal, frequency, etc.) 
• What are their roles and their self-perception?  
o mandates & objectives?  
o How far were the ‘traditions’ of predecessor organizations incorporated?  
o What contributions did CQC/HIW make to public debate, agenda setting 
and policy setting related to quality improvement? 
• What is the underlying philosophy / regulatory model?  
• What strategy do they follow with regard to direction, detection and enforcement?  
• What is the actual focus of activities?  
Organisational development and Lessons learnt 
• What changes has CQC/HIW undergone since its establishment? (structural, 
processual etc.) 
• What motivated those changes? (factors, incidents, change in government etc.) 
• What (strategic/future) changes are envisaged? And why? 
• What (else) can be learnt from the experience so far? 
Inspection model and regime 
• How is the inspection (=external assessment) process currently organized?  
Further, more specific questions: 
o Different types of inspections 
o Strategy (focus on qualitative, quantitative, mixed methodology) 
o Specific methods in combination with inspections, like audits, surveys etc. 
o Sources of information 
o Tools 
o Composition of teams  
o Status & qualification: (full-/part-time) staff or free-lance consultants, 
professionals, high-profile experts? 
o Consistency: measures to prevent or reduce bias 
o Transparency: Inspection results (why published), CQC (why was the star-
rating system abandoned) 
• To what extent have the inspection models been adapted and developed over 
time?  
• What specific barriers have been encountered in the implementation? 
• Which positive or negative changes have you observed within acute-care 
hospitals that can be associated with the inspections of CQC/HIW?  
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Appendix 4.2 Interview guide for hospital managers – after piloting  
Interview topic guide for interviews on inspections (hospital managers) 
1 Introduction - approx. 5 minutes  
• Thank you for participating in the study (+ hand over business card) 
• How much time do you have available? - Typically, an interview lasts approx. 60 
minutes. 
• While the purpose of the study is to determine and compare the strengths and 
weaknesses of the inspection regimes applied by the HIW (Wales) and CQC 
(England) – naturally, this interview will focus on HIW as your hospital is being 
regulated by HIW. However, if you have first-hand experience with CQC 
inspections, feel free to mention those explicitly during the interview. 
• (hand over written informed consent and information sheet) – the study report will 
not reveal names of informants and hospital sites, the transcripts will not be 
enclosed in the final report, therefore nothing you say will be linked to your identity. 
Please find more information on the information sheet and the consent form. 
[Allowing time for the participant to read the information form and the consent form.] 
As you can see there, the participation in this research is voluntary and you can 
withdraw from the study at any time. [clarifying any questions or concerns] – If you 
agree on participating in the study, please sign here the consent form. One copy 
will remain with you, one I will take with me.  
• With your permission I would like to audio-record the interview. 
• Feel free to ask any questions yourself at any time during the interview, especially 
when clarification is needed. 
 
2 Informant Introduction - 5 minutes 
• Could you please briefly introduce yourself (such as your name, your role in the 
organisation, professional background) 
• What has been your involvement in inspections in this hospital - including when, 
how many, which kind of inspections? 
• Have you been involved in other inspections outside this hospital, e.g. similar role 
as in this hospital or as a peer reviewer? 
 
3 - Research topics - 30 - 45 minutes 
Current inspection regime  
I would like to ask you about your experience with hospital inspections:  
• Could you please describe the last hospital inspection you were involved in or 
responsible for. 
Further, more specific questions:  
• When was the last inspection? 
• What information did you receive about the HIW inspection prior to their visit to the 
hospital?  
• If it was announced, how much time in advance? 
• How long did the inspection last?  
• What type of inspection was it? (i.e. a general / revalidation / follow-up / (thematic) 
focus? 
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• Which wards in the hospital were visited?  
• Who were the inspectors, i.e. what was their professional profile/qualification? 
• Who were the counterparts in the hospital? i.e. Whom did they meet and interview? 
• How did the cooperation between the inspectors and the hospital staff / managers 
proceed? 
• What was your particular role in the inspection?  
• What was your general impression of the (last) inspection?  
Functioning mechanisms 
As part of the methodology I am employing in this research, I am looking at specific 
elements of the hospital inspections. The aim is to find out what works in which 
particular setting – or what does not work there. I am going to ask you about your 
experience with the particular elements of the inspection regime (in THIS hospital, if not 
THIS hospital – please specify which hospital). 
Quality standards 
• What is your experience with the quality standards for acute care hospitals which 
HIW employs for the inspections? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What is your professional opinion about these standards?  
• What is your judgement concerning the achievability of the standards for 
acute care hospitals? -> What factors make them more or less achievable 
for a hospital? 
• How have they been communicated to the hospital? 
• How were they operationalised in the hospital? 
• What specific effects did the application of these standards during the inspections 
have? 
Self-assessments (relevant for members of Local Health Boards) 
• What is your experience with the self-assessments which the board submits to 
HIW? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What are the advantages? 
• What are the disadvantages?  
• What specific effect do they have? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of these self-assessments? 
Type of inspections 
• What is your experience with announced HIW inspections? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What were the advantages? 
• What were disadvantages?  
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• What specific effect did the announced HIW inspections have? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of announced inspections? 
• What is your experience with unannounced HIW inspections? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What were the advantages? 
• What were disadvantages?  
• What specific effect did the unannounced HIW inspections have? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of unannounced inspections? 
• What is your experience with general HIW inspections? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What were the advantages? 
• What were disadvantages?  
• What specific effect did the general HIW inspections have? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of general inspections? 
• What is your experience with themed HIW inspections? 
• Further, more specific questions:  
• What were the advantages? 
• What were disadvantages?  
• What specific effect did the themed HIW inspections have? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of themed inspections? 
Inspection teams 
• What is your experience concerning the inspection teams?  
Further, more specific questions:  
In particular, (what is your experience concerning) 
• their ability to identify critical issues at the hospital during the inspections?  
• their ability to assess the hospital’s performance adequately? 
• Which characteristics and conditions increase the effectiveness of the 
inspection teams? 
Advice and Recommendations / Inspection report / enforcement / follow-up  
• What is your experience concerning the advice & recommendations for 
improvements that were given during or after the inspections? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What is your experience concerning actions for improvements? 
• Which conditions increase the effectiveness of the recommendations 
provided by HIW? 
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• What is your experience with inspection reports? 
Further, more specific questions:  
• What is your experience with reports submitted to the hospital for 
commenting before publishing?  
• What effect / impact did they have? 
• What effects did inspection reports with positive assessment results have?  
• (Please provide concrete examples. Did the population, media, other 
hospitals, NHS, or other organisations or individual express feedback after 
the publication? Did patient numbers increase or decrease? Did staff morale 
rise or fall?) 
• What effects did inspection reports with negative assessment (if there were 
any) results have? 
• Which (other) conditions increase the effectiveness of the inspection 
reports? 
• How far are you aware of inspection results of other health boards or competitive 
hospitals? 
• That is your experience with follow-up or review procedures after an inspection (if 
there were any)? (for example, to ensure the implementation of agreed or imposed 
actions) 
Further, more specific questions:  
• (if applicable:)What is your experience with HIW or other organisations 
conducting other activities to enforce compliance with standards / improve 
performance?  
• What effects did the particular measures have? 
Other elements? 
• Have you identified any other elements of the inspections or positive or negative 
effects that you associate with the hospital inspection? (if yes, which?) 
The interviewee’s professional judgement /evaluation of inspections 
• How overall do you judge inspections in general from your professional point of 
view?  
• From your point of view, what are the major strengths of the hospital inspections 
that HIW conducts?  
Further, more specific questions:  
• What specific advantages does the current inspection regime have?  
▪ Versus previous regimes (or regimes other inspectorate employ)  
▪ Vs. alternative solutions like voluntary peer review or self-
assessment as applied in accreditation, supervisory audits and 
commands in hierarchical supervision or market competition etc.  
▪ Vs. complete freedom 




Further, more specific questions:  
• What specific disadvantages does the current inspection regime have? 
Alternative: What negative ‘side-effects’, if any, have you observed within 
the hospital (or outside) since the introduction of hospital inspections? 
• From your point of view, what is the major purpose that HIW’s hospital 
inspections seek to fulfil? (quality assurance, quality improvement, 
accountability)  
Further, more specific questions:  
• How far do you think does HIW’s current inspection regime achieve these 
objectives? (e.g. scale between 0 – 10) 
 
Proposed changes 
•  If you were in power to design and implement a system that that addressed these 
objectives [-> objectives stated in research literature: quality assurance, quality 
improvement, accountability, informing the government], what would be its major 
components? 
• If your task was to adopt HIW’s current inspection regime, which changes would 
you suggest? 
4 Wrapping up - 5 minutes 
• What do you consider the most important things that we’ve spoken about? 
• Is there anything else that you’d like to raise? 
• Any questions? 
• [Informing about further proceedings]: I will send you the typed interview-text 
within the next few weeks. Feel free to clarify or add comments. Moreover, if you 
have time, it would be very nice if you could provide feedback on draft research 
report, which contains the analysis and conclusions of all interviews and research 
materials. 
• [Snowballing]: it will be crucial for this study to interview more people - also those 
with possibly different views - from this hospital or other relevant hospitals or 
organisations. Could you please share addresses of people with me that you 
think might be interested in being interviewed. Or forward my contact details to 
them. 
• Thank you very much for the interview and your support! (handing over …) 
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Appendix 4.3 Interview guide for HIW managers / inspectors  
Interview topic guide for semi-structured-interviews on inspections with HIW 
managers 
1 Introduction - 5 minutes  
(a) the study  
• Thank you for participating in the study (+ hand over business card) 
• How much time do you have available?  
• The purpose of the study I have explained during the presentation. While today’s 
interviews naturally focus on HIW inspections. However, you may wish to refer also 
to CQC inspection regimes. In those cases, please explicitly mention the CQC - in 
order for me not to confuse between the two. 
• (Reassure re: written informed consent, confidentiality) – the study report will not 
reveal names of informants and hospital sites, the transcripts will not be included in 
the final report, therefore nothing you say will be linked to your identity.  
• With your permission I would like to audio-record the interview. 
• Feel free to ask any questions yourself at any time during the interview, especially 
when clarification is needed. 
(b) the informant 
Usually, I ask the interviewee at the beginning to introduce herself, such as 
professional background and experience, anything that you consider important for the 
context of the interview. 
2 The mechanisms - 40 –50 minutes 
Functioning mechanisms (can skip this part, if the presentation has made that clear 
already) 
In my thesis, I am pursuing a realist-based programme evaluation methodology, 
which aims to first identify the mechanisms that are supposed to make a policy or 
programme or in our case the inspection regimes (for acute care/general hospitals) 
effective. In a second step, I am trying to find out in how far the regimes have been 
implemented the way they were supposed to and thirdly which of the particular 
elements of the inspection regimes have achieved their purpose in which particular 
hospital setting or context. (I.e. to find out what works in which setting and what does 
not). Your contribution to this study will be especially valuable given your profound, 
inside experience at HIW and your recent experience – working on the other side …, 
the hospitals. 
I have prepared schematic charts in table-form for some (but not all) elements of the 
inspection regimes and would like to go with you through them. Thereby, it would be 
good if you could comment on  
• the positive effects (or negative side effects) of the particular elements according to 
your experience and 
• whether the elements were relevant for the inspections in Wales and  
• Possibly whether you experienced any differences in the effectiveness of those 
elements depending on the specific setting, for example whether it was an NHS or 
independent sector hospital.  
2.1 Registration 
My understanding is that only independent sector hospital service providers have to 
register – not the NHS hospitals. 
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• What is the purpose of the registration required for hospital service 
providers?  
o Threshold to meet for performance – i.e. deter potential service 
providers who are unfit? 
o Relationship building with provider - i.e. establish an intensive 
relation, advice /direct the new service provider etc.? 
o Administrative data capture – get as much data as possible about 
the new service provider? 
• Why do NHS hospitals not have to register? – What is the rationale behind? 
• How often does a new service provider appear and thus has to register?  
• What happens in the case that a hospital is sold to another service 
provider?  
o One interviewee described a ‘light’ inspection… is this the norm? 
• How successful has HIW in achieving the above-mentioned purpose? 
2.2 Standards 
According to research literature, standards play an important part in the regulatory 
process, particularly for providing ‘direction’ to the regulated organisations.  
 
My understanding is that there are 26 healthcare standards in Wales for NHS hospitals, 
revised in 2010 and published as ‘Doing well, doing better’. One interviewee said 
however, that those standards apply to both, the NHS and independent sector 
healthcare providers. There are, however, the 25 ‘national minimum standards for 
independent health care services in Wales’, revised in 2011. I do understand that the 
two sets of standards are consistent and do not contradict each other –  
• I just want to clarify whether or not formally the ‘Doing well, doing better 
standards’ also apply to the independent sector, was one interviewee said.   
• And why would you not have ONE integrated set of standards, which may in 
one or another point differentiate between independent and NHS hospitals? 
• And why are the standards currently reviewed again – although the last revision 
is only 3 or 4 years ago. It does not seem plausible to me that rather generic 
standards in healthcare would change within such a short period of time? 
• What is the major purpose of the two sets of standards? 
• Framing values and expectations – rather than being concrete and precise. 
(Standards are an explicit expression of values more that they are a tool for 
performance measurement.) By the size of the documents, it seems to me 
that the minimum standards for the independent sector are given more 
explicit guidance than the NHS standards – correct? 
• Improvement through self-enforced compliance (‘So these standards are 
likely to be maximal, explicit, detailed, and accompanied by further 
guidance’) 
• Compliance through measurement and enforcement – relatively easy to 
reach (since the regulator is unlikely to be able to take enforcement action 
with more than a small proportion of providers) 
178 
• Differentiating performance of providers – ‘a wide variation of performance 
levels’. – I don’t see this at all in Wales at the moment. 
• According to your experience, what are the particular mechanisms that make 
standards work (well) in hospital inspections? 
Possibly, check the following scheme with the interviewee 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
 
Develops and promulgates 




1. Learns about standards / 
requirements  
2. Considers them appropriate 
and feasible 
3. Identifies the resulting need 
for changes and plans 
accordingly 
4. Implements changes 
Short-term 
• hospital managers/staff 
informed about standards 
• changes planned and 
implemented 
• compliance increased  
• performance improved in 
required areas  
Negative: 
• non-compliance issues 
remain (partly) 
• performance not 
improved in other areas 
Provides guidance and 
advisory information on 
how to … 
• Which contextual factors increase the effectiveness of regulatory standards 
according to your experience? 
• Which contextual factors reduce the effectiveness of standards? 
Further, more detailed questions:  
CQC discussed and developed the requirements for their inspections in a participative 
process that took several months and included a number of working meetings with the 
major stakeholders across England.  
o What degree of involvement should stakeholders have in the development 
of standards to make the standards an effective element in the regulation 
mechanisms?  
o What degree of achievability should standards have to make them an 
effective element in the regulation mechanisms?  
o How should standards be communicated to make them an effective 
element in the regulation mechanisms?  
• In how far do you consider does HIW achieve this purpose by applying the 
standards in their hospital inspections? Or: 
• What is your experience with the effectiveness of the standards that the HIW 
applied in their inspections hospitals in Wales? This question relates to the actual 
implementation of hospital inspections by HIW. 
 
Further, more detailed questions:  
o What differences, if any, in the effectiveness of standards have you 
experienced concerning NHS and independent sector hospital inspections? 
o What changes, if any, would you suggest concerning the standards that the 
HIW applies for hospital inspections? (ie. which aspects could still be 
improved by HIW, which are already perfectly suiting?) 
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2.2 Prior risk assessment and data analysis  
According to the concept of risk-based (or proportionate regulation), the regulatory 
ability to gather and analyse relevant hospital data plays an important role in the 
‘detection’ of hospitals that present a potentially larger threat to patients.  
• What is in your opinion the major purpose of HIW analysing and assessing the 
risks of particular hospitals? 
• Driver for improvement in advance of inspection 
• Determining when to use regulatory interventions  
• Focusing or directing attention during regulatory intervention  
• Making providers aware that regulator may intervene 
My understanding is that HIW conducts hospital inspections regularly / anyway (at 
least for the independent sector hospitals), i.e. does not chose particular hospitals.  
• What about NHS hospitals – are the validations of self-assessments made on a 
yearly basis or depending on the risk assessment? Or do the data provided in the 
self-assessments form one part of the risk assessments? 
• How would you distinguish between the various hospitals within a health board? 
Would you pick one hospital that has particular health data? Or choose more 
hospitals from a health board with poor results? 
• According to your experience, what are the particular mechanisms that make 
prior risk assessment and data analysis work effectively? 
Possibly, check the following scheme with the interviewee 
 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
1. Aggregates relevant, 
reliable and up-to-date 
information / intelligence 
about the hospital from 
various sources;  
 




3. selects the hospital 
and/or the inspection 
regime accordingly 
1. Regularly assesses its own 
performance level and risks 
(against the regulatory 
requirements)  
 
2. Acts appropriately upon 




• Acute compliance & 
performance issues 
resolved 
• Prevention mechanisms 
within internal quality 
system installed  
Long term 
• Performance levels 
improved 
• Which contextual factors increase the effectiveness of regulatory standards 
according to your experience? 
• Which contextual factors reduce the effectiveness of standards? 
• What is your experience with the effectiveness of prior risk assessments and data 
analysis HIW conducts? This question relates to the actual implementation. 
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Further, more detailed questions:  
o What differences, if any, in the effectiveness of prior risk assessment and 
data analysis have you experienced? (e.g. availability of data concerning 
NHS and independent sector hospitals, different sources of data, 
collaboration with other regulators in Wales…) 
o What changes if any would you suggest concerning the risk assessment 
and data analysis that the HIW conducts prior to the hospital inspections? 
(i.e. which aspects could still be improved by HIW, which are already 
perfectly suiting?) 
 
2.3 Type of inspections 
I would like to go with you through the specific mechanisms and effects that the 
different types of inspections have, such as announced, unannounced, themed 
inspections.  
 
But before looking at these types of inspections, I have 2 clarification questions.  
• HOW are you going to ‘test cultures’ - The last HIW operational plan states: 
‘During our inspections we will enhance our review of management and 
leadership to test cultures in services and organisations and to review how 
NHS…’ 
• Pilot infection prevention inspections (page 13 of the current operational plan). 
 
2.3.1 Let us look at announced inspections: 
My understanding is that announced inspections in hospitals are only conducted during 
follow-up visits or thematic reviews (i.e. in one particular area). – Is this correct? 
• According to your experience, what is the particular mechanism that makes 
announced visits work? 
• Which contextual factors increase their effectiveness according to your 
experience? 
• Which contextual factors reduce their effectiveness? 
Possibly, check the following scheme with Interviewee 
 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
Announces date/time of its 
inspection in advance   
1. Identifies non-compliance 
issues and takes immediate 
remedy action prior to the 
inspection  
 




3. Arranges for relevant staff 
and documents to be 
available at the inspection 
Short-term 
• compliance & 
performance issues 
improved 
• ‘evidence’ on compliance 
& performance 
manipulated 
• hospital staff informed 
and prepared 
• disruption minimised  
Long term 
• hospitals rely on schedule 
and make less efforts until 
the next announced visit  
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Further, more detailed questions:  
o In which cases or for which hospitals do you recommend conducting 
announced inspection visits? 
o What is the advantage of announced visits against unannounced visits? 
• What is your experience with the effectiveness of announced visits that HIW 
conducts? This question relates to the actual implementation.  
 
Further, more detailed questions:  
o What differences, if any, in the effectiveness of announced visits have you 
experienced concerning NHS and independent sector hospital inspections? 
o What changes, if any, would you suggest concerning the announced 
inspections that the HIW applies for hospital inspections? (i.e. which 
aspects could still be improved by HIW, which are already perfectly suiting?) 
2.3.2 Let us look at unannounced inspections: 
• According to your experience, what is the particular mechanism that makes 
unannounced visits work? 
• Which contextual factors increase their effectiveness according to your 
experience? 
• Which contextual factors reduce their effectiveness? 
Possibly, check the following scheme with Interviewee 
 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
Inspects hospital   1. Cooperates with inspectors  
 
and / or 
 
2. Tries to hide weaknesses  
 
Short-term 





Further, more detailed questions:  
o In which cases or for which hospitals do you recommend conducting 
unannounced inspection visits? 
o What is the advantage of unannounced visits against announced visits? 
• What is your experience with the effectiveness of unannounced visits that HIW 
conducts? This question relates to the actual implementation.  
Further, more detailed questions:  
o What differences, if any, in the effectiveness of unannounced visits have 
you experienced amongst different hospitals? (e.g. NHS and independent 
sector hospital, smaller or larger hospitals)? 
o What changes if any would you suggest concerning the unannounced 
inspections that the HIW applies for hospital inspections? (i.e. which 
aspects could still be improved by HIW, which are already perfectly suiting?) 
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2.3.3 Could we briefly discuss the differences between themed inspections and 
general inspections? 
According to the evidence on the HIW website, themed inspections play a prominent 
role in the inspection regime. This seems to be different from other regulators or 
inspectorates, including the CQC.  
• Could you please provide more information and explanation about themed 
inspections. 
Further, more detailed questions: 
o In what way do themed inspections work differently from general 
inspections? 
o Which contextual factors increase their effectiveness according to your 
experience? 
o Which contextual factors reduce their effectiveness? 
o What changes if any would you suggest concerning the themed inspections 
that the HIW applies for hospital inspections 
o The last annual report mentions ‘new approaches to the review of dignity 
and essential care’ – What exactly did you change and why and has that 
proved effective? The annual report state ‘’these changes are already 
having a demonstrable impact’ – I do understand this for the reporting 
process, but what about the other processes and inspections. 
o When reading the last annual report and the operational plan it seems that 
HIW is not conducting as many cleanliness inspections as it did in 
previous year? Is this impression correct? If yes – why is that? 
 
2.3.4 Could we briefly discuss self-assessments. 
My understanding is that NHS hospitals (or hospital trusts and boards???). It is then 
the HIW responsibility to validate those self-assessments. Correct? – 
• My understanding is that those have been introduced recently, i.e. 2 – 3 years ago? Is 
that correct? 
• My understanding is HIW tried to introduce a similar self-assessment – validation 
process for independent sector hospitals, but stopped that – as it did not work? Is 
this correct? Can you provide me with more details? 
• Can you explain a bit more the system of self-assessments? 
o How done – different or in addition to other  
o How often 
o Who 
o What role do they play? 
Further, more detailed questions: 
o What are the advantages and disadvantages? 
o What are the differences in the application of self-assessments at NHS 
hospitals and independent sector hospitals? 
o How are the self-assessments revalidated? By whom, how frequently? 
Independent sector hospitals told me that they submitted self-assessments to 
HIW, but never received any feed-back from HIW.  
o What is the procedure at HIW of handling self-assessments after 
receiving them? 




Another important element in the inspections are the people who conduct the 
inspections. Regulatory bodies like HIW and CQC seem to have different policies 
concerning the composition of inspection teams, mix of skills, or training for staff and 
external lay or peer reviewers they assign.  
• According to your experience, what makes inspection teams working most 
effectively?  
• How does the context that the inspections are performed in influence the 
effectiveness of the inspection teams or individual inspectors? –and which 
contextual factors would that be? 
Further, more detailed questions:  
• Page 16 of the last HIW annual report states ‘we developed a mixed model 
approach to identifying and recruiting peer reviewers’? What is new with this 
approach? My understanding was that HIW already used peer reviewers. 
• What skills mix should inspection teams ideally have?  
o I am interested in learning more about the contextual factors: How would 
that vary concerning the different attributes of hospitals (smaller or larger 
hospitals; independent or NHS hospitals; excellent performing or poorly 
performing hospitals)? 
• What about the ideal size of an inspection team?  
o How would that vary concerning the different characteristics of hospitals 
(smaller or larger hospitals; independent or NHS hospitals; excellent 
performing or poorly performing hospitals)? 
• Could you please explain more about the different roles in the team?  
o How do the roles of an HIW inspector differ from that of an external peer 
reviewer or a lay reviewer (what CQC calls now ‘experts by experience’? 
o How do these roles vary depending on the different attributes of hospitals? 
• What is your experience with the actual effectiveness of the inspection teams that 
conduct hospital inspection for HIW? This question relates to the actual 
implementation.  
o In how far, do you think, are inspection teams able to spot critical issues at 
the hospitals and correctly assess hospital performance? 
• What changes if any would you suggest to the HIW concerning individual 
inspectors and inspection teams? (i.e. which aspects could still be improved by 
HIW, which are already perfectly suiting?) 
HIW Inspectors and staff 
(a) HIW’s operational plan states on page 42 as one of HIW performance standards ‘to 
have at least 70% of HIW staff survey respondents state that they have been able to 
access the right learning and development opportunities when they need to’ and ‘to 
hold at least 8 staff seminars during 2014-15’   
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➔ Could I get access to the HIW staff survey (i.e. summary reports) that have 
been conducted so far? Is this the same survey that the last HIW annual report 
was referring to on page 27 ‘Each year the Welsh government undertakes a 
survey of all staff to assess their views on how effectively the organisation 
works.’? 
➔ Could I get access to HIW’s training calendar for 2014 (or what are the topics 
and learning objectives of the above mentioned 8 seminars?) 
➔ Does HIW encourage their staff to develop individual personal development 
plans and what is the process for monitoring their implementation? –  
➔ The last HIW annual report mentions on page 27 a ‘professional skills 
framework’ – could I see this? 
(b) HIW staff: the last annual report states on page 4 ‘we have a staff complement of 
about 60’, on page 27 the report lists in a table 41 permanent staff and 10 fixed term 
staff, which makes a total of 51, i.e. not 60.  
➔ What is the profile of HIW staff, i.e. how many are senior inspectors, what is 
their background etc. 
➔ The table on page 27 of the last HIW annual report shows 15 permanent and 2 
staff members with a fix-term contract leaving HIW (since April 2013) – do you 
conduct conversations with leaving staff members and if what do they state the 
reason for their leaving? 
➔ page 27 of the last HIW annual report mentions in this context a ‘staff churn’ 
and moving HIW head office to Merthyr Tydfil. So why did HIW move? 
 
(c) The last HIW operational plan states: ‘We will continue to listen to the voice of the 
patient (adult and child). We will establish a larger pool of lay reviewers who will 
receive enhanced support and communication from HIW staff and help us to ensure 
that the patients’ perspective is reflected in our work.’ –  
• How are lay reviewers recruited? – Individuals who volunteer – or patient 
organisations – or??? What is the motivation of those people? Are they 
compensated? How often do they participate in inspections? 
• Are the lay reviewers trained before they participate in the inspections? If yes, 
what does the training include? And for how long? 
 
2.4 Instructions and recommendations for improvement 
 
As far as I understand, the inspected hospital receives information about the detected 
non-compliance issues firstly orally during and at the end of the inspection and 
secondly and more profoundly in the report afterwards. Is my understanding correct? If 
not, please clarify. 
 
If there are non-compliance issues, the hospital will then be required to produce an 
action plan to tackle these issues. Correct? The hospital may also receive practical 
recommendations for improvement alongside the inspection and the report. Is that 
correct, too? 
• According to your experience, what mechanisms and factors do make the 
instructions and recommendations work most effectively? 
• How does the context the inspections are performed in influence the 
effectiveness? – 
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• and which contextual factors would that be? (smaller or larger hospitals; 
independent or NHS hospitals; excellent performing or poorly performing hospitals) 
Possibly, check the following scheme with Interviewee (simplified version) 
 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
Provides recommendations 
to the regulated hospital, 
including actions to be 
taken by the hospital 
1. Implements 
recommendations or  
 
 
2. Ignores recommendations 
Short-term 
• Actions implemented 
accordingly 
• Performance improved  
• Poor performance 
continues 
long-term 
• Cooperation and 
appreciation (or not) of the 
regulator’s role & advice 
 
Possibly, check the following scheme with Interviewee 
 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
1. summarises and 
prioritises the issues, gives 
immediate feed-back 
during and at the end of 
the inspection (debriefing) 
and (if necessary) 
 
2. indicate need for 
improvements and required 
(immediate) actions  
 
2.a agrees actions with 
regulated hospital 
/approves action plan  
 
2. Hospital managers listen and 
comment during debriefing 
 
3. discuss and agree upon 
actions (?) 
 
4. or try to ignore, deny and 
object criticism 
 
5. Fear to lose reputation as 
employer and service provider 
 
 
6. Identifies suitable immediate 
action submits and agrees 
action plan to regulator 
 
7. implement changes to resolve 
problems 
 
7a. take long-term actions to 
prevent performance problems 
and avoid future exposure and 
embarrassment 
Short-term 
• Action plan 
• Acute compliance & 
performance issues 
resolved 
• Prevention mechanisms 
within internal quality 
system installed  
 
(or negative) 
• Denial of problems, 




• Performance levels 
improved 
 
• Or negative:  
Problems remain unsolved 




• What is your experience with instructions and recommendations that HIW 
provides in oral and/or written form? This question relates to the actual 
implementation. 
 
Further, more detailed questions:  
• What changes if any would you suggest concerning the risk assessment and 
data analysis that the HIW conducts prior to the hospital inspections? (i.e. 





2.5 Inspection reports 
 
Although we have partly touched the element of ‘reporting’ in the last section, I would 
like to look now more specifically at inspection reports and the mechanisms and factors 
that make them an effective element of the inspection regime.  
• According to your experience, how do inspection reports become most effective? 
(working mechanisms) 
• What is their particular purpose concerning Information provision 
For example: 
o Information to be used by other stakeholders (users, government, 
commissioning bodies) in decision-making (direct or indirect influence on 
the provider, content, form and timescale comprehensible and usable) 
o Information to be used by providers in compliance and improvement – 
(audience for information provision is the provider community; providers find 
information useful to guide their action; willingness and capacity provided) 
o Information as a mechanism for public accountability (both the regulator 
itself and regulated organisations accountable to the public; publication is a 
purpose in itself) 
• Which contextual factors increase their effectiveness according to your 
experience? 
• Which contextual factors reduce their effectiveness? 
Regulator Regulated hospital Possible output/outcomes 
1. summarises and 
prioritises issues in a draft 
report, incorporating 
comments made during 
debriefing 
 
2. submits draft report  
 
4. Publishes report and 
press release on website 
(to be accessed by public, 





3. Hospital managers read and 




4. try to ignore, deny and object 
criticism 
4.a takes legal actions(?) 
 
5. Fear to lose reputation as 
employer and service provider 
 
 
6. Conduct immediate action to 
resolve problems and 
implement changes 
 
7. take long-term actions to 
prevent performance problems 
and avoid future exposure and 
embarrassment 
Short-term 
• Acute compliance & 
performance issues 
resolved 
• Prevention mechanisms 
within internal quality 
system installed  
(or negative) 
• Patient rates decline 
• Denial of problems, 
inability / incompetence 
of current management 
• Increased levels of 
complaints and legal 




• Performance levels 
improved 
• Or negative:  
Problems remain unsolved 







Further, more detailed questions:  
o The operational plan states as one of HIW’s performance standards ‘to 
publish agreed report and action plan on HIW website within a maximum 3 
months of inspection.’ -> why is it important to publish an agreed report? 
▪ What difference if any does it make when the HIW submits the 
report to the hospital for commenting before publishing?  
▪ Do the different attributes of hospitals play any role in the 
effectiveness of reports when they are prior submitted to them 
before publishing? 
o What difference if any does the content of a report, for example mainly 
positive, or mainly negative hospital assessments make concerning its 
effectiveness? 
▪ According to your experience, how do the different stakeholder 
groups receive and react on inspection reports? E.g. Population, 
media, other hospitals, NHS, or other organisations or individual 
▪ What impacts does a negative assessment report have for NHS 
hospitals? 
▪ What impacts does a negative assessment report have for 
independent sector hospitals? 
I do understand that there have been a number of issues raised during the recent 
Welsh Assembly Committee inquiry concerning the publication and accessibility of 
HIW inspection reports.  
• What is your experience with the inspection reports that HIW provides? This 
question relates to the actual implementation.  
 
Further, more detailed questions:  
o What changes if any would you suggest concerning the HIW inspection 
reporting? (i.e. which aspects could still be improved by HIW, which are 
already perfectly suiting?) 
 
2.6 Follow-up and enforcement 
 
The Welsh Assembly Social and Health Committee inquiry documentation also 
mentions issues concerning the follow-up and enforcement of action as well as the 
cooperation with other regulators in Wales.  
• Could you please provide your view on what should be effective mechanisms for 
follow-up and enforcement of actions?! 
For example: 
o Informal enforcement or prospect drives compliance (verbal threatening - in 
advance of inspection report – sufficient for the provider to comply) 
o Enforcement as incentive to drive compliance (provider considers cost of 
enforcement - needs to be greater than the cost of compliance for provider 
to comply) 
o Enforcement as symbolic action to drive compliance (actual content of 
enforcement action is not significant, - naming and shaming.) 
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o Enforcement as driver for other providers to achieve compliance 
(enforcement action against one provider is seen as providing a lesson – 
and a deterrence to non-compliance – to other providers) 
• Which contextual factors increase effectiveness of those mechanisms according 
to your experience? (e.g. cultural changes within NHS, political changes, small 
hospitals, independent sector hospital, insurance-based system) 
• Which contextual factors reduce their effectiveness? (e.g. financial cuts, 
economic crisis, larger hospitals, poor leadership) 
Further, more detailed questions:  
o How do follow-up and enforcement actions affect the hospitals and their staff? 
o How do follow-up and enforcement actions affect potential patients and their 
relatives? 
o How should the cooperation with governmental institutions be organised to 
improve the effectiveness of follow-up and enforcement activities? 
• What changes if any would you suggest concerning  
• the powers / authority the HIW should be provided with in order to effectively 
enforce necessary actions for improvement?  
o Which differences would there be concerning the independent sector 
and the NHS? 
• The actual follow-up and enforcement actions that HIW conducts? This 
question concerns the actual implementation  
We have looked profoundly at a number of elements of the inspection regime.  
• What other relevant elements are there that we have not spoken about yet?  
 
4 The interviewee’s professional judgement /evaluation of inspections - 5 - 10 minutes 
• How do you by and large judge hospital inspections from your professional point of 
view?  
• From your point of view, what are the major strengths of hospital inspections (that 
HIW conducts)?  
• What are the major weaknesses of inspections (that HIW conducts) from your point 
of view?  
Further, more specific questions:  
• What specific disadvantages does the current inspection regime have? 
Alternative: What negative ‘side-effects’? 
• From your point of view, what is the major purpose that hospital inspections seek to 
fulfil? (quality assurance, quality improvement, accountability, informing the 
government)  
Further, more specific questions:  
• How far do you think does the current HIW inspection regimes achieve 
these objectives? (e.g. scale between 0 – 10) 
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Proposed changes 
• If you were asked to design and implement a system that that addressed these 
objectives (quality assurance & improvement etc.) within the healthcare sector in 
Wales, what would be its major components? 
• If your task was to adopt the current HIW hospital inspection model/regime, which 
changes would you suggest? 
5 Wrapping up - 5 minutes 
• What do you consider the most important things that we’ve spoken about? 
• Is there anything else that you’d like to raise? 
• Do you have any questions? 
• (Informing about further proceedings): I will send you the typed interview-text within 
the next few weeks. Feel free to clarify or add comments. Moreover, if you have time, 
it would be very nice if you could provide feedback on draft research report, which 
contains the analysis and conclusions of all interviews and research materials. 
• (Snowballing): it will be crucial for this study to interview more people - also those 
with possibly different views - from this hospital or other relevant hospitals or 
organisations. Could you please share addresses of people with me that you think 
might be interested in being interviewed. Or forward my contact details to them.  




Appendix 5 Transcription instructions 
Rules applied during the transcription. 
Feature Transcription 
Short breaks … 
Longer breaks … … 
Vocal expressions like umm, eh (which 
indicate the interviewee’s thinking or 
searching for words) and expressions 
like ‘you know’ are not transcribed 
 
Non-verbal expression like smiling, 
laughing,  
[smiling] [laughing]  
Inaudible  [inaudible] 
Emphasis on specific words through slow 
and emphatic speech 
italic letters 
Comments like "how interesting" or 
"really?" or "wow!" which the interviewer 
made during the interviewee’s speech to 
show that she was listening are not 
transcribed. 
 
Explanatory text that was not in the 
interview. 
[ ] 
Contractions like isn’t, doesn’t are kept doesn’t, isn’t, can’t, don’t 
Contractions like ‘cause and ‘till are spelt 
in the correct grammatical form 
because, until 




General rules:  






Appendix 6  Agreement between the researcher and the transcriber 
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Code - Level 3 Code - Level 4 Code - 
Level 5 






             Contextual factors which 
influence the development, 
organisation and effectiveness of 








      Differences and similarities 
between UK and Wales 
Wales = small 
country  
    The impact the small size of the 
country has, e.g. the healthcare 
community, decision makers et 
al. know each other well. 
  Austerity     Limited funding and cuts in HIW's 
and NHS budgets in Wales and 
beyond 
  Difficult times 
for NHS  
    The increasing expectations 
towards the NHS in times of 
restricted funding. 





    The Welsh assembly government, 
the Welsh government, the 
Health and Social Care 
Committee, their oversight on 
HIW, differences in policies (in 
comparison to England) 
  NHS structure 
in Wales (and 
England) 
    The current structure of the NHS 
in Wales and the reorganisation 
in 2009. Differences between 
England and Wales. 








      Prominent shortcomings in the 
UK healthcare sector, which 
received a lot of media attention. 
  Staffordshire       
  Abertawe Bro 
Morgannwg 
    
 
  Stoke 
Mandeville 
      
  Tunbridge 
Wells 
      
    Betsi 
Cadwaladr 









      The specific differences (and 
similarities) between NHS and 
independent health sector  
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  Independent hospitals in Wales 
are typically smaller and have a 
much flatter hierarchy than the 
NHS structure 





    
  Attitude / 
commitment to 
quality 
    
  Attitude 
towards HIW 
inspections 
  The attitude towards HIW and 
HIW inspections expressed by 
interviewees from the 
independent sector 
    Remuneration/i
ncentive 
schemes 
  Positive inspection results are 
rewarded in the remuneration / 
incentive schemes of 
independent sector 





    Interviewees pointing to the 
differences (size, conditions etc.) 
between NHS and independent 
sector 
  NHS       
    Gaps between 
board and floor 
  The gap between the top 
management level of a Local 
Health Board and the staff 
delivery healthcare services. The 
includes decision making, 
information flow, access to 
resources. 
    Internal 
governance and 
QM systems 
  This particularly refers to internal 
'inspection' mechanisms like HIW 
inspections, exercised by top 
managers of the HCO 
    Organisational 
culture and 
leadership 
    
    Accredited 
services 
  NHS services which underwent 
accreditation 
    Attitude 
towards HIW 
inspections 
  The attitude towards HIW and 
HIW inspections expressed by 
interviewees working at the NHS 





        
  University 
hospital 
      
  Tertiary 
care/cancer 
hospital 
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    Independent sector hospitals in 
Wales have less than 50 beds 
  General acute 
care hospital 
      
  Community 
hospital 
    Community hospitals in Wales 
offer a smaller spectrum of 
services than a general acute care 
hospital 
  Hospice     Hospital that specialised on end 
of life care 
  Large size     If reference was made to the 
large size of the organisation 
  Variatio




      Quality of care varies across 
different wards within the same 
hospital 
  Reasons for 
variation 
    Interviewees knowing or 
speculating what the reasons for 
the variation of quality of care 
across hospitals are 












    
          











        
Formal status     HIW is a governmental structure, 





    HIW's general approach as a 
regulator and inspectorate, the 
principles it follows and 
assumptions it has as to how its 





    Suggestions and indications that 
HCOs adjust their behaviour (in 
response to inspection regimes) 
HIW changing 
and adapting 
    Suggestions and indications that 
HIW adjusts its inspection 
regimes (in response to changes 
in HCOs behaviour) 
  Variety of 
responsibilities 
(too many?) 
    The variety of responsibilities of 
HIW and suggestions that those 
are too many for HIW to handle 
or cope with 
    Relationship / 
lead review 
manager 
    Newly introduced functions in 
HIW to establish and maintain a 
relationship with a particular 
health board and monitor their 
performance 
    Purpose of 
inspections 
    Overarching objective or purpose 
of inspections 
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  Assuring that HCOs provide a 
defined (by standards) minimum 
of quality 
    Quality 
improvement 
  Increasing the level of quality 
    Informing the 
government 
  Informing the government and 
governmental policies 
    Accountability   Making HCO (and individuals 
within HCOs) accountable for 
substandard healthcare quality 











        
  Capacity 
problems 
    Capacity problems arising after 
the changes in staff in 2013 
  Size and 
resources 
    The budget and staff available to 
HIW 
  Advisory 
board 
      
  Need for 
change 
    Need for change expressed by 
interviewees (or other 
stakeholders during review of 
HIW's effectiveness) 
  Review into 
HIW 
effectiveness 
    The review into HIW's 
effectiveness, evidence collected 
during the consultation process, 
Ruth Marks' report 
  HIW after 
reorganisation 
    HIW's situation after the 
reorganisation in 2014, reference 
made to improvements due to 
the reorganisation, change in 
staff  













        









    Formal and informal cooperation 
and coordination between 
various review bodies in Wales 
and beyond 
  Who does what   Roles and functions of different 
review bodies, including the 
question of social care, which 
overlaps with healthcare 
  Formal 
cooperation 
mechanisms 
  Formal agreements such as the 
concordat 
  Informal 
relationship 
  Informal cooperation, also at 
individual level 
    Coordination of 
inspections 
  Coordination or more often the 
perceived or acknowledged lack 
of coordination of inspections 
amongst review bodies in Wales 
    Health summits   Healthcare summits are 
organised by HIW: review bodies 
from Wales meet and exchange 
information about HCO 
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    Joint 
inspections 
  Joint inspections between HIW 
and other review bodies in Wales 
    CQC     The Care Quality Commission in 
England 
    Trusted to 
care spot 
checks 
    Trusted to care spot checks were 
an inspection programme run by 
the Welsh Government, 
independent from HIW, but 
relying on HIW's peer reviewers 
    Cancer peer 
review 
    Cancer peer review is an 
independent peer review 
scheme, initially supported by 
HIW 
    CHC     Community Health Councils 
organise inspections in hospitals, 
often focusing on the 
environment 
    CSSIW     Care and Social Services 
Inspectorate Wales 
    Welsh Risk 
Pool 
    The Welsh risk pool supported 
HCOs in Wales in managing and 




























      




  Invitation and participation of 
healthcare managers / 
professionals in the process of 
developing and reviewing 
healthcare standards. 




  Quote by representatives of 
independent sector, expressing 
why they willingly complied with 
standards 








      
  Evidence based   Requirement that standards need 
to be based on (clinical, medical) 
evidence or at least best practice 
    Generic   Generic, i.e. not very specific 
standards. Vaguely formulated. 
    Specific   Specific to healthcare setting or 
healthcare service 
    Measurable   Quantifiable, entails the 
possibility to compare the 
achievement of standard 
    Focus on 
outcome 
(versus input or 
process) 
  Claim that standards - and thus 
inspections - should focus on the 
outcomes of healthcare rather 
than on inputs or the process of 
how care is provided 
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    Minimum 
standards 
  Minimum standards aim to 
ensure that a defined minimum 
level of healthcare is provided, 
not less. 
    Doing well - 
doing better 
standards 
    Name of the document, 
published in 2010 which lists the 
healthcare standards for the NHS 
in Wales 
    Independent 
sector 
standards 
    similar standards to the Doing 
well - doing better were issued 
about the same time for the 
independent sector in Wales 
    Fundamental 
of care 
standards 
    A set of standards which are used 
in nursing care 
    Health and 
Social care 
standards 
    New set of standards, issued in 
2015, relating to NHS and 
independent sector 
    Interpretation 
of standards 
    The way different people, 
healthcare managers / 
professionals, HIW reviewer 
interpret the standards 
      Unrealistic/ideal
istic 
  Accusation that HIW reviewers 







        
  Regulatory 
relationship 
    Suggestions and indications that 
a regulatory relationship has 
been formed between HIW and 
the regulated/inspected HCO 
managers 
  Independent 
sector 
    Only independent sector HCO are 
subject of registration in Wales 
  Why not NHS?     Question raised by interviewees: 
why NHS Organisations are not 







        







    How HCOs in Wales organise and 
perform the self-assessments 
  Variability    The variability in format, content 
and organisation of self-
assessments across the different 
HCOs in Wales 
  Im/maturity of 
Health board 
  Suggestions and indications that 
certain HCOs are not mature 
enough for an effective use of 
self-assessments as part of 
quality management / 
governance systems 
    Too ambiguous 
/ HIW over-
whelmed 
  Suggestions and indications that 
HIW was overwhelmed by the 
amount of work related to 
validating the self-assessments 
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    Feeding the 
beast' (not 
purposeful) 
    Quote by several interviewees 
suggesting that the self-
assessment is a formal exercise 
only, which entails a lot of work 
at HCOs, but does not necessarily 
achieve its purpose  




    The feedback / response that 
HCOs receive upon the submitted 
self-assessments 
    Perceived lack 
of feedback 
    
    External 
validation 
(needed) 
    The need for external validation 
of self-assessments expressed by 
several interviewees, some 
referring to 'not letting turkeys 
voting for Christmas' 
    Benchmarking 
and league 
tables 
    References made to the 
possibility / missed opportunity 
of benchmarking and league 
tables 













        




    The capability of HIW (and thus 
HIW's capacity) staff to analyse 
data prior to inspections and thus 
select purposefully inspection 
sites 
  HIW staff 
expertise 
  Professional background, 
experience, expertise of HIW in 
analysing data 
  Data sets    Defining the 'right' set of 
indicators to predict substandard 
quality and thus to purposefully 
select inspection sites 
  Access to data     HIW's ability to get access to 
relevant healthcare data 
    Ward-specific 
information 
  Quantitative and qualitative data 
which help to identify 
underperforming hospital wards 
and thus to purposefully select 
inspection sites 
      Sources of 
information 
  such as complaints from patients, 
information received from 
whistle blowers, other review 
bodies etc. 




    Number of inspection sites  
    Number of 
wards per 
inspection 
  How many hospital wards or 
departments were inspected 
during one inspection 
    Suggested ideal 
number 
  Suggestions or indications as to 
what would be the 'ideal' number 
of sites to be inspected during 
one inspection  
199 
      Multiple 
hospital sites  
  If during one inspection two or 
more different hospitals of the 
same Health Board were 
inspected (occurred during new 
scheme in 2015) 





    How inspection sites (hospitals, 
wards and departments) are 
selected. 
    Presumed by 
HCO as based 
on intelligence 
  Interviewees from HCOs assumed 
that HIWs selection of inspected 
sites (hospital wards or 
departments) was informed by 
'Intelligence' 
    No idea why 
ward was 
chosen (HCO) 
  Interviewees from HCOs stated 
that they did not know on which 
basis HIW had selected the 
ward/department, nor did they 
assume that there was any 
particular reason 




  The (rare) cases where HIW 
choose not to inspect a ward it 
had initially selected. Typically, 
this was due to a reason and HCO 
interviewees appreciated the 
decision as appropriate 
      Not disclosed to 
peer reviewers 
until day before 
  Information about the hospital to 
be inspected is not disclosed to 
the peer reviewed until the day 
before. This is to prevent leaks. 
    Assessment/ju
dgement 
    Suggestions or indications as to 
how (statistical) data and other 
information about an inspection 
site informs the assessment in 
general and the judgement of 
reviewers in particular 
      Data is not all - 
seeing it with 
my own eyes 
  Quote by a reviewer, referring to 
the necessity to visit the hospital 
and not rely on data only 
      Piecing things 
together', 
synthesis 
  Referring to the amount of 
information which needs to be 
synthesised in order to make a 
final judgement 
      Not wanting to 
know prior to 
inspection 
  Some reviewers refusing to see 
the data before the inspection, 
thus to avoid 'framing' (positive 
or negative pre-assumptions 



















      Themes and topics that 
determine the content of the 
inspection, i.e. which standards 





    HIW comprehensive inspection 
regimes that was run in the early 
years 
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  Cleanliness 
and Infection 
control 
    HIW's programme in the late 
2000s and early 2010s, including 
Cleanliness spot checks 
    DECI     Dignity and Essential Care 
inspections - HIW main 
inspection programme for 
hospitals 
    New 
inspection 
regime (2015) 
    A hospital inspection regime, HIW 
introduced in 2015, like DECI, but 
inspecting against a wider range 
of standards and including 
multiple sites 
    Independent 
sector regimes 
    HIW's inspection regimes for 
independent sector hospitals, 
inspecting against a large range 
of standards 
    Special and 
thematic 
reviews 
    Special reviews or review 
programmes which focus on a 
particular issue, often across HCO 
in Wales 




    Proposals made by interviewees 
as to future inspection schemes, 
themes or topics 






      Any issues related to when, how 
often, how long and thus how 
thorough the inspection was 
conducted 
  Frequency       
    Not enough 
HIW inspections 
  Suggestions and indications that 
HIW inspections were not 
frequent enough. This relates to 
HCOs which had not been 
inspected by HIW for several 
years. 
    Too many 
inspections  
  Perception of interviewees that 
their HCOs were 'over-inspected', 
'inspected to death’. This does 
not necessarily relate to HIWs 
inspection only. Sometimes, 
interviewees referred to poor 
coordination of inspections 
amongst review bodies 
    Timing 
  
    Day of the week or time of the 
day, when inspections take place 
    out of hour 
inspection  
  Inspections that are conducted 
during the evening or night or 
during the weekend.  
    Duration     How long the inspection lasts 
      One day     
      Two days     
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      Perceived as 
'snapshot' 
  Perception that the inspection 
only reflects one moment in time 
and therefore is not necessarily 
'representative' 
    Thoroughness     How thorough the interviewees 
perceived the inspection to be 
conducted  
  Inspectio
n mode  
      Whether the inspection was 
announced in advanced to the 
HCO or the inspection team 
occurred unannounced at the 
hospital 
    Unannounced       




  Rationale, benefits and potential 
disadvantages which 
interviewees associated with the 
unannounced mode of inspection  
      Interviewee 
preference 
  Preference which interviewees 
expressed for unannounced 
mode 







    The difficulty to distinguish 
between unannounced and 
announced inspections 
    Call to CEO 30 
minutes before  
  Statement made by an 
interviewee that HIW calls the 
CEO of the HCO 30 minutes prior 
to the inspection 
    Second day of 
unannounced 
inspection 
  The fact that the second day of a 
two-day inspection is no surprise 
anymore for the HCO 
      Could arrive any 
day 
  The expectation by HCO 
managers that an inspection is 
likely to arrive 
    Announced       




  Rationale, benefits and potential 
disadvantages which 
interviewees associated with the 
announce mode of inspection  
      Interviewee 
preference 
  Preference which interviewees 
expressed for announced mode 
    Invited 
inspections 
    HIW inspections that were 









      How the inspection is conducted 
on site 
  Process     Sequence of activities and how 
the process was conducted / 
perceived 
    Consistency   In how far the inspection was 
perceived to be conducted in a 
consistent manner, with as little 
variation in the application of 
methods 
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    Methods     Data collection / assessment 
methods applied during the 
onsite inspection 
      Document 
review  
  incl. Patient records, statistical 
data reports, internal audit 
reports, fundamental of care 
reports 
      Interviews     




        Staff Which staff is interviewed, how 
far are non-nurses been 
interviewed, Staff pointing to 
shortcomings 
        Senior 
manage
rs 
Are managers and especially 
senior managers been 
interviewed - or not. Why not? 




HCO managers try to 'intercept' 
HIW reviewers to highlight / 
share specific information 
      Surveys   for staff and patients/relatives 
      Observation   Which areas are being observed? 
      Smell   Interviewees (particularly 
reviewers) referring to the 
importance of using 'all sense', 
including their noses 
      Intuition and 
experience 
  Interviewees (particularly 
reviewers) referring to intuition 
and experience 
    Tools 
  
    Tools (such as checklists) which 
HIW uses during the inspection 
    Structure and 
flexibility 
  Interviewees (particularly 
reviewers) referring to the 
balance between the structure 
(of a tool) and the flexibility for 
the reviewer to apply the tool 
and make an informed 
judgement 
      Access to 
inspection tools  
  Whether the inspection tools are 
available to the public or 
particular stakeholders 
        Public Publicly available inspection tools 




Interviewed HCO managers state 
that they do not know the tools 
HIW uses 
        Manage
rs know  
Managers (seem to) know HIW 
tools, typically through the peer 
reviewers 
      Questionnaires/
checklists (HIW) 
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      Prompt card   Prompt card used by Trusted to 





        
  Team       
    Roles, 
teamwork 
  How the different members of 
the team cooperate with each 
other as a team 
      Team 
composition 
  This includes the mix of 
competencies and professions 
within the inspection team 
      Team size    This includes the question what 
the ideal number of reviewers is, 
whether there were too many or 
not enough reviewers in the 
inspection team 
      No physicians   Interviewees stated that the 
inspection team did not include a 
physician 
      Unclear 
professional 
background 
  Interviewed HCO managers were 
uninformed about the 
professional background of the 
reviewers 
    Inspection 
lead 
    Usually a permanent HIW 
employee who leads the 
inspection team 
      Characteristics   What were or should be the 
characteristics of the inspection 
manager 
      Leadership role   How, whether the inspection 
manager performed the 
leadership role 
    HIW peer 
reviewers 
    The clinical / professional 
reviewers that HIW assigns from 
outside HIW to complement the 
inspection team  
      Clinical/professi
onal expertise 
  The clinical / professional 
expertise of these reviewers 
      Double role   the double role of peer reviewers 
as HIW reviewer and their role 
within their HCO 
      Outdated, lack 
of experience 
  Statements made by 
interviewees that a peer 
reviewer's expertise was 
outdated and therefore the 
inspection seen as less credible 
    Lay reviewers     The non-professional reviewers 
that HIW assigns from outside 
HIW as representatives of the 
patients and population to 
complement the inspection team  
    Attitude and 
behaviour 
    Attitude and behaviour of 
members of the inspection team 
that interviewees referred to 
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      Interpretation / 
judgement 
  How data and findings are 
interpreted, and judgement is 
formed 
      Balance: 
friendliness and 
rigour 
  The balance between 
communicating in a friendly way, 
but at the same time applying 
rigour - which interviewees 
referred to 




    Meetings, induction and training 













                                        
Oral 
feedback  
      Feedback given to the HCO 
during and at the end of the 
inspection (debriefing) 
  Interaction 
with 
participants 
    Interaction between the 
inspection team and participants 
of the debriefing 
    Who presents 
feedback 
  Who does and who should 
present the inspection finding to 
the audience 
    Composition of 
audience 
  Which HCO professionals and 
managers attend the meeting, 
should attend the meeting, and 
what does this reflect 
    Two-way 
communication 
/ reaction on 
feedback 
  HCO manager reacting to 
feedback given by the inspection 
team 
    Emotions   Emotions that arise during the 
meeting, the difficulty of 
managing emotions 
  Type and 
content of 
feedback 
      
    Perceived 
credibility  
  How interviewees perceived the 
feedback in terms of credibility. 
Did they perceive it as 
substantiated? 
    Fair and 
balanced 
content 
  Whether interviewees perceived 
the feedback as fair and 
balanced, i.e. it included a fair 
proportion of positive and 
negative findings 
    Focus on 
negative 
aspects 
  Whether interviewees perceived 
the feedback as too negative 




  Whether interviewees perceived 
the findings as inaccurate or not 
contextualised 
205 




  Whether interviewees perceived 
the recommendations or 
proposed actions as realistic, 
useful and constructive 




    Any discrepancies that 
interviewees noticed between 
the feedback and the later 
inspection report 
    Oral feedback 
more positive 
than the report 
    





    Whether and why interviewees 
made notes during inspections 
and or debriefing 
    Making notes 
during 
inspection 
    
    Actively seeking 
advice 
  HCO manager are actively 
seeking advice from the 
inspection team 
    Making notes 
during 
debriefing 
    
Immediate 
action  
      Suggestions and indication that 
immediate action was required 
and or implemented after the 
inspection 
  Management 
letters 
    Management letters or assurance 
letters which HIW issues to HCOs  
    No letter = 
positive result 
  The absence of a 
management/assurance letter is 
considered as a sign that the 
inspection findings were rather 
positive. Vice versa is the number 
of management letters received 
by a Local Health Board 















    Suggestions and indication that 






      The preparation and publication 
of inspection reports, including 
the submission of draft reports to 
the HCO for accuracy check 
  Process and 
targets 
    How the reporting process is 
organised and HIW time targets 
    At HIW   The reporting process and targets 









































    At the 
healthcare 
organisation 
  The receipt of the draft report at 
the HCO and how it is processed 
internally 





    at which audience are the 
inspection reports targeted and 
which mechanisms are presumed  
  Reading and 
readability 
  Who reads the reports, do style 
and language support readability 
  Traffic lights, 
scores (reducing 
complexity) 
    
    Format, 
structure 
    
    Government 
reading reports 
    








      
  Findings 
substantiated 
  Interviewees perceive the 
findings as substantiated and 
justified - or not 
  Recommendatio
ns perceived as 
good advice 
  Interviewees perceive the 
recommendations as 'good 
advice' 
  Recommendatio
ns perceived as 
unrealistic 
  Interviewees perceive the 
recommendations as unrealistic 
  Unidentified 
shortcomings 
  HIW failed to identify / report a 
non-compliance issue / 
shortcoming at the hospital 
  Many, detailed 
recommendatio
ns 
    
  Accuracy and 
QA 
  
    How does HIW make sure that 
the reports are accurate 
  Role of peer 
reviewers 
  The role of peer reviewers in the 
reporting process 




    Delays in publishing the 
inspection reports on HIWs 
website 
  Causes of delays   What have been the (presumed) 
causes of the delays 
  Impact of delays   What (potential or real) impact 
did the delayed reports have 




      
  HIW Website   Perceived user-friendliness or 
unfriendliness of HIW website 
  (perceived) 
Positive reports  
  What are the reaction of HCO 
professionals and managers 
concerning inspection reports 
that they consider as positive for 











































    (perceived) 
negative reports  
  What are the reaction of HCO 
professionals and managers 
concerning inspection reports 
that they consider as negative for 
them or their reputation 
    Sharing good 
practice 
  How good practice examples - 
mentioned in inspection reports -  
are shared across different HCOs 
    Photographs    Role of photographs published in 
Cleanliness reports 
    HIW visibility in 
the media 
  How far is HIW visible in the 
media and thus create the 
impression that an inspection is 
likely any time (-> alerts 
hospitals) 
    Media focus on 
negative 
findings 
  Interviewees referring to the 
general focus on negative news in 
the media. I.e. positive inspection 






        
How and who 
develops 
    How and who within the HCO 
coordinates and develops the 
action plan 
  Consenting 
internally 
  the process how action plans are 
consented inside the HCO 
    Too many 
(fragmentation), 
losing sight 
  Interviewees referring to too 
many action plans, instead of an 
integrated plan and that the 
action plan alone does not mean 
implementation 
  When 
developed 
    When the HCO starts developing 
the action plan 
    after onsite 
inspection  
    
    after receipt of 
inspection 
report 
    
  Meaningful 
action plans 
    Interviewees referring to the 




    Interviewees referring to the 
implementation of action plans 
and factors which might impede 
implementation 
  Publication of 
action plans 
(HIW website) 
    Action plans should be published 
alongside the inspection reports, 





        
Whose role is 
follow up? 
      
Follow up by 
HIW 
      
    No follow up by 
HIW 








    so called 'Follow 
up'  
  Follow up inspections in 2014 - 
due to lost reports/HIW 
reorganisation 
    Unannounced 
or announced 
  Whether follow-up inspections 
were announced or unannounced 
and whether this makes a 
difference 
    Part of next 
routine 
inspection 
  Embedding follow up into the 
subsequent routine inspection  




    How HCOs monitor 
implementation of action plans 





        
Enforcement 
powers  
    The formal enforcement powers 
that HIW has 
  Difference NHS - 
independent 
sector 
   HIW's enforcement role in the 
independent sector compared to 
its power over NHS  
    Examples   Cases where HIW used its 
enforcement powers 
    More 
enforcement 
necessary? 
  The question interviews raised or 
answered as to whether HIW 
needs to have more enforcement 
power and or execute more 
enforcement 
  Informal 
mechanisms 
  
    Any informal mechanisms HIW 
uses to make HCO implement 
corrective actions etc. 
  Examples   Cases where HIW used informal 
mechanisms 




    The formal and informal process 
of informing the government and 
escalating  
  Tripartite 
meetings 
  Tripartite meetings between 
HIW, the Welsh Government and 
the Welsh Audit Office as part of 









    HIWs inspections and inspection 
reports helped to sway the 
decision / argument 
  For a particular 
stakeholder 
group 
  HIWs inspections and inspection 
reports were used to convince or 
persuade a particular stakeholder 
group 
  HIW findings = 
impartial 
evidence 
  HIW findings were valued 
because they were considered as 
impartial evidence 
    Additional 
weight 
  HIW findings were valued as they 
were adding weight to an existing 
cause 
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    Tried before, 
but not 
successful 
  Cases where interviewees had 
tried to improve the situation, 
but were unsuccessful - before 
HIW inspection 
    Reallocation of 
funds, change in 
priorities 
  HIW's inspection report led to a 
change in the priorities of actions 
and reallocation of funds 
(towards the implementation of 
the recommendations) 







      
  Mental 
healthcare 
inspections 
  Reference was made to HIW's 




  this includes improvement of 
furniture, sanitation, floors, walls, 
curtains, hearing loops 
  Behaviour 
changes 
  This includes changes for 
exchange hand hygiene, 
communication with patients 
  Service 
improvement 
  This includes improvement of 
patient experience, clinical 
effectiveness etc. 






      
  Lack of financial 
resources 
  Lack of financial resources or not 
sufficient value for money 
associated with the investment 




  Interviewees referred to a lack of 
leadership or the organisational 
culture which was not conducive 
for change 
  Reluctance to 
accept and act 
upon negative 
findings 
  Interviewees seemed reluctant to 
accept the findings and 
recommendations for corrective 
actions because considered the 
findings as not based on evidence 
and best practice criteria, or they 
considered them as not 
significant and not systemic. 
    Perceived lack 
of power to 
effect change  
  Interviewees feel that they lack 
the power/authority to effect 
change 
  Frontline 
hospital staff 
    What impact HIW inspections 
have on frontline hospital staff 
    Become more 
familiar, less 
frightened 
  Being frequently exposed to 
inspections makes staff less 
frightened 
    Intimidated / 
frustrated / 
desensitised 
  Frequent inspections intimidate 
staff and frequent, negative 
inspection results frustrate and 
desensitise them 
    Understanding 
the rationale, 
positive attitude 
  When frontline staff is explained 
the rationale of inspections, they 
understand the importance and 
develop a positive attitude 
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  Senior managers try to prepare 
frontline staff for an inspection 
and provide moral support during 
the inspection  







    HIW inspections identify non-
compliance issues 
  Known to senior 
manager but 
not acted upon 
  Senior managers have been 
aware of the shortcomings 
before HIW identified the issue, 
but have not acted upon  
  Known to senior 
manager - 
action started 
  Senior managers have been 
aware of the shortcomings 
before HIW identified the issue 
and initiated action. But the 
action is not completed yet. 
  Not known to 
senior managers 
    




  The HCO quality committee 
reviews HIW inspection reports 
and identifies systemic issues 






    HCOs read inspection reports of 
other HCOs, learn and improve 




  HCO try to avoid making the 
same mistakes (preventative 
effect) 




  Learning from best practice of 
other HCOs 




    Inspections disrupt the care 
process at the inspected hospital 
ward / department 
  Less time for 
patients during 
inspection 
  HCO staff have less time for the 
patients 




  The disruption causes mistakes / 
medical errors 





    Impact that HIWs inspection 
reports have on patients and 
relatives 





  Patients and relatives take 
informed decisions as to which 
hospital to choose based on HIWs 
findings (inspection reports) 
  No choice 
anyway 
  Patients and relatives in the NHS 
in Wales have no choice of 
hospital 
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    Patients 
(temporarily) 
unsettled 
  NHS patients are temporarily 
unsettled 
  Government 
actions 
    The Welsh government takes 





    Recommendations that 
interviewees make concerning 
changes in HIWs inspection 
regime and or the quality 






Appendix 8 Example of coded interview transcript 
 
  
213 
 
214 
 
